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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Amartya Sen has made many important contributions to the development of the 
theory of rational choice. One of those contributions was his introduction, in the 
early seventies, of individual rights into the formal analysis of processes of 
collective decision-making. Sen formulated individual rights in terms of properties 
of specific decision procedures and showed that it is impossible to define decision 
procedures which satisfy both a very mild assumption about the rights of 
individuals and the Pareto-condition - the condition which states that an alternative 
may not be chosen whenever there is another alternative unanimously preferred to 
it. The assumption about the rights of individuals was defended as a necessary 
requirement of any theory of liberalism. The impossibility theorem became 
therefore known as the 'impossibility of the Paretian liberal' or simply as 'Sen's 
liberal paradox'.' Alan Gibbard [1974] extended Sen's framework in an interesting 
way. He defined conditions of liberalism which are logically stronger than Sen's but 
which, as Gibbard argued, are perfectly in line with Sen's notion of individual 
rights. He showed that these conditions cannot be satisfied by any decision 
procedure, not even when the Pareto-condition is dropped. This result became 
known as 'Gibbard's paradox'. In this introductory chapter we shall describe the 
We use the Icnn rational choice theory to refer to formal theories of individual and collective 
decision-making. Rational choice theory encompasses social choice theory, which focuses especially on 
the procedural aspects of collective decision-making, as well as game theory which is concerned with the 
strategic aspects of decision-making For introductions to and overviews of the theory of social choice, 
see [Kelly, 1978], [Sen, 1986] and [Slorcken en Dc Swart, 1992]. [Luce and Raiffa, 1957] is the classic 
introduction to game theory. (Shubik, 1982] is a more recent introduction. [Pattanaik, 1978], [Moulin, 
1983] and [Pclcg, 1984] border on the frontiers between game theory and social choice theory. 
In our exposition of Sen's contribution to the study of the concepts of freedom and liberalism we 
concentrate on his formal analysis. For a general overview of Sen's work in this area, see [Dc Beus, 
1989]. 
-J 
Wc shall follow the terminology of the original statement of the paradox and speak about 
'liberalism'. However, Sen [1976] later preferred ihc term 'libertarianism'. In Sen ( 1983] Sen decided 
that neither liberalism nor libertarianism were satisfactory and formulated the paradox as a tension 
between liberty and the Pareto-condition 
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theoretical background of our study. Since the two liberal paradoxes are important 
parts of that background, we shall present Sen's liberal paradox in section 1 and 
Gibbard's paradox in section 2 of this introductory chapter. 
The two liberal paradoxes provoked many reactions.4 First of all, it has been 
argued that they do not only have relevance for the theory of liberalism, but also for 
other topics. For example, Gardenfors and Pettit [1989] broadened the meaning of 
Sen's liberal paradox by showing that it can be applied to the theory of represen-
tation as well. Batra and Pattanaik [ 1972] have extended the framework to 
incorporate group rights in the context of theories of federalism. Others have 
explored ways to escape the impossibility results by weakening one or more of the 
assumptions. In this direction, a fruitful line of research has been the one in which 
restrictions on the preferences of the individuals were examined. Whereas these 
two lines of investigation - extensions and restrictions - take the conceptual 
framework as introduced by Sen as their basis, there have also been authors who 
maintained that the framework of the theory of social choice, in which individual 
rights are defined in terms of the preferences of individuals, does not capture the 
notion of individual rights adequately and that a game-theoretic framework would 
be more suitable. Recently, a forceful and cogent argument for the game-theoretic 
approach has been given in a article written by Wulf Gaertner, Prasanta Pattanaik 
and Kotaro Suzumura. In section 1.3 we shall outline their main arguments. In a 
discussion of Sen's response to those arguments we argue that it can be concluded 
that the game-theoretic approach is in many circumstances indeed a more 
appropriate way of analysing individual rights. However, as we shall see in sections 
1.4 and 1.5, those game-theoretic approaches also have their disadvantages. In 
particular, they lack a firm foundation. One of the objects of this study is to provide 
such a foundation. 
In doing so we shall use insights from deontic logic. Deontic logic is the formal 
study of the logical relationships between such concepts as permissions, obligations, 
rights, etc. With a few exceptions, theorists in the field of rational choice have 
[Sen, 1976] [Sen, 1983] [Wnglesworth, 1985] conlam overviews of the literature. 
For an extensive overview of this research see [Wnglesworth, 1985]. 
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neglected the formal studies of individual rights of logicians, and, conversely, the 
debate among rational choice theorists did not have much impact on the 
development of deontic logic. In section 1.6 it is hypothesized that the insights 
offered by deontic logic may be used to solve the problems connected with the 
game-theoretic approach of analysing rights, and, furthermore, that the insights 
offered by game-theoretical analyses can be fruitfully incorporated in deontic logic. 
Whereas the first six sections of this chapter provide the theoretical background of 
the problems which we investigate in this thesis, the last section describes the 
objects of our study and the plan of this book. 
1.1 Sen's notion of liberalism is based on the idea that each individual has a 
protected sphere: there are things in the life of a person with regard to which that 
individual should be free to do whatever he or she likes. If John wants to read a 
book, eat candy, play soccer, watch a movie, etc., then John may do those things 
regardless of the opinions which the other members of society have about those 
activities. In the social choice theoretic framework of Sen, this idea is expressed in 
terms of the decisiveness of individuals with respect to social states. 
A social state is a complete description of a state of affairs. Let X+ denote the set 
of all social states. The set is assumed to be finite. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
individuals do not always make decisions about the set of all social states, but that 
sometimes a proper subset of X+ is presented for choice. We shall call the set of 
social states which are presented for choice the issue, its elements are called 
available social states. Any non-empty subset of X+ can be an issue. A Group 
Decision Procedure (GDP) is a decision mechanism which assigns to an issue and 
an и-tuple of preference orderings (n > 2) over the set of all social states (one 
ordering for each individual) at least one element of the issue. If the GDP can 
take any logically possible issue and η-tuple of individual preference orderings as 
its input, it is said to satisfy the condition of universal domain (UD). 
Ail ordering is a reflexive, complcle and transitive binary relation (see definition 7*2.3). 
4 Rights, Liberalism and Social Choice 
On the basis of their preferences regarding the set of social states X+ individuals 
make a social choice, i.e., they choose one of the available social states. A group 
of individuals is called decisive over a set [x,y) of social states (x * y) if the social 
state y will never be chosen when χ is available and when all members of the group 
strictly prefer χ to y and, vice versa, if χ will never be chosen when y is available 
and when all group members strictly prefer y to дг. Sen's condition of liberalism 
says that 
(S) For every individual i there are social states χ and у such that {i} is 
decisive over {x,y}. 
The liberal paradox formulated by Sen expresses a tension between principle 5 and 
the (weak) Pareto-condition: 
(PAR) The group of all individuals is decisive over every pair of social states. 
According to the Pareto-condition, if everybody strictly prefers a social state J: to a 
social state y, then у should not be chosen when χ is available. 
We can now formulate Sen's liberal paradox. It states that 
There does not exist a GDP which satisfies UD, S and PAR? 
Example To illustrate the paradox let society consist of two individuals. Person 1 
is a conformist, whereas person 2 is a non-conformist. They have to make a choice 
about the set of social states [x,y,z,v]. The elements of this issue differ only with 
respect to the colour of the shirts the individuals are wearing: in χ person 1 wears 
blue and person 2 white, in y they both wear white, in ζ person 1 wears white and 
We shall talk about collective decisions in terms of social dûmes lastead of social preferences. 
There are several ways of defining social preferences on the basis of social choices. [Kelly, 1978, p. 20] 
See also [Sen, 1993]. 
e 
The proof is straightforward, cf. [Sen, 1970). Since the idea of the proof is contained in the 
example, we shall omit the proof. 
9 
The example is taken from [Gaertner, Pallanaik. Saumura, 1993]. 
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person 2 wears blue and in ν they both wear blue. For obvious reasons, we write χ 
= (b,w), y = (w,w), г = (w,b) and ν = (b,b). We assume that condition S is satisfied: 
say person 1 is decisive over [(w,w),(b,w)} and person 2 over {(w,w),(wj))}. The 
preferences of the individuals 1 and 2 regarding the social states belonging to the 
issue are (in decreasing order of strict preference), 
1 2 
(w,w) (b,w) 
(b,b) (w,b) 
(b,w) (w,w) 
(w,b) (b,b) 
Thus, person 1 - the conformist - wants to wear white if person 2 wears white and 
blue if person 2 wears blue. Person 2 wants the wear a shirt with a different colour 
than l's: if person 1 wears white he rather wears blue and if 1 wears blue he 
prefers white. 
Since person 1 is decisive over ( (w,w),(b,w)} and since person 1 strictly prefers 
(w,w) to (b,w), the social state (b,w) cannot be chosen. For similar reasons (w,w) 
cannot be chosen: person 2 is decisive over ( (w,w),(w,b)} and strictly prefers (w,b). 
Finally, since both individuals strictly prefer (b,w) to (w,b) and (w,w) to (b,b) the 
Pareto-condition precludes {w,b) and (b,b) from being chosen. Hence, we see that 
every social state is rejected: none of the available social states can be chosen. This 
implies that condition UD is violated: given these individual preferences and this 
issue, a GDP cannot assign an outcome without violating S or PAR. More generally, 
Sen's paradox states that for any GDP there is an issue and a combination of 
individual preference orderings such that the GDP cannot assign an outcome 
without violating PAR or S. 
According to Sen the condition of liberalism is a necessary requirement of any 
theory of liberalism; it is not a sufficient condition. [Sen, 1970, p. 79] [Sen, 1992, 
p. 140] Thus a proposition which states that there exists a decision procedure 
satisfying condition S does not establish the possibility of liberalism; there may be 
other conditions deemed relevant from a liberal point of view which the procedure 
does not satisfy. If the notion of decisiveness correctly represents an individual 
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right, then principle S is very weak indeed. A theory of liberalism implies that 
individuals have several rights and therefore probably also several pairs of social 
states with respect to which an individual is decisive. 
On the other hand, a proposition about the impossibility of defining a decision 
procedure which satisfies condition S and some other normative principle has 
important consequences for the theory of liberalism: if liberalism indeed entails 
condition S, then such an impossibility result states that there is an intrinsic conflict 
between liberalism and this other normative principle, in our case the Pareto-
condition. 
Before we discuss the merits of Sen's analysis of individual rights, we present the 
Gibbard paradox which uses a stronger notion of individual rights than Sen's, but 
which, according to Gibbard, is based on the same idea. 
1.2 Gibbard follows Sen's idea that liberalism demands that each individual should 
have the right to decide some matters on his or her own. Like Sen, he assumes that 
this implies that individuals are decisive with respect to certain pairs of social 
states. However, whereas Sen left the set of social states unspecified and therefore 
left it unclear over which pairs of social states an individual is decisive, Gibbard 
characterizes the set of all social states in a certain way and makes a specific 
assumption regarding the pairs of social states over which individuals are decisive. 
In the example we have already given an impression of the approach taken by 
Gibbard: we wrote a social state as a pair of features. One feature specified the 
colour of l 's shirt, the other that of 2's. In the example we assumed that the social 
states were identical with respect to all further features. Hence, there was no need 
to specify those other features as well. According to Gibbard each social state χ can 
be described as a vector (jr0, Д^, ... , xn) consisting of a public feature characteristic, 
JCQ, and η (я > 2) private feature characteristics: one for each individual. A 
private feature characteristic represents the things about which the individual alone 
decides, e.g., the colour of his or her shirt. The public feature describes those things 
which do not belong to the protected spheres of individuals. If for all Í < η M¡ 
We have simplified Gibbard's definition of an alternative somewhat. See [Gibbard, 1974, p. 390-
1]. 
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denotes the set of all features of type i, then X+ is defined as the Cartesian product 
MQ Χ ... χ M
n
. Gibbard's condition of liberalism consists of two parts: 
(G) For every individual i: (a) M¡ contains at least two elements, and (b) for 
all distinct social states x, y e X+; if χ and y only differ with respect to 
the private feature characteristic of i, then {i} is decisive over {x,y}. 
Obviously, condition G is stronger than condition S: if condition G is satisfied, then 
S is satisfied as well. The converse implication need not be true. Nevertheless, the 
justification of condition 5 also seems to supports G: it invokes the idea that each 
individual has a protected sphere in which he alone has the right to decide what 
happens. 
Gibbard's paradox states that 
There does not exist a GDP satisfying UD and G. 
To illustrate the Gibbard paradox we take the same example of the right to 
determine the colour of one's shirt. To facilitate matters, we assume that a social 
state is completely described by the colour of the shirts of the individuals 1 and 2, 
i.e., A/Q and M¡ for ƒ > 2 are assumed to be empty. Hence, we can still write those 
social states as ordered pairs in which the first feature represents the colour of 
person l 's shirt and the second the colour of person 2's shirt. Applying part (b) of 
the condition, we see that person 1 is decisive over [(w,w),(b,w)} and {(b,b),(w,b)}, 
and that the other individual is decisive over {(b,w),(b,b) ) and {(w,b),(w,w) ). 
Looking at the preference profile described in the example, it is easily checked that 
none of the social states can be chosen. Social state (w,w) is rejected since person 2 
strictly prefers (w,b) and since he is decisive over {(w,w),(w,b)\. Similarly, his 
decisiveness for {(b,b),(b,w) ) and his preferences exclude (b,b). Furthermore, person 
l's decisiveness over the sets ((w,w),(b,w)} and ((b,b),(w,b)} implies in this 
situation that neither (b,w) nor (w,b) can be chosen: the conformist 1 strictly prefers 
(w,w) to (b,w) and (b,b) to (w,b). Hence, none of the social states can be chosen, 
which violates UD. Or, stated differently, one cannot choose an element from this 
issue without violating condition G. 
δ 
Rights, Liberalism and Social Choice 
1.3 Over the more than two decades that have passed since Sen first published his 
liberal paradox, there has been much discussion of Sen's and Gibbard's 
formalization of individual rights. The critique has recently culminated in an 
important article by Wulf Gaertner, Prasanta Pattanaik and Kotaro Suzumura 
(henceforth: GPS). Like many authors before them, they argue that the decisiveness 
concept does not capture the notion of individual rights adequately and that a game-
theoretic approach would be more appropriate. One of their arguments questions 
the reasonableness of condition S and, by consequence, also the reasonableness of 
the stronger condition G. Their other arguments are concerned with condition G. 
Since condition G is logically stronger than condition S, these arguments do not 
directly go against the latter condition. However, GPS maintain, like Gibbard 
himself, that Gibbard's condition is based on the same idea as Sen's, i.e., the notion 
of a protected sphere, and that, consequently, their critique on G also entails a 
critique of S. 
In each of their arguments the social choice view on rights is contrasted with the 
intuition that if an individual has a right, for instance the right to choose one's own 
clothes, then he is able to fix a particular feature, i.e., the colour of one's shirt, of 
the social state. After all individuals have (or have not) exercised their rights, that 
is, have fixed features of the social state, a social choice mechanism decides about 
the character of the features which have been left unspecified. Applying this 
intuitive conception to the example we see that each individual decides on his own 
what shirt he will wear. Since it was assumed that a social state is completely 
specified by the colour of the shirts, there are no further choices left to make. 
The first point of critique of condition S formulated by GPS is as follows. Given 
the intuitive conception, assume that the two individuals, in their choice for one of 
the four available social states, are completely ignorant of each other's preferences 
or choices. Thus, person 1 has to fix his private characteristic feature without any 
information about the other feature. Similarly, when making his decision about his 
1 1
 Cf. [Bernhob, 1974] [BeriihoU, 1975], (Fine, 1975]. [Aldnch, 1977], [Gardeiifors, 1981], 
(Gibbard, 1982], [Sugdcn, 1985], [Barry, 1986], (Giglioni, 1988], [Deb, 1990], [Suzumura, 1991], 
(Gaertner, 1992]. 
1 2
 See [Nozick, 1974, p. 166]. 
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own shirt, person 2 does not know anything about what person 1 will do. In 
situations of uncertainty there are several courses of action open to the individuals. 
One rule of behaviour is the 'maximin'-principle: the individuals choose the course 
of action which avoids the outcome they find worst. Given the preferences 
described, person 1 wants most of all to avoid the situation (w,b). If he chooses to 
wear blue, he will be certain that this outcome will not result. Person 2 can avoid 
his worst outcome, (b,b), by choosing white. Thus, if they both adopt the maximin-
principle, the outcome (b,w) results. Clearly, under the intuitive conception, this 
outcome is the result of freely made individual choices: the rights of the individuals 
have in no way been violated. Now consider condition 5. According to this 
condition, person 1 is decisive over at least one pair of social states. Assume that -
like in the example - {(w,w),(b,w) } is a set for which person 1 is decisive. (As seen 
above, condition G also implies that person 1 is decisive over this set.) Since person 
1 strictly prefers (w,w) to (b,w), condition S (and also G) implies that (b,w) cannot 
be chosen. However, we have just seen that (b,w) is the result of the free choices 
made by the individuals, if both adopt the maximin-principle. Hence, either our 
intuitions about the notion of individual rights are incorrect or condition S (and by 
consequence G) does not correctly describe individual rights. " 
In his reply to this criticism Sen remarks that one should distinguish social choices 
based on individual choices (CC) from social choices based on individual desires 
(CD). On the CC-interpretation, saying that a person strictly prefers a social state χ 
to a social state y implies that the individual will not choose y when χ can be 
chosen. In the CD-case it means that the person desires χ more than y. According to 
Sen, the argument of GPS 
'brings out the tension between two different interpretations of ML [= 5] in 
terms of choice and desire, respectively. If person 1, guided by maximin 
rationality (or some other decision rule), opts for a blue shirt, his choice-based 
liberty over the pair ( (w,w),(b,w)} is not contradicted since he did not choose 
to exercise his right to knock out (b,w) in favour of (w,w). But as far as his 
" As GPS claim [GPS, 1992, ρ 166], the argument docs not depend on the rule of behaviour which 
individuals adopt in situations of uncertainty For any rule it is possible to construct a choice situation in 
which the free choices made by the individuals lead to an outcome that condition S and С exclude. 
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desire is concerned, the fact remains that he did desire to have (w,w) over 
(¿>,w), even though he did choose b. So, if we take individual preferences P¡ in 
the desire sense (case CD), there is a violation of his liberty in this sense, 
despite there being no such violation in the choice sense (case CC).' [Sen, 
1992, p. 148] 
On Sen's view, GPS's example does contain a violation of an individual right on 
the desire interpretation of individual preferences (CD). GPS's appeal to the 
intuition that such a violation does not exist implies that, in this case, the choice 
interpretation of individual preferences, CC, would be more suitable. On this choice 
interpretation the example of GPS does not describe a violation of an individual 
right: not exercising a right does not imply not having that right. 
The general question then is: what kind of perspective is best suited for an analysis 
of individual rights, CD or CC? [Sen, 1992, p. 149] Sen concedes that even though 
there are circumstances in which the desire perspective seems to be more 
appropriate, the choice perspective still 'has obvious merits' in many circumstances. 
[Sen, 1992, p. 149| Furthermore, even in circumstances in which the desire 
perspective is more suitable, one can question whether condition S stands for the 
concern for individual rights or for some other normative principle. To discuss only 
one of Sen's arguments against the CC-view, consider the existence of choice 
inhibition which, for example, occurs in the situation in which someone - due to 
some external reason like peer pressure - makes choices which are not in line with 
his or her preferences: although I really would like to do χ and although I have the 
power to do so, I abstain from doing it because I am afraid of what the others 
might think. In our opinion this is not an instance of a violation of my right to do 
x. It merely shows that, apart from respect for individual rights, there may be other 
normative considerations, for instance individual autonomy, which are relevant in 
making decisions. Defining individual rights in terms of individual choices does not 
preclude that a desire-perspective on individual preferences is needed to take 
account of these other considerations. 
Furthermore, even on the choice-perspective, i.e., when one relates rights to 
individual choices, one might question whether the notion of individual decisiveness 
Chapter 1 introduction 11 
is most suited to formalize individual rights. Why not simply use the conceptual 
apparatus which is best suited for the analysis of the interplay between individual 
and collective choices: game theory? Moreover, the distinction made in game theory 
between the choices (strategies) of people on the one hand and their desire-related 
preferences on the other makes it possible to take account of normative principles 
which, as shown above, need information about both the individual choices and 
desire-related preferences. 
GPS's other two arguments focus on condition G. Firstly, consider individual 1. 
Again take the intuitive conception of rights: he alone chooses to wear white or 
blue. This implies that he can make sure that, by choosing blue, either the outcome 
(b,b) or (b,w) results, or by choosing white, that either (νν,ή) or (w,w) results. He 
can, however, not make sure that the outcome will always be in the set 
{(b,w),(w,b) ) . Yet, given the individual preferences described in the example, 
condition G accords person 1 with precisely that power. Thus, once more we see 
that the intuitive conception of an individual right does not correspond with the 
formalization of a right in terms of decisiveness. 
GPS's third argument makes use of the Gibbard-paradox. As we have seen, there is 
no group decision procedure which can pick one of the outcomes without violating 
condition G. However, it seems counterintuitive to conclude that in this example an 
individual right to choose the colour of one's shirt has been violated: each of the 
individuals has decided on his own what colour to wear. For liberals, and 
undoubtedly also for many non-liberals, the Gibbard-paradox probably has all the 
characteristics of a real paradox, i.e., a seemingly selfcontradictory statement. 
GPS have argued that the two points of critique which were raised against condition 
G also apply to condition S, since they are both based on the same idea. We shall 
not discuss this claim. We conclude our discussion of conditions S and G, 
however, by noting that the arguments of GPS raise serious doubts about both 
conditions. The defence given by Sen against the First argument does not show that 
the criticism is incorrect. Sen admits that a choice-interpretation of individual 
1 4
 Sen himself denies this. [Sen, 1992, p. 150) 
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preferences is in many circumstances adequate for the analysis of individual rights. 
As we shall see in the next section, a game-theoretic approach is a more convenient 
way of modelling individual choices. Moreover, we conjectured that a desire-
interpretation entails additional normative principles - principles which may go 
beyond the conception of minimal liberalism underlying condition S. 
Furthermore, condition G does not only seem to be too strong (as the Gibbard-
paradox shows), it also seems to go against our intuition about what it means to 
have an individual right. Gibbard himself has later abandoned the formalization of 
individual rights in terms of decisiveness. As he stated it: 
'These liberal paradoxes carry, with them, then, an air of sophistry: they must 
in some way be creating problems that do not really exist. (...) To talk about 
the paradoxes, then, is to explore the role of one kind of mathematics in 
thought about social norms and organization. What is it about the 
mathematical apparatus of social choice theory that apparently so misapplies 
to questions of liberty?' [Gibbard, 1982, 597-598J 
In the next section we shall present game-theoretic models for the analysis of 
individual rights, models which are not subject to the points of critique raised 
against the social choice theoretic approach. In our treatment of those models we 
shall not go into the question of the compatibility of principles of liberalism with 
the Pareto-condition. Such a discussion will be postponed until chapter 7. However, 
we can already note that the tension between individual rights and the Pareto-
condition does not disappear when we switch to a game-theoretic framework. 
Therefore, and contrary to Gibbard's remark above, we believe that the Sen's liberal 
paradox reveals a genuine problem. There does exist a tension between the Pareto-
condition and principles of liberalism. 
1.4 The game-theoretic approach originates in the intuitive conception of rights 
described in the previous section. My choice to wear a blue shirt fixes a certain 
feature of the social state: the feature which describes the colour of my shirt. The 
way I exercise my other rights also determines features of the social state which 
will eventually result; it determines whether it will be one in which I organize a 
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party, smoke cigarettes, eat junk food, etc. Similarly, the way other people exercise 
their rights determines other aspects of the social outcome. In sum, the combination 
of all such individual choices determines to a large extent the characteristics of the 
social state that will be chosen. If there are any aspects of the social states which 
are not yet specified in this way, social choice mechanisms come into play. Such 
mechanisms pick an outcome from the set of social states which remain after 
people have exercised their rights. [Suzumura, 1991, 229-230] This idea of rights as 
constraints [Sen, 1976] [Sen, 1982] has been formulated game-theoretically in 
different ways. 
Peter Gärdenfors [1981] has defined individual rights in terms of effectivity 
functions. An individual is effective for a set of social states if he or she can make 
sure that the outcome of a decision process belongs to that set. An effectivity 
function specifies for each individual the sets for which the individual is effective. 
In this framework, a person exercises his or her rights by choosing one of those 
sets. The social choice will be an element of this set because after each individual 
has exercised his or her rights, society will choose an element which is in the (by 
assumption non-empty) intersection of all the chosen sets. To illustrate this, 
consider the example of section 1.3 again. Individual 1 can make sure that a social 
state results in which he wears blue. Hence, he is effective for a set which contains 
only social states in which he wears blue: [(b,w),(b,b)}. Similarly, since he also has 
the right to wear white he is effective for the set {(w,w),(w,b)}. In the same way, 
we see that individual 2 is effective for the set ( (b,w),(w,w)} of social states in 
which he wears white and for the set {(w,b),(b,b)} of social states in which he 
wears blue. If individual 1 chooses to wear white, i.e., chooses the set [(w,w),(w,b)} 
and if individual 2 chooses blue and therefore the set \(w,b),(b,b)}, the result of 
these acts of rights-exercising will be that the social state will belong to the set 
((w,w),(w,b)} (~Ì [(w,b),(b,b)} = [{w,b)}. In this case there are no further choices 
left to make (remember that we have assumed that a social state was completely 
specified by the colour of the shirts of the individuals): the social choice is (w,b). 
Usually, effectivity functions are associated with decision situations. [Peleg, 1984] 
[Abdou and Keiding, 1991J Given a particular decision situation, one derives an 
effectivity function. In Gärdenfors' framework it is left unspecified from which 
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decision situation the effectivity function is derived. This poses certain problems. 
Consider, for example, the 'condition of consistency' which Gärdenfors assumes to 
be satisfied by each effectivity function describing rights. This condition demands 
that if one individual is effective for a set A and another for a set B, then the 
intersection of these two sets will be non-empty. Whereas this condition seems 
reasonable in circumstances in which a right is always accompanied by a 
corresponding power, it need not be so if that is not the case: I have the right to be 
prime minister of the Netherlands, my colleague has the right to be prime minister 
of the Netherlands, yet we cannot be prime minister at the same time. Thus, to 
judge the appropriateness of conditions imposed on effectivity functions we have to 
go beyond the function and look at the decision situation from which it is derived. 
1.5 A possible way of looking directly at decision situations is through the use of 
game forms. The modelling of rights through the use of game forms is an approach 
which has been explored by many authors. In our exposition we follow GPS. In the 
game form approach individual rights are understood in terms of specific game 
forms. A game form is a specification of 
(1) a set of outcomes; 
(2) a set of strategies for each individual; 
(3) an outcome mapping which assigns exactly one outcome to each combination 
of individual strategies (one strategy for each individual). 
Game forms are used to specify the individual rights: 
'The content of individual rights in this framework lies in a specification of 
the admissible strategies for each player (...), and the complete freedom of 
each player to choose any of the admissible strategies and/or the obligation of 
the agents not to choose a non-admissible strategy'. [GPS, 1992, p. 173] Cf. 
[Suzumura, 1991, p. 229] 
To illustrate, consider the shirt example again. The two individuals each have two 
admissible strategies: wearing a white shirt or wearing a blue one. The relation 
between the outcomes and their strategies is obvious. If 1 chooses white and 2 blue, 
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(w,b) results. If they both choose white, (w,w) results, etc. The game form approach 
avoids the problem of the effectivity approach. It is clear what the decision situation 
is from which the rights of the individual are derived: it is precisely that decision 
situation which the game form describes. 
The close relation between the effectivity approach and the game form approach 
follows from the possibility of associating effectivity functions with game 
forms. For example, one can say that an individual is effective for a set of 
social states if and only if the individual has an admissible strategy which leads to 
an element of the set, regardless of the admissible strategies chosen by the others. If 
individual 1 chooses white, either (w,b) or (νν,νν) will result. Hence, the individual is 
effective for the set {(w,b),(w,w)}. 
The examples given by GPS seem to assume that the admissible strategies of the 
individuals are always feasible strategies, i.e., strategies which the individuals 
actually can adopt. [GPS, 1992, p. 169] See also [Suzumura, 1991]. Obviously, this 
is a rather restrictive assumption. There are many admissible strategies which are 
not feasible. For instance, an individual can, apart from his admissible strategies 
'white' and 'blue', also have the non-admissible but feasible strategy 'steal the other 
person's white shirt'. Now, this strategy does not change the right of the victim to 
wear a white shirt. Intuitively, the fact that another person has the possibility of 
choosing a non-admissible strategy does not change the admissibility of a strategy. 
It can, however, affect its feasibility; if my shirt is stolen, then I cannot wear it. 
Yet, even when I cannot wear a white shirt because it is stolen, I may still have the 
permission to wear it. The question naturally arises whether it is possible to define 
game forms in which individuals have admissible strategies which are not feasible. 
As we saw in our discussion of effectivity functions, this might imply the existence 
of game forms with which effectivity functions are associated which violate the 
condition of consistency. However, it is easily checked that such game forms are 
Note, by die way, that an effectivity function cannot be described as a game form since the 
intersection of the individual strategics need not always yield a one-element set. 
For a detailed and systematic account of the relationship between game forms and effectivity 
functions in the context of the analysis of rights, see [Deb, 1993]. 
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logically impossible. Thus, in order to analyse choices that are admissible but 
not feasible, the game-theoretic framework of GPS needs to be extended. 
To conclude the preceding sections, we can say that the game-theoretic approach 
has important advantages compared to Sen's and Gibbard's social choice approach. 
It is easily seen that the three problems which flawed the social choice approach do 
not trouble the game-theoretic approach. However, the game-theoretic approach has 
limitations as well. Firstly, it is safe to say that much of the work in this area is 
largely aimed at showing the inadequacy of the Sen-approach through the use of 
specific examples. Obviously, there is nothing wrong with this approach: to show 
that a theory is incorrect, counterexamples suffice. However, in establishing an 
alternative framework we have to go beyond specific examples. With the exception 
of the pioneering work of Gardenfors, the important recent work of Deb [1990] 
11994] and GPS, this route has not been much explored yet: the game-theoretic 
approach is 'virtually devoid of general formal axiomatic analysis'. [Deb, 1990, p. 
2] 
Secondly, we saw that both the effectivity approach and the game form approach 
only consider admissible behaviour which is feasible. This means that the individual 
rights are defined in terms of actual control, thereby ignoring rights to which there 
is no corresponding power. It is interesting to examine how admissible strategies 
which are not feasible should be analysed. Rights which are defined in terms of 
such strategies might be called devices of hypothetical control. 
Thirdly, the formal treatments do not yet provide a systematic account and 
categorization of different types of right. Though [Gardenfors, 1981] and [GPS, 
1992] contain important work in this direction, much work still needs to be done. 
[Suzumura, 1991, p. 236] 
Our remarks suggest the following preliminary research questions: 
Is it possible to provide a foundation of the game-theoretic framework of the 
analysis of individual rights? 
Stated formally, any ct-effectivity function associated with a game fonti is always monotonie with 
respect to the players. Sec [Pclcg. 1984, p. 89]. 
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Is it possible to formulate a game-theoretic model of individual rights which 
not only incorporates rights in terms of actual control, but which also takes account 
of rights defined in terms of hypothetical control? How would such a model look 
like? 
Given a game-theoretic model of individual rights, is it possible to give a 
systematic account and categorization of different types of individual rights? 
1.6 It is somewhat surprising that the debate among rational choice theorists about 
the proper formalization of individual rights has so far taken place virtually without 
any reference to the insights of logicians who occupy themselves with the formal 
study of such concepts as norms, permissions, obligations, etc. This branch of logic, 
which became known as 'deontic logic' after Von Wright published an article in 
1951 with the same title, has developed rapidly in the second half of this century. 
18 
We shall not try to provide an overview of the field of deontic logic , but for our 
purposes it is useful, firstly, to mention some lines of research which have been 
explored, and, secondly, to discuss some of the (conceptual) problems related to 
those lines of research. To do so, we shall, first of all, describe briefly the general 
approach taken by many logicians. 
The first step in a logical enquiry is to describe the syntax of the formal language 
one wants to study. The formal language contains the concepts, the logical relations 
of which one wants to investigate. For example, modal logic studies the language 
containing the concepts of 'necessity' and 'possibility', epistemic logic studies the 
language containing the concepts of 'belief' and 'knowledge', etc. In the language 
of deontic logic the two central concepts are Obligation' and 'permission'. The 
syntax of a language describes which expressions in the language can be made 
legitimately and therefore form a 'well formed formula', and which cannot. 
Different types of languages containing normative concepts have been constructed. 
A common characteristic is, however, that formulas of the form Shallcp and Maytp 
(where φ is an expression of the language) are well-formed. These formulas are 
For an excellent survey, see [Âqvisl, 1984]. [Hinlikka, 1971] contains a lucid discussion of some 
of the central topics of deontic logic. 
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interpreted as saying that 'it is obligated that φ' and 'it is permitted that φ' 
respectively. The first line of research that we believe can be useful for the theory 
of rational choice is the categorization of different types of rights in terms of 
formulas of a language of deontic logic. [Kanger, 1971] [Kanger & Kanger, 1966] 
[Lindahl, 1977] For example, the formal language which Kanger and Kanger use 
contains such formulas as 'individual ι shall see to it that χ occurs' and 'individual j 
may see to it that χ occurs' (where χ is a formula describing a state of affairs 
existing between ι and another individual, say j). On the basis of formulas of this 
type, different types of legal relations existing between individuals are 
distinguished. To mention two of those legal relations: person ι is said to have a 
claim versus j with respect to л' if it is the case that j shall see to it that χ occurs, 
and he has a freedom versus j with respect to χ if ί may see to it that χ occurs. 
The second line of research which is important for our purposes is the formulation 
of a semantic theory, i.e., the formulation of a model which is used to determine the 
truth-values of the well-formed formulas of the formal language. Though there are 
important differences with respect to the characteristics of the various semantic 
models used in deontic logic, one can describe them as Kripke systems of possible 
worlds. [Hintikka, 1969, p. 185| [Kanger, 1971] [F0llesdal and Hilpinen, 1971] The 
basic idea is as follows. A possible world is a (partial) description of a state of 
affairs. A model structure of a language of deontic logic consists of a set of 
possible worlds which is structured by a binary relation. The binary relation is 
called a relation of 'deontic alternativeness'. The relation and the description given 
by the possible worlds are used to see which formulas about permissions and 
obligations are true in a particular possible world. We give a rough outline of the 
approach. Given a possible world m, a formula of the type Мауф is said to be true 
in m if and only if φ is true in at least one possible world which is a deontic 
alternative to m. A formula of the type Shallcp is said to be true in m if and only if 
φ is true in all deontic alternatives to m. Although this is a very crude description 
of the Kripke semantics in the context of deontic logic, it already permits some 
inferences. First of all, if we assume that a formula φ is either true or not true in a 
possible world and if we let -φ stand for the negation of the formula φ, we see that 
19 
Kripke's model structure was defined in the context of modal logic. Our account of a model 
structure is based on [Hughes and Crcsswell, 19681. 
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the formula May(p is true in a possible world if and only if Shall-φ is not true in it. 
If ~<p is true in every deontic alternative to m, then φ is false in all its deontic 
alternatives. Hence, Mayq> is not true in m. Conversely, if φ is true in at least one 
deontic alternative, then - φ is not true in that particular deontic alternative. 
Consequently, Shall-φ is not true. Furthermore, it is easily checked that the truth of 
the formula Shall(p in a possible world also entails the truth of the formula Мауф in 
that world: if φ is true in all possible worlds which are deontic alternatives to m 
and if each possible world has at least one deontic alternative, then it is obviously 
also true in at least one deontic alternative to m. 
If specific assumptions are made about the characteristics of the binary relation of 
alternativeness, other logical relationships between the formulas of the language can 
be established. For example, if one assumes the relation to be transitive, i.e., if for 
any possible world m it is true that a deontic alternative to a deontic alternative of 
m is itself also a deontic alternative to m, and if the language permits the iteration 
of the operators May and Shall, then it can be proven that the truth of a formula 
like Shallcp in a world m entails the truth of the formula ShalI(Shall<p) in that world, 
and consequently also the truth of Shall(Shall(Shall(p)), etc. Thus, if the relation is 
transitive, the truth of a statement describing an obligation logically entails the truth 
of the statement describing that that obligation itself is obligated. In general, we see 
that the logical relationships between normative concepts depend for a large part on 
the conditions which the alternativeness relation is assumed to satisfy. Given one or 
more such conditions, the set of all formulas which are true in any model structure 
in which the alternativeness relation satisfies those conditions is called a system of 
logic. Thus we see that the logical relationships existing between the formulas of 
the language are determined by the contents of the possible worlds and by the 
characteristics of the relation of 'alternativeness'. 
Susan Haack [1978, p. 190-11 has distinguished three interpretations of a possible 
world. In the linguistic approach a possible world is a set of formulas satisfying 
some conditions of consistency. The conceptualist approach interprets possible 
worlds as ways of conceiving the world. Finally, in a realist approach possible 
worlds are assumed to refer to entities existing wholly independent from our 
language or thought. Whereas there has been much discussion on the status of a 
possible world, less has been said about that other part of the model structure - the 
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relation of altemativeness. The few remarks which have been made seem most in 
line with the conceptualist approach. [Hintikka, 1971, 70-1J The difficulty in 
interpreting the altemativeness relation is regrettable in so far as it hinders us in 
making judgments about the appropriateness of conditions imposed upon the 
relation. For example, taking the standpoint of a realist, since it is not specified 
what the relation stands for - the relation is a primitive of the model - it is difficult 
to decide what the characteristics of the relation are and, consequently, it is unclear 
which system of logic describes the actual logical relationships between normative 
concepts. If we would have that information, then it would in principle be possible 
to examine whether the relation of altemativeness is, for instance, transitive and, 
consequently, whether an obligation is itself always obligated. 
To summarize the foregoing: we have seen that rights have been defined in terms of 
such deontic concepts as 'permission' and Obligation'. Since we are interested in 
the logical relations existing between legal rights we would like to know whether it 
is possible to specify the relation of altemativeness in such a way that it permits us 
to say anything abouts its characteristics. 
Our remarks about the advantages and disadvantages of game theory on the one 
hand and deontic logic on the other naturally lead to the question whether the two 
theories can be integrated in such a way that the problems which we have described 
can be solved without losing the advantages of each of the approaches. Although 
many deontic logicians have applied game-theoretic concepts in one way or 
another, there has not been a systematic application of game theory to problems 
of deontic logic. An important exception, however, is the work of Lennart Aqvist 
[1974] [1985a] [1985b]. In [Âqvist, 1974] a theory of actions and causality is 
described which takes the game-theoretic notion of a 'game in extensive form' as 
its central concept. Aqvist argued that the approach can also be useful for the 
-" Cf. [Aposlol, 1960] [Von Wright, 1963) |Pöm, 1971] [Pörn, 1977] [Apóstol, 1978] [Bclnap and 
Perloff, 1989]. 
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analysis of deontic notions like obligations and requirements. In [Âqvist, 1985a] this 
claim is further substantiated. 
1.7 To summarize, in the second part of this century many logicians have 
investigated the logic of normative concepts like permissions and obligations. The 
formal theories which have been developed in this area have been more or less 
ignored by rational choice theorists, and, conversely, the debate among rational 
choice theorists did not have much impact on deontic logic. Yet, the overlap in 
issues and the work which has been done on the frontiers of the two theories 
suggest that an integration of the two theories can be fruitful. The central object of 
this study is to argue that a fruitful synthesis of game theory and deontic logic is 
indeed possible. With this purpose in mind, we shall reformulate the preliminary 
questions posed earlier: we require that the questions will be answered through the 
use of insights from deontic logic. Furthermore, we shall not only focus on 
individual rights but also on the rights of collectivities. Hence, the research 
questions which we shall investigate are: 
1. Is it possible, using insights of deontic logic, to provide a foundation of the 
game-theoretic framework of the analysis of individual and collective rights? 
2. ¡s it possible, using insights of deontic logic, to formulate a game-theoretic 
model of individual and collective rights which not only incorporates rights in 
terms of actual control, but which also takes account of rights defined in 
terms of hypothetical control9 What would such a model look like? 
3. Given a game-theoretic model of individual and collective rights and the 
insights of deontic logic, is it possible to give a systematic account and 
categorization of different types of individual and collective rights? 
With respect to the application of deontic logic to rational choice theory the work of Sven Ove 
Hansson deserves attention [Hansson. 1988). He presents a formal model of collective decision-making 
which incorporates concepts from deontic logic in a subtle way. Using definitions of 'legal positions' he 
offers a new interpretation of the liberal paradoxes 
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4. Is it possible to provide a game-theoretic specification of the relation of 
alternativeness used in the Kripke semantics of deontic logic? 
As we shall try to show in the chapters 2 through 6, each of these questions can be 
answered in the positive. Our approach is as follows. In chapter 2 we construct a 
language of deontic logic. In this language one can formulate that individuals have 
permissions and obligations to do (or not to do) things. In chapter 3 we shall 
describe a semantic machinery which can be seen as a Kripke model in which the 
relation of alternativeness is defined game-theoretically. In chapter 4 we shall show 
how the language and semantics can be extended to take account of the permissions 
and obligations of groups of individuals. In chapter 5 it is shown how the semantic 
model is related to effectivity functions. After we have done so, we shall in chapter 
6 introduce formally individual and collective rights into the model. 
In the last two chapters of this thesis we shall discuss the relation between our 
game-theoretic model and the notion of liberalism. In the first place, we shall 
formulate a condition which captures the intuition underlying Sen's en Gibbard's 
conditions of liberalism and impose it on the game-theoretic model. We then ask 
ourselves whether the liberal paradoxes can be 'translated' in game-theoretic terms: 
5. Can the liberal paradoxes he defined in a game-theoretic model of rights, and 
if so, what is the meaning of the paradoxes in such a context? 
After we have investigated this problem in chapter 7, we shall, in chapter 8, 
approach an issue which has come only recently under the attention of social choice 
theorists, viz., the question of how constitutional decision-making, that is, decision-
making about the way society makes its decisions, should be analysed. Since, in our 
framework, a right can be viewed as part of a decision procedure, this question can 
also be seen as a question about how rights should be allocated. Moreover, we try 
to formulate liberal principles of constitutional decision-making. 
6. ¡s it possible to formulate a framework for the analysis of constitutional 
decision-making? In particular, is it possible to analyse the allocation of 
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individual and collective rights? If so, can we define liberal principles of 
constitutional decision-making ? 
In our answer to this question we shall use an extension of Sen's social choice 
theoretic framework. As a consequence, the liberal principles of constitutional 
decision-making which we define bear some resemblance to Sen's and Gibbard's 
principles of liberalism. In fact, as we shall see, we can even define liberal 
paradoxes of constitutional decision-making. In this way we can conclude that 
whereas the game-theoretic approach is more suitable for the analysis of individual 
rights as such, the social choice theoretic framework of Sen (albeit in an extended 
form) is more appropriate for the analysis of the allocation of individual rights. 
At the end of this introductory chapter some remarks about the way this book is 
structured may be in order. Following Sen's method of exposition in [Sen, 1970], 
the book is divided in starred and unstarred chapters. The unstarred chapters present 
the arguments in an informal (sometimes semi-formal) style. Except for this 
introductory chapter, the definitions and arguments described informally in an 
unstarred chapter are presented in a formal manner in the starred counterpart of the 
chapter in question. Whereas we shall sometimes refer in an unstarred chapter to a 
definition or proposition given in a starred chapter, the starred chapters are in 
principle self-contained. 
Chapter 2 
Deontic Logic of Action: The language 
Introduction As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a lively debate in the 
theory of rational choice about the proper formalization and analysis of individual 
rights. Two positions can be distinguished: 
(1) the social choice approach in which the rights of an individual are defined in 
terms of pairs of alternatives with respect to which the individual is decisive; 
(2) game-theoretic approaches in which rights are defined through the use of 
specific types of game-forms. 
It was argued that the game-theoretic approaches are more appropriate. However, 
we also saw that that these game-theoretic models - contrary to the social choice 
framework - lack a firm foundation. [Deb, 1990] In the next three chapters we shall 
try to provide such a foundation. To do so, insights and results of studies of formal 
logic will be used - in particular that branch of logic which occupies itself with 
legal concepts. The way we shall proceed is as follows. First of all, we construct a 
formal language which contains expressions about the behaviour of individuals. 
More precisely, it includes statements about, on the one hand, the actual behaviour 
('/ sees to it that φ') and the potential behaviour ('i' can see to it that φ') of 
individuals, and, on the other hand, the permissibility of actions undertaken by 
individuals ('/ may see to it that φ'). 
As we shall see in chapter 6, on the basis of a specification of the actions that 
individuals are (and are not) permitted to take, it is possible to define distinct types 
of legal relations among individuals. To give only one example, the type of right 
which in jurisprudence is known as a claim is, in the formal language, defined 
along the following lines: ƒ has versus j a claim with respect to a state of affairs 
existing between the individuals ƒ and j if and only if y is obligated to see to it that 
the state of affairs arises. 
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A language is only one aspect of a system of logic. Another feature is the 
semantics, i.e., the procedure through which the truth-value of the statements of the 
language is determined. In the logic of law different types of semantics are used. 
[Kanger, 1972] We shall develop a semantic machinery which is of a game-
theoretic nature. This yields an embedding of systems of rights and liberties in a 
game-theoretic setting, thus providing us with the desired foundation of the formal 
analysis of individual rights. 
The resulting logic will be called the Deontic Logic of Action (DLA). It is a 
deontic logic since it studies normative expressions, and it is a logic of action since 
those deontic notions are used in the context of actions only. 
2.1 The language of DLA contains formulas describing actions taken by one or 
more agents at particular points of time leading to specific states of affairs. Three 
types of descriptions can be distinguished: the performance of an action can be said 
to be actually realized ('John smokes now'), to be merely possible ('John can 
smoke now') or to be permissible ('John may smoke now'). 
For a person to act is, for him or her, to bring about a certain state of affairs: the 
acts of lighting a cigarette and inhaling the smoke bring about the state of affairs in 
which a person is smoking. States of affairs can be generic or individual with 
respect to the dimensions of time and place. [Von Wright, 1968, p. 39-40] The 
statement that John smokes a cigarette at a particular time and place is a description 
of a temporally and spatially individual state of affairs - it can occur only once. On 
the other hand, the temporally and spatially generic state described by the statement 
'John is smoking' is not limited to a certain time or place. It can occur at different 
points in time and at different places. 
The language of DLA is built upon first-order predicate logic. This logic, to which 
we shall refer as the basic logic, is described in Appendix 1. If ψ is a formula of 
the basic logic describing a state of affairs which is temporally generic ('John is 
smoking'), it can only be part of an expression of the language of DLA if it is 
combined with a time-point f : the formula φ = (Λ,ψ), which describes that John 
The name was introduced by Von Wright [Von Wright, I968|. 
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smokes at time t, is a formula of DLA, whereas the expression ψ on its own is 
not/ 
We do not make similar assumptions with respect to the spatial dimension; the 
states of affairs described by formulas of DLA can either be spatially generic or 
spatially individual. Since a state of affairs can be generic in one dimension and 
individual in the other, this implies that a state of affairs described by a formula of 
DLA is either temporally and spatially individual, or temporally individual and 
spatially generic. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that time can be described in terms of points (the time-
points) which are related in a particular way. The symbol 4 ' denotes this relation. 
It can be interpreted as 'earlier than'. For instance, the statement that the state of 
affairs described as (ί,,φ) is located at an earlier point of time than the one 
described as (ί.,ψ) can be formulated as the conjunction of the formulas (ί,,φ), (ί,,ψ) 
and (f, < tj). 
2.2 As stated above, the formulas of DLA describe actions taken by agents. It is 
assumed that agents are subjects who have several courses of action open to them, 
one of which they decide to adopt after an appropriate process of gathering 
information. [Weinberger, 1985, p. 3141 Except for this general remark it is left 
unspecified who the agents i, j , k, ... are. When applying the logic, however, this is 
an important question which should be settled. Two further remarks are in order. In 
the first place, although we shall speak throughout the text about individuals or 
persons performing actions, it is not precluded that an agent is, for example, a state 
or a government. Secondly, even if an individual symbol denotes an individual, care 
should be taken when answering the question who the agents are. Consider, for 
example, statements about the actions of private persons in contrast to their actions 
in the context of an official function. The rights of a judge need not be the same as 
those of citizen J., who happens to be a judge. 
It should be noted that fixing the time of states of affairs does not imply that it is always clear at 
what time the consequences of an action are manifest. In DLA it is still possible to form statements 
which express uncertainty in this respect One can, for instance, forni an expression which states that 
something is the case at /, or ι. 
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The basic structure of the logic DLA does not permit us to analyse cooperation 
between the individuals. In chapter 4 we expand the logic so as to allow the 
analysis of actions taken by collective agents, i.e., coalitions of agents. Specific 
assumptions will be made about the relation between the actions of a coalition and 
the actions possibly taken by the individuals constituting the coalition. The resulting 
logic is denoted DLA*. 
In the language of the deontic logic of action two types of individual symbols are 
distinguished. The first type consists of free individual symbols i, j , k, ... referring 
to actual agents. We use bound individual variables s, t, it, ... when we make 
general remarks about the agents. When we say that a particular individual, say 
John, is doing something, a free individual symbol, for instance /, is used to denote 
this individual. On the other hand, when general remarks are made about 
individuals, e.g. 'Some individuals are smoking', we use one of the bound 
individual variable symbols, say s, and formalize such statements along the lines of 
'There is some s such that s is smoking'. 
In a similar way we distinguish free temporal symbols f,, t¡, r¿, ... and bound 
temporal variables ts, tt, tu, ... . A free temporal symbol denotes a particular point in 
time, whereas the bound temporal variable symbols are used in quantificational 
contexts only. 
2.3 A logic of action should be able to formalize such notions as 'seeing to it' and 
'bringing about'. However, in everyday language these concepts are not always 
used in an unambiguous way. As a consequence, there are different ways of 
incorporating these notions in a formal framework. We shall distinguish two types 
of formal translations of 'seeing to it' or 'bringing about'. One is defined in terms 
of necessary consequences only, whereas the other makes use of counterfactual 
information. 
The action operator Do is used to describe the necessary consequences of a 
person's actions and is called the weak action operator. It is always used in 
connection with a formula φ describing a (temporally specific) state of affairs, an 
individual agent symbol i and a symbol f representing a time-point. A formula of 
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type Do^i ,φ) is called a weak action statement (or Do-statement) of type i/f ·. The 
conjunction of two weak action statements of the same type is also a weak action 
statement of that type, as is the negation of one. 
The formula Do,(f ,φ) can be interpreted as 
φ is necessary for something i does at t ,·; 
/ performs an action at t such that, whatever else may happen, φ is the case; 
For example, if φ = (ί
λ
,ψ) is the state of affairs in which John smokes at time tk, 
and if ( denotes John, and t the point in time at which John lights a cigarette and 
inhales the smoke, the formula Do((r ,φ) states that it is a necessary consequence of 
John's action at time t that he is smoking at time r¿. 
The symbol ' - ' is used to negate a formula. The state of affairs in which John is 
not smoking at time fA can be described by two formulas: -(ί
λ
,ψ) and (ί^,~ψ). As 
we shall see later such formulas are equivalent. 
The formula ~Do;(r ,φ) can be interpreted as 
it is not true that i performs an action at t for which φ is necessary. 
Since it is assumed that not performing an action is also an action, i.e., the action of 
not undertaking any action, it can also be interpreted as 
i performs an action at t for which φ is not necessaiy. 
To say that something is not necessarily the case is not the same as saying that it is 
necessary that it is not the case. Consequently, a statement describing that an agent 
does something for which φ is not necessary, -Do^f ,φ), is not equivalent to the 
statement that the agent does something for which ~φ is necessary. The latter 
statement is formalized as Do,(i ,-φ) which, as we shall see, always implies 
-Do,((.,φ) but is not always implied by it. 
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2.4 Next we introduce the operators 'Can' and 'Must'. The Can-operator expresses 
practical possibility.- It is used in contexts in which a person has the ability and 
the opportunity to perform a particular act. The Can-operator can only be attached 
to action statements. If φ is a weak action statement of type i/t, Cancp is interpreted 
as 
it is possible that φ; 
i has the opportunity and the ability to φ. 
For example, the formula CanDo,(f ,φ) can be interpreted as 'it is possible that, at t¡, 
i performs an action for which φ is necessary' whereas the Can-Do^r ,φ) can be 
interpreted as 'φ is not necessary for something / can do at i,' or 'at t i can perform 
an action such that φ is not necessarily the case'. 
Furthermore, a more complex formula like Сап[Оо,(л,ср) & -Do,(í ,ψ)] can be read 
as 'it is possible that, at t·, i performs an action for which φ is necessary but for 
which ψ is not', or, 'at time t individual / has the ability and the opportunity to 
perform an action which necessitates φ and for which ψ is not necessary'. Remark 
that this differs from saying that [CanDo,(f ,φ) & Can-Do;(í,,ψ)] is the case. The 
latter formula states that there is one action which necessitates φ and one, possibly 
another, which does not necessitate ψ. The formula Can[Do((i φ) & ~Do,(í ,ψ)], on 
the other hand, states that there is exactly one action which has both characteristics. 
The Must-operator is, like the Can-operator, attached to action statements only. If φ 
is a weak action statement of type i/t, Mustcp is interpreted as 
it is necessary that φ; 
/' has the opportunity and the ability to φ but does not have the opportunity 
and the ability to ~φ. 
The operator is used to express that an individual is forced to do a certain thing. 
We shall see that Mustcp if and only if -Can-φ. Thus, a person must see to it that 
3
 The operator Can1' m [Linciarti, 1977. p. 194]. See also [Pom, 1970, ρ 28], [Porn, 1977], [Von 
Wright, 1980]. [Holmstrom-Hiniikka. 1984], IHolmstrom-Hmiikka, 1991]. 
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something is the case if it is not the case that he or she can take an action which 
does not always lead to that situation. 
As our remarks make clear, there is a close analogy between the modalities of 
possibility and necessity and the operators Can and Must. Just like the operators 
Can and Must can be defined in terms of each other, so can something be said to be 
possible if and only if its negation is not necessary. In fact, the operators Can and 
Must can be seen as the modalities of possibility and necessity respectively, applied 
in the context of the logic of action. The action described by a formula Do,(i ,φ) is 
possible if the statement CanDo(<i ,φ) is true, whereas it is necessary if 
MustDo^f ,φ) is true. For this reason we shall sometimes refer to these operators as 
the alethic modalities.* 
2.5 In everyday language, saying that something is a necessary consequence of an 
action taken by an individual does not always imply that the individual actually sees 
to it that that state of affairs results. It is, for instance, a necessary consequence of 
any action that such statements as 'John is smoking now or John is not smoking 
now' are true. However, we do not want to maintain that, for instance, Alexander 
the Great saw to it that John is smoking now or not smoking now, although, 
formally speaking, this state of affairs is a necessary consequence of any of 
Alexander's actions. Or, to give another example, suppose that I am sitting in a 
train over which I have no control whatsoever (there are no emergency brakes, the 
engine-driver cannot be reached, etc.) and suppose that the train derails. It seems 
absurd to say that, because I am sitting in the train, I bring it about that the train 
derails. It is true, however, that this state of affairs is a necessary consequence of 
any possible action which I might take on board of the train. 
These examples show that to establish a relationship of 'seeing to it' or 'bringing 
about', counterfactual information is often needed. [Von Wright, 1968, p. 43] 
Alexander the Great cannot be said to see to it that John is smoking or not 
smoking, because he did not have a possible course of action which would have led 
Our view differs from Jones's and Pom's who construe ihe Must-operator as a deonlic modality. 
They use the deontic modality 'Ought' to express that some obligation holds conditionally, whereas 
'Must' refers to an unconditional obligation [Jones and Porn, 1986] 
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to a different state of affairs. Similarly, I cannot be said to have seen to it that the 
train derailed because I did not have the possibility of preventing it: any alternative 
action would have led to the same situation. On the other hand, if I had the 
possibility of pulling an emergency brake, but decided not to do so, then one might 
say that I really saw to it that the train derailed.5 
We introduce a second action operator, Dó, which is called the strong action 
operator and which takes account of counterfactual information. There are several 
ways of incorporating counterfactual information and, consequently, several ways of 
interpreting strong action statements or Dó-statements, i.e., statements of the form 
Dó((/,(p). [Kanger, 1972] It has been suggested that one must take into account 
what would have happened were it not for the actions taken by an individual. [Pörn, 
1977, p. 5] [Segerberg, 1985, p. 284] One might, for example, maintain that an 
individual brings about a state of affairs if and only if it is the case that the actions 
taken by an individual are both a necessary and sufficient condition for the state of 
affairs in question to arise. Although such an interpretation of 'bringing about' or 
'seeing to it' may be appropriate in particular contexts, it is, in our opinion, not 
adequate in general. Consider, for example, a very hungry person. Given a choice 
between a cup of soup and a sandwich, the individual decides to eat the sandwich. 
It seems natural to say that, througli the act of eating a sandwich, the person is 
seeing to it that his appetite is satisfied. Yet, eating a sandwich is not the only way 
to satisfy one's hunger. Hence, it is a sufficient but not a necessary condition: the 
individual could have taken the soup. 
Another way to account for the counterfactual aspect is to say that one brings 
something about if and only if (a) the situation is a necessary consequence of one's 
actions, and (b) no other individual can take an action which has that situation as a 
necessary consequence. Such a definition is weaker than the one discussed above, 
but stronger than the one in terms of necessary consequences only. However, one 
can again think of examples in which it does not correspond with our intuitions 
about what it means to say that someone brings about a state of affairs. Consider 
The intentional aspect of human action will be touched upon in section 2.7. 
6
 The Do-operator in [Kanger, 1972]. 
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the hungry individual. Though it is not the actual state of affairs, it is conceivable 
that there is a situation in which the hungry individual is forcibly being fed by 
another person. Because of this possibility, the act of eating a sandwich - without 
any interference of others - can, in our terminology, not be described as seeing to it 
that the appetite is satisfied: others could have taken an action which would have 
had the same result. 
A third way is to say that an individual sees to it that something, say φ, is the case 
if and only if (a) the individual's action necessitates φ, and (b) the individual could 
have chosen a course of action which would not have necessitated φ. It expresses 
the notion of a genuine choice, i.e., the existence of an alternative. It is this 
interpretation to which the semantics of DLA corresponds. As we shall see later, the 
following formula is a valid statement in DLA, that is, it is a formula which is 
always true: 
Dó,(/y,(p) if and only if [ϋο,^,φ) & Can-Do^.íp)] 
Obviously, Dó((f ,φ) can only be true if it is not the case that the individual must 
take an action at t which necessitates φ.7 Thus, if φ describes that the train 
derailed, and if t is the time at which ; sat in the train, it is true that Do(-(f,,<p) is the 
case: the actions i has taken all have φ as a consequence. However, since any 
alternative action of / also leads to that state of affairs, it is not true that 
Can-Do((i ,φ). Therefore Dó,(f φ) does not hold. 
2.6 We want to attach the alethic modalities Can and Must not only to weak action 
statements, but also to strong action statements. As has been said above, to say that 
Dó;(í ,φ) is true can be understood as saying that individual / has a genuine choice. 
He decides to take a course of action which necessitates φ, but he could have acted 
differently. In line with this approach seems an interpretation of CanDó({í ,φ) on 
which CanDó^f ,φ) is true if and only if individual / can, at time f, either take an 
action which always leads to φ or take an action which does not necessarily imply 
φ. Hence, we would like to see that CanDó^f ,φ) is true if and only if [CanDo,(r ,φ) 
7
 Formally, Do,(/;,<p) if and only if [Do,{/y,<p) & -MustDo,(/y,<p)]. 
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& Can-Do,(f ,φ)] is true. As we shall see later, this is indeed a valid statement in 
DLA. 
The interpretation of a statement of the type Can-Dó^f.íp) is less clear. In our 
semantics, we adopt the following approach: Can-Dó^í-,φ) is understood as saying 
that individual ι has, at t, the possibility to perform an action such that, when 
performed, ~Dó¿(/ ,φ) is true. Since the formula Dó(-(/,,φ) is true if and only if 
[Do((f ,φ) & C a n - D o ^ ,φ)] is true, -Dó,<f ,φ) is equivalent to saying that individual 
ι at t actually performs an action such that [~ϋο,{ί φ) ν -Can-Do,(f ,φ)] is true 
( 'ν ' is the sign of disjunction, i.e., the inclusive 'or'). The formula Can-Dó^í ,φ) 
can therefore be seen as equivalent to the statement that, at t, the individual can 
perform an action which, when it is actually performed, implies [-Do((i ,φ) ν 
-Can-Do,(í ,φ)]. Since it is assumed that an individual's actual behaviour at a 
certain time does not have consequences for the type of actions which the 
individual could have taken at that time, we can reformulate this equivalence as 
follows: Can-DójOj.cp) if and only if [Can-Do^i ,φ) ν ~Can~Do((f,,(p)]. Like any 
formula of the form (ψ ν -ψ) this formula is a valid formula of DLA: it is always 
true. One can ask oneself whether this is in accordance with one's intuitive 
understanding of a Can-Dó-statement (if one has such an understanding at all). 
However, the rationale becomes obvious if one considers the negation of such a 
statement: -Can-Dó((í ,φ). The formula ~Can~Dó,(í ,φ) is equivalent to the formula 
MustDó((? ,φ): any action possibly taken by i at t implies Dó((í,,φ). Or, any action 
which ι possibly takes implies Do,(f ,φ) and Can-Do^f ,φ). However, if any action 
which ί might take at t is described as Do^f ,φ), then the formula Can-Do^f-.cp) 
cannot be true. Hence, the formula ~Can~Dó((r ,φ) or, for that matter, MustDó,(/.,φ), 
is never true. This makes sense: one cannot maintain that an individual must do a 
certain thing and, at the same time, maintain that the individual has a genuine 
choice. 
2.7 Thus far we have said nothing about the intentional dimension of actions. 
Obviously, this dimension is an important aspect of actions undertaken by 
individuals. In everyday English, to say that an individual sees to it that something 
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is the case usually implies that the individual intends it to be the case. This aspect 
is, however, neglected in DLA. Actions undertaken by individuals are described in 
terms of their consequences, but neither the actions nor the results of those actions 
are necessarily intended. If one distinguishes instrumental actions from purposive 
actions [Holmström-Hintikka, 1985, p. 50], one can say that DLA focuses only on 
instrumental actions. 
There is, however, a specific context in which action-statements can be said to 
entail statements about the intentionality of actions, viz., the context in which each 
agent has complete information about all the possible consequences of courses of 
action, and in which each agent acts rationally. Without wanting to enter into a 
debate about the proper definition of the rationality of individual behaviour, it 
seems reasonable to assume that an agent is not acting rationally when (a) he or she 
adopts a course of action which necessarily leads to a state of affairs which is not 
intended, (b) there is a course of action which possibly leads to the situation which 
is intended, and (c) the individual knows all possible consequences of the options 
that are open to him or her. If somebody intends to prevent a train accident, can 
perform actions that may do so, he or she can be said to act irrationally when those 
actions are not performed. Stated differently, in the context of complete information 
and rationally acting agents, strong action statements say something about the 
intentions of the agents: Dó((í ,φ) implies that -φ is not intended by the individual. 
Though individual /' can take an action for which φ is necessary, he or she decides 
to choose the action which has φ as a consequence. If the individual acts rationally, 
it must be the case that the outcome - φ was not intended to be the result of the 
action. 
This example shows that it is possible to incorporate the concept of intentionality 
into DLA. For a more systematic account of the relation between instrumental 
actions and purposive actions, the reader is referred to [Holmström-Hintikka, 1985] 
and [Holmström-Hintikka, 1991]. [Pörn, 1977], [Segerberg, 1981] and [Segerberg, 
1982] also focus on the logical relationships between intentions and actions. 
[Lindahl, 1977. p. 73]. 
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[Thomson, 1987] stresses the importance of analysing the notion of intentional 
behaviour, but argues that it is not necessary to incorporate it in a theory of action. 
2.8 A logic of action studies individual acts. A possible way of defining 'to act' is 
saying that to act is to bring about or to prevent a change in the world. Thus, an 
act is either productive or preventive. Similarly, the omission to act (forbearance) 
can be of two types: one can leave something unchanged or one can let something 
happen. It has been argued that a logic of action should be able to distinguish these 
four types of individual behaviour, i.e., it should be able to express the differences 
between, for instance, opening a door, preventing someone else from opening the 
door, not opening the door, and not preventing someone else from opening the door. 
[Von Wright, 1968, p. 38] The definitions presented so far do in fact make such a 
distinction possible. 
Let (ί,,ψ) be a formula describing that a door is closed at i,, let t be the point of 
time in which an individual is either acting or forbearing to act, and let tk be the 
point of time at which it is clear what the result of those actions or omissions of 
actions are (with f, < ί < tk). The first mode of behaviour is the productive mode 
('to open a door which was closed') and can be described as 
(1) [(ί,,ψ) & ϋ ο , ^ , ^ , - ψ ) ) ] . 
At г, the door was closed, but as a necessary result of an action taken by i at f, the 
door is open, -ψ, at f¿. The second mode is to prevent something from happening 
('keeping the door closed'): 
(2) [(ί,,ψ) & Do,{íy,(í¿,V|/))]. 
The individual takes an action such that, as a necessary consequence, nothing will 
change. Forbearing to act in these two ways constitutes the third and fourth mode of 
behaviour. These modes can be described by simply negating the Do-formulas 
contained in the descriptions of the first and the second mode respectively. The 
expression 
Q 
In fact, if we use not only the Do-operator but also the Dó-operator even finer distinctions can be 
made. 
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(3) [(ί,,ψ) & -ϋο,ίί, , ί^-ψ))], 
for instance, states that /' does not open the closed door, and 
(4) [(ί,,ψ) & -ϋο,ίί,,ί^ψ))] 
expresses that t does not see to it that the closed door remains closed. 
2.9 Systems of logic study the relationship between specific types of expressions. 
Different systems focus on different expressions. The concepts discussed so far, 
'bringing about', 'being able to', etc. belong to the logic of action. The central 
statements of this logic. Do-, Dó-, Can and Must-statements, are statements about 
the actions individuals take or might take and the consequences of such actions. 
They do not refer to the admissibility or permissibility of such actions. Deontic 
logic, on the other hand, studies normative expressions, i.e., expressions containing 
such notions as permission, obligation, duty, etc. There is a close relationship 
between deontic logic and modal logic [Von Wright, 1951], since the central 
deontic notions, permission and obligation, are defined along the same line as the 
notions of possibility and necessity in modal logic. A permissible act is, in a certain 
sense, an act which is deontically possible [Von Wright, 1968, p. 58], and, 
similarly, an obligation to act can be understood as a deontic necessity. Like the 
alethic modalities Can and Must, the deontic modalities of permissibility, May, and 
obligation, Shall, can be defined in terms of one another: something is obligated if 
and only if its negation is not permitted. More precisely, saying that one should (or 
has the obligation to) do something, or that one should see to it that something is 
the case, is equivalent to the statement that it is not true that one is permitted not to 
do it or not to see to it that it is the case. 
Deontic notions can be applied both in a moral and in a legal framework. In the 
latter case a May-statement describes a permission which an individual has 
according to the legal constitution of the society the individual lives in. Such a 
permission need not be morally acceptable: if I 'may' do something in the legal 
We ignore Von Wright's distinction between weak and strong permissions. [Von Wright, 1963, p. 
86] 
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sense, it need not be the case that I also 'may' do it in the moral sense. Since our 
primary goal is to analyse rights-structures we shall restrict ourselves throughout the 
text to the legal interpretation of deontic notions. 
In DLA the deontic operators May and Shall are used in combination with action-
statements. Given our remarks above, formulas of the type May(p, where φ is a Do-
statement, are interpreted as 
it is permissible that φ 
and Shallcp is interpreted as 
it is obligated that φ. 
For instance, if φ = Do(<í ,ψ) the formula Мауф can be interpreted as 
at t: i has permission to perform an action which necessitates ψ 
and May-φ as 
at t: i has permission to perform an action which does not necessitate ψ. 
Application of the deontic operators in the context of strong action statements 
establishes a close connection between the two types of modalities. A statement like 
MayDó((f ,φ) is interpreted as 
at t individual i may (is permitted to) take an action which always leads to φ 
and can take an action which does not necessarily imply φ. 
ShallDó((í ,<p) is interpreted as 
at t: individual i shall (is obligated to) take an action which always leads to φ 
although i can take an action which does not necessarily imply φ. 
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We saw in the previous section that it does not make much sense to say that an 
individual must perform an action which can be described as a strong action 
statement, i.e., we saw that formulas of the form MustDó^f ,φ) are never true. Note, 
however, that in the interpretation given above a statement like ShallDóí(í.,(p) makes 
sense: obviously, an individual might be obligated to do something although he has 
the opportunity not to do it. 
To recapitulate, in this chapter we have described the type of expressions which can 
be made in DLA. Furthermore, we have discussed how those expressions can be 
interpreted. In chapter 3 we show how those interpretations can be justified. That is, 
we present the semantics of the logic. 
Chapter 2* 
Formal presentation 
The signs of the language of the Deontic Logic of Action (DLA) are 
(1) The signs of the basic logic (BL) presented in Appendix 1: 
(a) Individual symbols 
- Free individual symbols: /', j , ... (countably many) 
- Bound individual variables: s, t, ... 
(b) Predicate symbols: Px, P2, ..., Pp 
(c) Sentential connectives: &, v, -, -», <-» 
(d) Quantifiers: 3, V 
(e) Identity sign and non-identity sign: =, * 
(0 Auxiliary symbols: (, ), [, ] 
(2) Temporal symbols 
- Free temporal symbols: tv t, ... (countably many) 
- Bound temporal variables: ts, tr ... 
(3) Temporal predicates: <, <; 
(4) Action operators: Do, Dó 
(5) Alethic modalities: Can, Must 
(6) Deontic modalities: May, Shall 
The set of atomic formulas of DLA is defined in the following way: 
2*1 Definition 
(1) For all free temporal symbols f(, f·, (r, < t) and (f, = t ) are atomic formulas of 
DLA; 
(2) For all free individual symbols i, j , (/ = j) is an atomic formula of DLA; 
(3) DLA contains no atomic formulas other than those defined by (1) and (2). 
The signs tt, t, ... are symbols denoting actual points in time. Atomic formulas of 
the form (f, = f) and (f, < t) state that r( denotes the same point in time as, 
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respectively an earlier point of time than, t The formula (/' = j) states that the free 
individual symbols i and j denote the same individual. 
2*2 Notation Let φ be a well-formed formula of DLA, α a free individual 
(temporal) symbol and β a bound individual (temporal) variable. φ[β/α] denotes the 
expression which results if the symbol α is wherever it occurs in φ replaced by the 
variable β. 
2*3 Definition The set of well-formed formulas (wffs) of DLA is defined as follows: 
(1) For all wffs φ of BL and all free temporal symbols f/( (ί,,φ) is wff of DLA; 
(2) Each atomic formula of DLA is a wff of DLA; 
(3) For all wffs φ of DLA, - φ is a wff of DLA; 
(4) For all wffs φ and ψ of DLA, (φ & ψ) is a wff of DLA; 
(5) For all free individual symbols i and all free temporal constants t : 
(a) if φ is a wff of DLA, the expression Do,(f ,φ) and Dó((f ,<p) are wffs of 
DLA called Do-statement of type ilt and Dó-statement of type ¡It 
respectively; 
(b) if φ is a Do- (Dó-) statement of type i/t, - φ is a wff of DLA which is 
also a Do- (Dó-) statement of type i/t; 
(c) if φ and ψ are Do- (Dó-) statements of type i/t then (φ & ψ) is also a 
Do- (DÓ-) statement of type i/t and a wff of DLA; 
(d) there are no other Do- or Dó-statements of type i/t than those defined 
by (a) - (c); 
(6) For all free individual symbols /' and all free temporal symbols t : if φ is a 
Do-statement or Dó-statement of type i/t, then Мауф and Cancp are wffs of 
DLA; 
(7) For all wffs φ of DLA, all free individual (temporal) symbols cc, and all 
individual (temporal) variables β: V« [φ[β/α]] is a wff of DLA (see notation 
2*2); 
(8) the clauses (l)-(7) define all wffs of DLA. 
2*4 Definition Let β be a variable of DLA, i.e., it is a temporal or individual 
variable. If ψ is a string of symbols of DLA and φ = 3n [ψ| or Vn [ψ], then [ψ] is 
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called the scope of the quantifier 3a respectively Vn. The symbol β occurs bound in 
a string of symbols of DLA iff it occurs immediately under a quantifier 3 or V or 
in the scope of the quantifier 3« or Vn. β occurs free iff it does not occur bound. 
2*5 Definition The abbreviations used in DLA are the same as those used in BL 
plus the following: 
(1) (f, * tj) for ~(f, = tj); 
(2) (f, < t}) for [(i, = tj) ν (/, < tj)]; 
(3) 3t
s
 [φ] for ~\/t
s
 [-φ]. 
Moreover, the basic logic's customs of economizing on notation are used in DLA as 
well (see Appendix 1). 
Note that if a variable occurs free in a siring of symbols, then the string is not a wff of DLA. 
Chapter 3 
Deontic Logic of Action: Semantics 
3.1 The semantics of DLA is of a game-theoretic nature. In chapter 3* we shall 
present this game-theoretic framework in a rigorous manner. In this chapter we 
describe it more informally. The central notion in the semantics of DLA is that of a 
model structure. It consists of three components: a complex game tree Γ, a play-
structure p and an interpretation 3. 
The concept of a game form is a useful tool for modelling decision situations. 
Given a finite and non-empty set of individuals N and a set A of outcomes. It 
assigns to each individual a non-empty set of strategies. A play of the game form is 
a combination of individual strategies - one for each individual. The outcome of 
each play of the game form is an element of A. However, one can also think of 
more complex decision-situations, i.e., decision situations of which the outcomes 
themselves consist of decision-situations. To describe such decision situations we 
introduce the concept of a Complex Game Tree, which is a specific constellation of 
game forms. It can be described as a tree of infinite length consisting of a set of 
points X = (<7Q, q
x
, q2, ...}, game forms G0, G,, G2, ... assigned to those points, and 
time-points 1, 2, 3, ... . Graphically, a tree looks like 
Figure 3 1 
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To each point in the tree one or more game forms belong. A play of any of those 
game forms is depicted by a line or arrow departing from the point in the tree to 
which the game form belongs, to the point which is the outcome of the play. There 
are no plays of game forms belonging to a point which are not represented by a line 
departing from that point. 
We shall describe a complex game tree as a quadruple < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > where Σ is a 
mapping assigning game forms to each element of X, and where Ξ is a mapping 
which itself assigns a mapping to each element q of X. For all q, the mapping E(q) 
assigns game forms to non-empty subsets of N. The game forms assigned by Σ are 
called feasible game forms, whereas the game forms assigned to the non-empty 
subsets of N are called admissible. The outcomes of any feasible or admissible 
game form are all elements of X. 
Thus to each point in the tree two types of game forms belong. The first type of 
game form is the one which describes the feasible strategies of individuals. It is 
assumed that exactly one of those feasible game forms belongs to each point in the 
tree. The strategies individuals have in these game forms are not necessarily 
strategies that are permitted. It sometimes makes perfect sense to say that someone 
can perform a particular action, even though he or she does not have the permission 
to do so. The information given by states of affairs and corresponding game forms 
is, in itself, not sufficient to find out what a person may do. For this, extra 
information is needed. This extra information is given by admissible game forms. 
These are used to determine what the individuals may and may not do in a state of 
affairs. Whereas there is exactly one feasible game form belonging to each point, 
we assume that at each point there are either just as many admissible game forms 
as there are individuals, namely one admissible game form for each singleton subset 
of N, or that each non-empty subset of N has been assigned an admissible game 
form. In the latter case we speak of a cooperative CGT. In this chapter we shall 
speak about non-cooperative CGTs only. Cooperative CGTs will be discussed in 
chapter 4. 
A complex game tree resembles a game of ainwst-perfect information (see [Shubik, 1982, p. 47]) 
except for the fact that more than one game form can be assigned to a point of the tree. 
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To find out what an individual is able to do, we look at what we call the alethic 
realm, whereas to find out what the individual is permitted to do, we look at the 
deontic realm. This deontic realm is described by the admissible game forms 
assigned to the individual at the various points in the tree. The alethic realm 
contains the actual strategic possibilities. The strategies individuals are permitted to 
take belong to the deontic realm. As we shall see later, we shall say that a person 
can do something if it is alethically possible, whereas he or she may do it if it is 
deontically possible. 
The alethic realm is assumed to be identical for all individuals: at each point in 
time there is one alethic realm, which is described by a feasible game form. This 
implies that the actions of one individual have consequences for the actions of other 
individuals. If I can make absolutely sure that a state of affairs д: arises, then it is 
impossible that you see to it that л- will not arise. However, we do not make such 
assumptions with respect to the deontic realm. To find out whether I may see to it 
that χ is the case, I look at a decision situation - my deontic realm described by my 
admissible game form - which need not be identical to the deontic realm as 
described by your admissible game form. Accordingly, the fact that I may see to it 
that, for instance, a state of affairs χ arises does not entail anything about the things 
other human beings are allowed to do. In their own deontic realm, they may well 
have the permission to see to it that χ will not arise. 
Finally, to each point in the tree a time-point is assigned by a mapping τ. A time-
point is a positive integer denoting the time of a point of the tree. The time-point 
assigned to the starting point of the tree is 1, whereas, for all points r, x{q) = t(r) + 
1 for all points q to which a line from r departs. 
An interpretation 3 is a mapping which assigns to each free individual symbol of 
DLA a one-element subset of the set N of all individuals and to each free temporal 
symbol a positive integer. Furthermore, it assigns models of the first-order predicate 
logic (see Appendix 1) to the points of a complex game tree. Since a model of the 
first order predicate logic is a description of a state of affairs, we can also say that 
To make reading lighter, we shall speak about the admissible game form assigned to an individual 
ί instead of the admissible game form assigned to the one-clement set (i). 
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an interpretation attaches states of affairs to the points of the tree. It is assumed that 
those models all have the same interpretation of the free individual symbols which 
coincides with the interpretation 3 of those symbols. Hence, it cannot be the case 
that in some of the models a formula like (i = j) holds, whereas it does not hold in 
a model of the basic logic assigned to another point in the model structure. 
Like all mathematical trees, a complex game tree has exactly one initial point or 
root. A path, which is an uninterrupted sequence of lines starting at the initial point, 
is called a play-structure p. Since each line represents a play of a game form, we 
can also describe a play-structure as a sequence of pairs ('rounds'), each consisting 
of a point and a play of a game form. The point of the first pair is the initial point, 
the play in the first pair is a play of either the feasible game form or of one of the 
admissible game forms belonging to that point. The outcome of this play is the 
point in the second round of the play-structure. The game form which is played at 
the second point is a play of the feasible game form assigned to the point or a play 
of one of the admissible game forms which belong to this point. The outcome of 
that play is the point of the third pair in the sequence, etcetera. 
Thus far we have said nothing about the information that an agent has. We shall 
assume that an agent has full information about the characteristics of the complex 
game tree and of everything that happened in the past. However, when making a 
choice a player does not know what strategies the others are playing at that same 
point in time. 
The definition of a complex game tree is inspired by Von Wrights' notion of a life 
tree. [Von Wright, 1968, p. 51]. Von Wright introduced a topological tree of which 
the points represent possible worlds and the branches courses of action open to 
individuals. Furthermore, he made a distinction between natural possibility and 
deontic possibility - a distinction which coincides with our distinction between 
feasible and admissible actions. A CGT is also related to the notion of a game-tree 
presented in [Âqvist, 1974] and [Áqvist, 1985a] but differs from it in several 
aspects. Firstly, we make a distinction between feasible and admissible actions. 
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Although Âqvist notes the usefulness of an application to deontic logic, he 
focuses especially on the formulation of a logic of feasible actions. Furthermore, 
each individual makes a decision at a point of the CGT, whereas at most one 
individual makes a choice at a point of Âqvist's game-tree. 
3.2 To illustrate these concepts we describe in this section (part of) a model 
structure M = < Γ, p, 3 >. First of all, consider the following decision situation. 
At time t¡ an individual í is, on his own, organizing a party to be held at time 
tk and is considering to invite j and k. Whether she is invited or not, к has the 
opportunity and ability to attend the party (she can fight her way through in 
case she is not invited). On the other hand, j does not have the possibility of 
attending the party when he is not invited by i. Knowing all this, í decides to 
invite j but not k. At time f, individual j decides to go to the party, whereas к 
stays at home. Furthermore, to facilitate matters it is assumed that, except for 
the actions of k, the realm of the possible and the permissible coincide. The 
things j and ι can do are precisely the things they may do, and vice versa. 
This is not true for k: though she has the means to attend the party without 
invitation, she does not have the permission to do so. 
Complex Game Tree Г Let < [qQ, q[t q2, ... }, Σ, Ξ, τ > be a non-cooperative CGT. 
By assumption, Σ and Ξ assign the following game forms to the first five points: 
At point <7Q 
At point q
x 
At point <72 
At point <73 
At point ¿74 
Zforj) = 
Σ(<7,) = 
ад = 
ад = 
ад = 
: Ξθ70)(ι) = E(q0)(j) = 
: Ξ(«7,Χ0 = E(q
x
)<j) = 
: E(q2)(i) = Ξ(<72)(/) = 
: адо) = адо) = 
= ад(0 - адо) = 
: E(q0)(k) = G 0; 
 ад(*) = G,; 
G 2 * E(q2)(k) = 
-- Eiqjik) = G 4; 
= G 5 * Ξ(<74)(£) = 
: G 3 ; 
-G,-
Hence, the feasible game forms assigned to the points qQ, qx and 173 are identical to 
the admissible game forms assigned to the individuals at those points. At the points 
See [Âqvist, 1974, p. 74]. [Aqvisl, 1985a] focuses on a particular problem of deontic logic. 
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q2 and ήτ4 k's admissible game forms differ from k's feasible game forms at those 
points. 
We shall not focus on all of these game forms but describe three of them, G0, G 2 
and G3, in detail. To do so, let jj-i7 be strategies described as: 
j j : sending an invitation toy and k\ s5: staying passive; 
i 2 : sending an invitation to j but not to к; s6: going to the party; 
i 3 : sending an invitation to к but not to j ; s7: not going to the party. 
i 4 : inviting neither j nor к; 
Figure 3 2 
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(a) G 0 is the feasible game form belonging to qQ and is also each of the 
individuals' admissible game form at that point. Like any game form, G 0 is a triple 
consisting of a set of outcomes, a strategy-allocation which assigns to each 
individual a set of strategies and a decision mechanism which assigns an outcome 
to each possible combination of individual strategies (one for each individual). G 0 is 
described as the triple < [q{, q2, <73, q^), σ 0 ,π 0 > where σ 0 is the strategy-
allocation assigning to i the set {sl>s2,Sj,s4} a n d toy and к [s5], and where π 0 is the 
decision-mechanism (or outcome mapping) according to which 
(1) the play p 0 1 = ( i 1 ? s5, s5) leads to qx\ 
(2) the play p02 = (s2, s5, s5) leads to q2\ 
(3) the play p 0 3 = C$3, ¿'5, s5) leads to qy, 
(4) the play p^ - (s4, s5, s5) leads to q4. 
(b) The feasible game form belonging to q2 is G2 = < W9, <7|0, <7ц, ^12Ь σ 2 >π2 
> where, according to σ 2, i has only one strategy, s5, and j and A: each have both 
the strategies i 6 and s-j. 
The outcome mapping assigns to the plays 
(1) p 2 1 = (i 5 , s6, J 6 ) the outcome ? 9; 
(2) />22 = ( J 5 , J 6 , J 7 ) the outcome qi0; 
(3) P23 = (J5· ^7' л'б) t h e outcome ςτ
η
; 
(4) p24 = (Í5. Í7. s-j) the outcome ^12 . 
(c) Finally, the admissible game form assigned to к at q2 is G 3 = < {<7ι0, <7ι2}, σ 3 
,π 3 >. In this game form the players ; and к each have been assigned only one 
strategy: i's only strategy is J 5 and k's only strategy is j 7 . Individual j has the 
strategies s 6 and л7. Thus there are only two possible plays: 
(1) P31 = (S5. ·*6» sj) w ' l n outcome </10; 
(2) p 3 2 = (s5, s-j, i'7) with outcome q]2. 
4 The first component of a play represents the strategy chosen by 1, the second and the third the 
ones chosen by j and к respectively. 
Chapter 3 Deontic Logic of Action: Semantics 49 
In other words, at the point q2 player к has the feasible strategies of going or not 
going to the party (remember that к can force her way through), but she does not 
have the admissible strategy of going to the party. In the admissible game form 
assigned to к she only has the strategy of staying at home. 
Part of the complex game tree Г is described by Figure 3.2. As said above, an arrow 
between two points represents a play of a game form assigned to the point from 
which the arrow departs. The second point is the outcome of the play. The time of 
a point q, \(q), is denoted at the bottom of the figure. Thus, q0 has time 1, the 
points q^ - <74 have time 2, the points q5 - qi() have time 3, etc. 
Interpretation 3 An interpretation assigns models of the basic logic to each of the 
points. We shall not describe these models completely, but focus only on formulas 
in which one or more of the symbols φ, ψ, ω and ρ occur. The symbols designate 
formulas of the basic logic which are to be interpreted as: 
φ: player 7' is invited ω: player j attends the party; 
ψ: player к is invited p: player к attends the party; 
The intended meaning of negations or conjunctions of these formulas is evident. For 
instance, the formula -φ is the formula describing that j is not invited. The 
conjunction (-ω & ρ) describes the state of affairs in which к attends the party, but 
j does not, etc. 
We assume that in the interpretation 3: 
φ is only true in the models assigned to qlt q2, 
ψ is only true in the models assigned to q
x
, q^\ 
ω is only true in the models assigned to q5, q6, q9 and ^ I 0 ; 
ρ is only true in the models assigned to q5, q-¡, <y9, qn, q^ and q^6. 
Furthermore, an interpretation assigns one-element subsets of N to the free 
individual symbols and time-points to the free temporal symbols. To make things 
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easy, we assume that 3(0 = {(}. 3(/) = ÜI. etc. The time-points assigned to f,, f 
and tk are 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
Play-structure p A play-structure describes, for each point in time, a point in the 
tree and a play of one of the game forms belonging to that point. The outcome of 
the play decides which point will be reached next. The play-structure p is assumed 
to be the one which starts in the following way: [(q0, p02), (q2, P22)' (tfio» —)» ··· J-
Graphically, a play-structure is any uninterrupted sequence of arrows starting in the 
initial point. In our example, part of the play-structure p can be depicted in the 
following way: 
Figure 3 3 
But an alternative play-structure is the one in which / invites bothy and k: 
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Figure 3 4 
Truth in a model structure A model structure M = < Γ, ρ, 3 > describes a 
particular 'history of the world', i.e., one which starts at time f( and passes through 
f, í¿, etc. For instance, the model structure M describes a history starting in q0, then 
passing through q2, Ç\Q, etc. The models assigned to those points describe state of 
affairs which, according to the history of the world, are true at that time. For 
example, at time 2 the world is as described by the model assigned to q2, which 
means that at time 2 the formulas φ and - ψ are true. In terms of DLA this is 
understood to mean that, since the interpretation 3 assigns the integer 2 to the free 
temporal symbol f, the formulas (f ,<p) and (ί,,-ψ) of DLA are true in (hold in) the 
model structure M: at time 2 in the history of the world described by M j is invited 
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to /'s party, but к is not. At time 3 player j goes to the party (ω is true), whereas к 
does not (p is not true), etc. 
Now consider a Do-statement, say the one that expresses that /, at time /,, sees to it 
that j is invited at time f ·: Do((í(,(í ,φ)). To see whether such a formula holds in M 
we first look at the point at which M is at time t. In our example this point is q0. 
We then look at the play which is played in the feasible game fonm of that point, 
and examine whether the strategy chosen by ƒ, s2, is such that (ί,,φ) is always true 
in a history of the world which passes through an outcome of any play of the 
feasible game form in which /' plays that strategy. Does (ί,,φ) always result if i 
chooses the strategy s{! If we look at the game form belonging to q0, we see that 
this is indeed the case. Any play in which i follows the strategy i 2 leads to q2, a 
point to which a model is assigned in which φ is true. There is nothing that the 
others can do which would lead to a world with time t, say q^ or q^, in which φ is 
not true. Thus, we say that, at t
r
 individual ; performs an action such that as a 
necessary result, φ is true at time f : / sees to it that y is invited. 
On the other hand, the formula which describes that at i, individual ì makes sure 
that к does not attend his party at time ί
λ
, Do((f(,(í¿,-p)), does not hold in M. The 
truth of ~p at time fy is not guaranteed by the strategy that i chooses at time r(. 
There is an alternative play-structure in which i takes the same actions at time f, as 
in M, even though it is not true that -p holds in the model belonging to the point at 
which the play-structure is at time í¿. As said above, individual к can force her way 
through in case she is not invited: there is a play of the feasible game form at time 
ί· that leads to q^. Hence, not inviting к to the party does not necessarily imply that 
к does not attend the party. 
A strong action statement like Dó((/r(í ,φ)) is true in M if and only if ϋο ί^,,Ο? ,φ)) is 
true in M and if / has, in the feasible game form at t
r
 a strategy such that (ί,,φ) 
does not necessarily follow. In our example this is the case: if / adopts strategy Sy, 
the point q^ will be reached, a point with time 2 at which the formula φ does not 
hold. Indeed, it is rather trivial to say that if ; decides not to send an invitation to j , 
then j will not be invited to the party. Thus, ƒ s invitation is the result of a genuine 
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choice by i: the state of affairs in which j is invited would not have resulted 
otherwise. 
Now consider the statement CanDo^Xr^-iu)). It expresses that ƒ can, at time f,, 
choose a strategy in the play of the feasible game form such that as a necessary 
result j does not attend the party. Does i have such a strategy? If we look at the 
strategy i 3 we see that whatever the others do, if i chooses Sj in the play at q0, then 
the history of the world will at time tk go through a world in which - ω is true. This 
means, in our semantics, that the statement СапооД/Д^.-и))) holds in M: individual 
i can choose at time tt a strategy which always leads to the truth of - ω at time tk. If 
/ decides not to invite j , then j has no choice but to stay home. Hence, at time t
r
 i 
can see to it that j does not go the party. 
A formula like MustDo^Xf^-cu)) is true in M if and only if for any strategy that 
individual ƒ possibly chooses in the feasible game form at time t
v
 it is true that - ω 
results at time tk. Hence, the individual has no option but to choose a course of 
action which leads to - ω at time t: he must see to it that (tk,-(û) happens. 
Obviously, this is not the case in our example. If i does not invite j and, for 
instance, chooses strategy i3, the outcome at time 3 will be q^ or ql4, points at 
which -ω does not hold. 
The treatment of May- and Shall-statements differs from the treatment of Can- and 
Must-statements because we focus on the admissible game forms to see whether a 
deontic statement holds. The basic idea is that an individual may do something at a 
certain point in time if, in his or her admissible game form at that time, he or she 
has an action which always leads to that state of affairs. The individual shall do it if 
he or she has, in that game form, no alternative but to choose a strategy which 
always leads to it. 
ι 
Take the formula MayDo¿(í (í¿,p)), i.e., the formula which describes that at time t 
player к has the permission to see to it that she attends the party. This formula does 
not hold in the model structure. At the í-point of p, i.e., the point <72 through 
which the play-structure passes at time t the admissible game form of к is such 
that she has no strategy which always leads to </9 or </u, i.e., which always leads to 
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a point with time tk at which ρ is true. Hence, MayDo¿(f Jtk,p)) is not true in M. In 
fact, any strategy which к chooses in her admissible game form at <72 always leads 
to a point, i.e., qi0 or ήτ12, at which ρ is not true: the formula ShMDok(t:,(tk>~p)) 
holds in M. 
The examples given so far concern formulas of the form which contain at most one 
action operator and one modality. However, DLA also contains more complex 
formulas like, for instance, Do;<i,-,MayDo,</.·,(ίλ,ω))), MayDo^.ShallDo^.Cf^-Y))), 
or Can[Do(<y(,(f:,\|/)) & ShallDoA.(f:,(f¿,~p))]. To see whether such more complex 
formulas are true in a model structure M, we adopt an approach which generalizes 
the approach described above. 
To do so we have to introduce some definitions. Let p be any play-structure of the 
CGT, L a non-empty subset of N and tk a time-point. Let G denote the game form 
that is played in the ¿¿-round of p and let ρ be the play of G of that round. An 
[L,tk]-variant of p is any play-structure p* of Γ with the following characteristics: 
(1) if q is the (tk + l)-point of p*, then there is a play p' of G such that all 
individuals outside the set L play the same strategy in ρ' as in ρ and nip') - q 
(where π denotes the outcome mapping belonging to G); 
(2) at all points in time later than tk a play of the feasible game form is played in 
P*. 
In other words, if we call a play ρ 'o f G an L-variant of ρ if all members outside L 
have in p' the same strategy as in p, then an [L.f^-variant of p is any play-
structure that (1) passes through an outcome of an L-variant of ρ and (2) in which 
at that outcome and at all points later in time the feasible game form is played. 
Given a model structure M and a point in time tk, we shall call a play-structure a tk-
split of another play-structure p if it has the same ¿¿-point as p. In the feasible tk-
split of p one plays a play of the feasible game form at the ¿¿-point of p. This 
play need not be identical to the play of the game form which is played in the tk-
Note lhal ihe game form thai is played in the «¿.-round of ρ need not be the same as the one 
played in the /¿-round of p* . 
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point of p. In the L-admissible tk-split of ρ a play of the admissible game form 
which is assigned to L is played at the ¿¿-point. 
If p* is a feasible or L-admissible ¿¿-split of a play-structure p (p* Φ p), then 
M* = < Γ, p*, 3 > describes a hypothetical history of the world which has the 
same ¿¿-point as the history of the world as described by M - < Γ, p, 3 >. M* and 
M differ with respect to what happens at the ¿¿-point and afterwards. If p* is a 
feasible ¿¿-split the individuals play the feasible game form belonging to the world 
at time ¿¿, if it is an ¿-admissible ¿¿.-split they play at that time the admissible game 
form assigned to L. Thus if M describes the actual history of the world, a feasible 
¿¿-split of p describes what might have happened if some of the individuals would 
have adopted a different feasible strategy at time ¿¿. The ¿-admissible ¿¿-split 
describes what might have happened if, at time ¿¿, the actual choice situation would 
have been the one described by the admissible game form assigned to L. 
The first truth condition is straightforward: a formula of the type (¿,,ψ), where ψ is 
a formula of the basic logic, is true in a model structure M if and only if the 
formula ψ is true in the model of the basic logic assigned to the 3(¿,)-point of M. 
Now consider a wff of the form Do,(¿ ,φ). We will say that Do,(¿ ,φ) holds in M = < 
Γ, p, 3 > if and only if for any [/V-3(0,3(¿.)]-variant p* of p the formula φ is 
true in < Γ, p*, 3 >. Thus, φ is true in M regardless of what the others do at time 
0-
A wff of the form Dó,{¿ ,φ) is true in M if and only if the formula Do,{¿ ,φ) is true 
in M and if, for at least one feasible 3(¿,)-split p* of p, Do;{¿,(p) is not true in < 
Γ, p*, 3 >. In other words, the strong action statement Dó(¿ ,φ) is true if and only 
if (1) the weak action statement Do,(¿ ,φ) is true, and (2) i could have chosen at the 
¿-point a strategy such that Do,{¿ ,φ) would not have been true in the resulting 
history of the world. 
A play-slnicture ρ can be a feasible f^ -split of itself. This is the case if in the fy-round of p the 
feasible game form is already being played Similarly, if the /¿-round of p is a play of the admissible 
game form assigned to L, then ρ is an ¿-admissible /¿-split of itself. 
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Now let φ denote a Do- or Dó-statement of type i/t. The formula Can(p is said to 
be true in M if and only if there is at least one feasible 3(f.)-split p* of p such 
that φ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 >. Hence, Cancp implies that the individual z' has at 
time t a feasible strategy of which the performance leads to the truth of the Do-
respectively Dó-statement φ. The formula Musup holds in M if and only if φ is true 
in < Γ, p*, 3 > for all feasible 3(f,)-splits p* of p: every feasible strategy 
possibly chosen by / at time t entails the truth of φ. The formula May<p holds in M 
if and only if φ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for at least one 3(i)-admissible 3(r.)-split 
p* of p. Thus, the individual has in the admissible game form assigned to him at 
time t a strategy of which the performance leads to the truth of φ. Shallcp is true in 
M if and only if this is the case for all 3(i)-admissible 3(f.)-splits P* of p: 
whatever admissible strategy ι chooses at time t, the choice entails the truth of φ. 
As for other types of statements, their truth-conditions are defined in the usual way. 
Thus a conjunct holds in a model structure if and only if each of its conjuncts hold 
in it, a negation of a formula holds in the model structure if and only if the formula 
does not hold in it, etcetera. 
Applying these definitions to the model structure described in the example, we see 
that each of the following formulas is true in it: 
(1) (ί,,φ & -ψ) 
(2) (/;,ω & -ρ) 
(3) ϋο,ίί,,^,φ & -ψ)) 
(4) Do/f,,(fA,ü))) & DoA(f;,(f¿,~p)) 
(5) -CanDo/f , ,^^ & ψ)) & -CanDo^X^cp & ψ)) 
(6) C a n D o ^ X ^ S h a l l D o ^ - p ) ) ) ; 
(7) ϋο,Ο,Λί,,-ψ)) -> S h a l l D o ^ - p ) 
(8) S h a l l D o ^ - p ) 
(9) - C a n D o ^ X ^ M u s t D o ^ - p ) ) ) ; 
(10) CanDo^X^MustDoX^-co))); 
(11) MayDoXí,XírShallDoA(í;,-p))); 
(12) -MayDoXfjX^MustDo^-p))). 
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Individual i can adopt a strategy at t¡ such that к is not allowed to go the party (6): 
if ι does not invite к, к may not come. Since he actually does not invite к (3), к has 
no permission to visit the party (7) (8). However, i has no strategy which ensures 
that к does indeed stay at home (9). Player i has such a strategy, however, with 
respect to j : not inviting j implies that j has no choice but to stay at home (10). 
Individual ι decides to invite j but not к (3) (1). Individuals j and A: cannot do so 
themselves (5). Only individual j accepts the invitation (4). As a result j attends the 
party, whereas к does not (2). 
Since the admissible game forms of i always coincide with the feasible game forms, 
the statements (11) and (12) also hold: the things / may do are precisely the things 
he can do. 
3.3 We shall call a formula T-valid if and only if it holds in every model structure 
in which Г is the complex game tree and in which the play-structure is such that, in 
every round of it, a play of the feasible game form is being played. Obviously, the 
characteristics of a complex game tree Г determine which formulas are Г-valid. For 
instance, if Г is the complex game tree in which at each point of time only one 
point exists, 
о • <> *•" 
4 «ι чг 
τ= 1 2 3 
Figure 3.5 
then we know that, for instance, the formulas 
(1) Vr, V, [ϋο,α,,φ) «-> MustDo^q»] 
(2) Vf, V, [Do/ί,,φ) «-» ShallDo/ί,,φ)] 
(3) Vf, [5, Do/ί,,φ) -» V, Do,(/J(<p)] 
are Г-valid. Regardless of the interpretation or the play-structure, if each individual 
has only one strategy in each point of the complex game tree, then it is true that 
doing something is equivalent to having no choice but to do it (1) or being under an 
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obligation to do it (2). Furthermore, it follows that if one individual sees to it that 
something happens then every individual does so (3). 
A stronger concept of validity is in terms of classes of complex game trees. Let В a 
class of complex game trees. We say that a formula is ß-valid if and only if it is In-
valid for every complex game tree Г belonging to B. In chapter 5 and 5* we shall 
use these concepts of validity to distinguish different systems of logic within DLA. 
This can be very useful. For example, we know that the feasibility of an action does 
not always entail the admissibility of that action: a 'can' does not always imply a 
'may'. It is equally obvious that permissible choices do not need to be choices 
which the individual can actually take, i.e., they need not be feasible. I may have 
the permission to fly to the moon, but I do not have the opportunity or the ability to 
do so; a person may have the permission to sleep in a bed without actually having 
the opportunity to do so. Nevertheless, it is interesting to know under which 
circumstances such inferences as 'may implies can', 'can implies may', 'shall 
implies can', etc. are sustained. 
Chapter 3* 
Formal presentation 
Let TV be a non-empty, finite set of individuals (IM > 2) and X* a denumerable set 
of which the elements are called points. 
3*1 Definition A Game Form G is any structure < Α, σ, π > such that 
(1) A is a non-empty and finite subset of X*. The elements of A are called the 
outcomes of the game form; 
(2) σ is a choice-allocation, i.e., a mapping assigning to each ieN a non-empty 
set σ(0 of which the elements are called choices or strategies; 
(3) π is a mapping from σ(1) χ . . . χ σ(η) onto Α; π is called the outcome-
mapping of G. 
3*2 Definition Let G be a game form < Α, σ, π >. An element ρ = (jj,...,.$„) of 
σ(1) χ . . . χ σ(η) is called a play of G. The point π(ρ) is called the outcome of the 
play p. For LczN, two plays ρ = ($,, . . . , s
n
) and p* = (s¡ s') are called L-
variant iff for all /e(N-L) s¡ = s'. 
3*3 Definition A Complex Game Tree (CGT) Γ is a quadruple < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > such 
that 
(1) X is a non-empty subset of X*; 
(2) Σ is a mapping which assigns to each element of X a game form; 
(3) Ξ is a mapping which assigns to each element q of X a game form allocation, 
i.e., a mapping from either the set of all non-empty subsets of N or the set of 
all singleton subsets of N, to the set of game forms. For all q, r e X, the 
mappings E(q) and E(r) have the same domain which is denoted as £>
r
; 
(4) τ is a mapping from X to the set of positive integers; 
(5) If R is the binary relation over X* defined as: pRq iff peX and there is (a) 
some L e D
r
 such that there is a play of E(p)(L) which has q as its outcome, 
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or (b) a play of Σ(ρ) which has q as its outcome, then (XJi) is a tree of 
infinite length, i.e., 
(a) R is acyclic; 
(b) for all p, q e X*, pRq implies qeX; 
(c) for all p, q, r e X, if pRq and rRq then ρ = r; 
(d) the transitive closure R* of /? is such that for all p, q € X (p * <7), if 
neither p/?*<7 nor qR*p then there is an r e X such that rR*q and 
rÄ*p; 
(6) for all p,q e X, x(q) = τ(ρ) + 1 iff pRq; 
(7) if for some q e X there is no ρ e X such that pRq, then τ(</) = 1. 
By definition, a complex game tree contains exactly one point q e X such that for 
no ρ e X it is true that pRq. We call that point the initial point. By (7) the time of 
the initial point is 1. Note that the tree is of infinite length because a game form is 
assigned to each point. Hence, for all ρ € X there is a q e X such that pRq. 
The game forms assigned by the mapping Σ are called feasible game forms. If q is 
an element of X, L(q) is the feasible game form belonging (assigned) to q. For any 
q e X the game forms assigned by E(q) are called the admissible game forms 
belonging (assigned) to q. If S is a non-empty subset of /V, E(q)(S) is called the 
admissible game form of S at q. 
3*4 Definition A complex game tree Γ is called cooperative iff the domain D
r 
equals the set of all non-empty subsets of N. A CGT which is not cooperative is 
called non-cooperative. 
Let Γ = < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > be a CGT. 
3*5 Definition A play-structure of Γ is a sequence p = Kq^p^, {q^, p2), — ] 
where τ ^ ) = 1, and for all t > 1: 
(1) <7,eX; 
(2) pt is a play of the feasible game form Σ(ί/() or a play of an admissible game 
form assigned to an element of D
r
 by S{qt)\ 
(3) qt+i is the outcome of the play pr 
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A point qt is called the qt-point or simply the t-point of ρ. We shall refer to a play 
p, as the t-play of p. 
3*6 Definition Let p = [(q{, p{), (q2, p2)> ··· ] be a play-structure of Γ. It is called 
an alethic play-structure iff, for all t > 1, pt is a play of the feasible game form 
Σ(?,)· 
3*7 Definition Let p be a play-structure of Γ, L e DT and it a positive integer. Let 
pk denote the ¿-play of p. A play-structure p* = [(<7*,/>*), (q^Pj)' · · ·] is called 
an [L, k]-variant of p iff 
( 1 ) p * is a play-structure of Γ; 
(2) there is an L-variant of pk which has ^t*+1 as its outcome; 
(3) for t > k: p* is a play of the feasible game form T,(q*). 
3*8 Definition Let p = [(q^Py), (^»Рг^ ••· 1 be a play-structure of Г, L an element 
of Dp and к a positive integer. A play-structure p* = [(ί'.ίΊ*)· (Яг'Рг^· • • ·1 ' s 
called 
(1) a feasible k-split of p iff 
(a) p* is a play-structure of Г; 
(b) ЯІ = <7*; 
(c) pi is a play of the feasible game form Σ(<7
λ
). 
(2) an L-admissible k-split of p iff 
(a) p* is a play-structure of Γ 
(b) ЯІ = Qk 
(c) />;* is a play of the admissible game form S(q¡)(L). 
3*9 Definition A model structure of DLA is an ordered triple < Γ, p, 3 > such 
that 
(1) Γ = < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > is a non-cooperative CGT (cf. definition 3*4); 
(2) ρ is a play-structure of Γ; 
(3) 3 is a mapping which assigns 
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(a) to each free individual symbol a singleton-subset of N; 
(b) to each free temporal symbol a positive integer; 
(c) to each element of X a model of BL in which the set of individuals is N. 
The interpretation /" (see appendix 1) of each of those models assigns 
the same singleton to a free individual symbol as the interpretation 3. 
3*10 Definition Let Γ = < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > be a non-cooperative CGT, ρ a play-
structure of Γ, and M = < Γ, p , 3 > a model structure of DLA. 
Furthermore, let for any free individual symbol i and any free temporal symbol ί, 
3(0 and 3(i.) be denoted as 1 respectively t
r 
For any formula φ of DLA, we say that φ is true in (holds in) M iff 
(1) in case φ = (ί,,ψ): ψ is true in the model of the basic logic assigned by 3 to 
the tj-point of p; 
(2) in case φ = Do^r-,ψ): ψ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for every [/V-/,r ]-variant p* 
of p; 
(3) in case φ = Dó((f-,Y|/): 
(a) Do((f ·,ψ) is true in M; 
(b) ϋο,ίί,ψ) is not true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for at least one feasible tJ-split p* 
of p; 
(4) in case φ = Cany (ψ is a Do- or a Dó-statement of type Ut): 
ψ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for at least one feasible f -split p* of p; 
(5) in case φ = Musty (ψ is a Do- or a Dó-statement of type Ut): 
ψ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for every feasible t-split p* of p; 
(6) in case φ = May\y (ψ is a Do- or a Dó-statement of type iff): 
ψ is true in < Γ, p*t 3 > for at least one ϊ-admissible r -split p* of p\ 
(7) in case φ = Shally (ψ is a Do- or a Dó-statement of type Ut): 
ψ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for every ¿-admissible i¡-split p* of p\ 
(8) in case φ = -ψ: ψ is not true in M\ 
(9) in case φ = (ψ & ω): both ψ and ω is true in M; 
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(10) in case φ = Va [ψ] (β is a bound individual or temporal variable): for every 
free individual respectively temporal symbol β, the formula ψ[α/β] is true in 
M; 
(11) in case φ = (t¡ = tfi: i¡ = f,·; 
(12) in case φ = (r, < tj): t¡ < t}\ 
(13) in case φ = (< = _ƒ): / = ]. 
where ψ [α/β] denotes the formula which results if the symbol β is replaced by the 
symbol α wherever it occurs free in ψ. 
3*11 Definition Let Γ be a non-cooperative CGT and φ a wff of DLA. φ is Γ-
satisfiable iff there is an alethic play-structure p of Γ such that φ is true in a 
model structure < Γ, p, 3 > of DLA. The formula φ is T-valid iff for all alethic 
play-structures p of Γ and all interpretations 3, φ is true in the model structure < 
Γ, p , 3 > of DLA. 
Let С be a non-empty class of non-cooperative CGTs. A set of wffs of DLA is C-
valid iff every element of the set is Г-valid for all Г e С 
Chapter 4 
DL A*: Collective agents 
Introduction Not only individuals can be said to perform actions with certain 
results. The same can be said about collectivities. In fact, collections of people 
sometimes do, can do or may do things which the individuals on their own do not, 
cannot or may not do. It makes perfect sense to say that one soccer team beats 
another team and, at the same time, hold that none of the players has on his or her 
own defeated the other team. To give another example, the parliament of a country 
can see to it that a law is enacted even though none of the individual members of 
parliament can. Similarly, to say that a group of citizens has the permission to do 
something does not imply that any of the members of the group may, on his or her 
own, do so. 
Thus, the necessary consequences of the actual, the possible or the permissible 
actions of a collectivity (e.g. a soccer team, a parliament, a group of citizens) may 
well differ from the consequences of the actions (actual, possible or permissible) 
taken by the individuals constituting the collectivity. 
In this chapter we shall expand the syntax and the semantics of DLA in order to 
study expressions about actions taken by collectivities or groups. The logic which 
results, DLA*, can be called a logic of collective action, in contrast to the logic of 
individual action formed by DLA. 
4.1 Before discussing the possible relationships between individual and collective 
behaviour we shall first go into the question of how a collectivity is constructed. 
The language of DLA* contains a symbol '+' which is used to describe the process 
of collectivization. We shall use the term agent designator for any expression 
designating an individual or collective agent. [Lindahl, 1977, p. 220] The symbol 
'+' denotes a binary operation operating on all pairs of agent designators T{ and T2 
and yields an agent designator (T, + T2). For example, if / and j are two free 
individual symbols, (/ + j) refers to the collective agent of which i and j are the 
only members. Since the operation works on all pairs of agent designators, and 
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since an expression of the form (Tl + T2) is itself an agent designator, the 
expression of a more complex expression like (T{ + T2) + T^ is also an agent 
designator, i.e., a symbol denoting a collectivity. 
On the basis of the properties of the binary operation *+' one can distinguish 
several ways of collectivization. A distinction is often made between ordered and 
unordered collectivization.1 Consider the following interpretations of the 
expression (ƒ + j) [Lindahl, 1977, p. 224]: 
(1) (' makes use of the help of j ; 
(2) / has consulted j . 
These two interpretations yield an ordered collectivity, since the order in which the 
operator ' + ' is used is of importance. The individual i who makes use of the help of 
individual j is not the same agent as the individual j receiving help from ι: on this 
interpretation (i + j) and (j + i) denote different collective agents. An unordered 
collectivity results if it does not matter in which order the operation of 
collectivization is executed. For example, if we interpret ' + ' as 'together with' 
[Lindahl, 1977, p. 2201 or 'the union of' [Kanger and Kanger, 1966, p. 103], then it 
does not matter in which order we place the agent designators. To say that (/' + j) is 
the union of / and j or that it is i together with j , is the same as saying that it is j 
and (' united or j together with i. On this interpretation (/ + j) denotes the same 
collectivity as (/' + /). 
The action operators which we use or the states of affairs which are the result of 
actions do not convey conclusive information about the specific way something is, 
can be or may be brought about. We know that individuals can take actions, we 
know the consequences of those actions, but we do not know what those actions 
look like. In particular, we do not have the means to determine whether i has 
helped j , whether / has consulted j or whether any other possible relation between 
1
 Cf. [Lindahl. 1977, p. 214]. [Hansson, 1986. p. 89]. 
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the two individual agent designators holds. For this reason we shall define collective 
agents as unordered collectivities, i.e., as sets of individuals. 
In the semantics of DLA the free individual symbols refer to one-element sets. They 
were said to be identical if they referred to the same set. This approach is also 
taken in DLA*: agent designators are expressions designating sets of individuals. 
Just like in DLA two free individual symbols i, j are said to be identical, (i = J), if 
they refer to the same set, so are, in DLA*, two agent designators identical if they 
refer to the same set. Thus, for instance, the expression Ту - (T2 + T¿) states that 
the collectivity designated as Tl is the same set of individuals as the one to which 
(T2 + T3) refers. 
Furthermore, the operator '+' can in our logic be interpreted both as 'in union with' 
and as 'together with'. We shall say that an expression (F + G) refers to the union 
of the sets to which F and G refer. Obviously, this implies that the rules of logic 
which govern the set-theoretic operation of union also govern the operation '+'. 
This means that for all agent designators Ту, T2, Г3 the following properties hold: 
(1) (Ту + T2) = (T2 + Г,) (commutativity) 
(2) (Ту + T2) + T3 = Ty + (T2 + T3) (associativity) 
(3) (Ту + Ту) = Ту (idempotency). 
Leo Apóstol has argued that not every notion of 'togetherness' satisfies the property 
of associativity: 
'(W)hen a married couple goes for a walk together with a friend, then this 
does not always imply that the husband and the friend go for a walk, together 
with the wife. Groups acting as groups can do things together with outside 
individuals without being broken up in the act of doing so (and on the other 
hand, the opposite may occur). For this reason we must consider both an 
associative and a non associative "together".' [Apóstol, 1978, p. 1341 
2
 Cf. [Hansson, 1986, p. 89]. 
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Again we remark that our logic does not say anything about the means which are 
used to realize a state of affairs. We only know the consequences of the actions 
taken by individuals, not the characteristics of those actions. For this reason it is not 
possible to introduce a non-associative collectivization operator: we do not have the 
means to distinguish an action undertaken by the agent designator (Ту + T2) + Γ3 
from the actions undertaken by Ту + (7"2 + T^). 
Furthermore, according to Apóstol a statement of the type (7"j + Ту) is meaningless 
in any possible interpretation of a notion of togetherness. [Apóstol, 1978, p. 135] 
On his view, a statement like (Г, + T{) - T{ is not true or false, but absurd: it 
should not be considered a well-formed formula. However, the syntax of DLA* 
would become rather complex if we would use the operator '+' only on agents 
which differ from one other. Since the gain in intuitive clarity of such a more 
complex syntax is not very great, we shall not join Apostol's view and instead 
permit such statements as (T¡ + Ту). Once one permits such formulas, the validity 
of the property of idempotency is easily seen. Since an expression of the form (F + 
G) refers to the union of the sets to which F and G refer, and since, for any set A, 
(A u A) = A, the set to which (Ту + Ту) refers is identical to the set to which Ту 
refers. Hence, (Ту + Г,) = Г, is always true. 
The last symbols which we introduce are θ and «. The symbol 'Θ' operates in the 
same way as '+' . It is an operation carried out on two agent designators, and the 
resulting expression also denotes an agent. However, the interpretations of the two 
operations differ. Whereas the expression (Γ, + 7*2) refers to the union of Ту and T2, 
(Ту θ Γ2) refers to its intersection: it contains only those individuals which are a 
member of both the agent denoted as Ту and the agent denoted as Г2. The 
expression Г3 = (Ту Θ 72) states, for instance, that an individual is a member of the 
coalition to which T3 refers if and only if the individual is a member of the sets to 
which 7", and T2 refer. It is easily checked that the operator 'Ф', like '+', has the 
properties of commutativity, associativity and idempotency. The symbol '«' is used 
to express the notion of 'subgroup'. For any two terms Ту and 7 2 we use the 
expression (Ту « 7"2) to say that Ту refers to a set which is a subset of the set 
denoted as T2. Stated differently, every individual belonging to the agent denoted Ту 
also belongs to the set which T2 designates. Since free individual and coalitional 
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symbols are agent designators, we can write (/ « G) to express that individual i is a 
member of coalition G. 
Given two agent designators Tj, 7 2 it is sometimes convenient to be able to express 
that there are no individuals who are members of both groups. The statement Vj 
[~(s « Tj) ν ~(s « T2)], where s is a bound individual variable, is such an 
expression. The symbol which designates the empty coalition permits, however, a 
more economic way of stating this: J. = 7^  Θ T2. 
Obviously, there is a relationship between formulas of the type (F « G) and 
formulas expressing an identity. Two sets are identical if they have the same 
elements, or stated differently, if they are subsets of one other. Consequently, two 
agent designators Γ1? T2 are identical if and only if the symbols refer to sets which 
are subsets of each other: every member of 7j is a member of 7"2 and vice versa. 
4.2 In DLA two types of agent symbols, the free individual symbols and the bound 
individual variables, are used. In DLA* there are five types of agent symbols. The 
first type is the set of free coalitional symbols. These symbols, which will be 
denoted with capital letters F, G, H, ... refer to sets of individuals which always 
contain at least one member. Thus a coalition to which such a symbol refers can 
never be empty. The second type of agent symbols is identical to the free individual 
symbols i, j , k, .... used in DLA. These symbols refer to one-element sets of 
individuals only, the so-called trivial coalitions. The symbol J. refers to the empty 
coalition, i.e., the coalition containing no members at all. As we shall presently see, 
it is assumed that the empty coalition cannot be said to perform actions. Finally, we 
distinguish bound individual symbols s, t, u, ..., as in DLA, and bound coalitional 
symbols S,T, U 
By definition an agent designator is any expression which refers to a set of 
individuals. Since we permit the operators '+' and ' ' to operate on any two agent 
designators, we can conclude that a free coalitional symbol is always an agent 
designator, but that an agent designator is not always a free coalitional symbol. For 
example, the expression (F + G) + Η is well-formed and is an agent designator - it 
refers to a set of individuals - but it is not a free coalitional symbol. (Though we 
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shall assume that for any agent designator Τ which refers to a non-empty set there 
is a free coalitional symbol which refers to the same set. Thus, in this particular 
case, there is a free coalitional symbol, say /, such that I = (F + G) + H.) 
The syntax of DLA* is constructed in such a way that formulas of the type 
Doj(t¡,q¡) and ϋό^Ο,,φ) are wffs of DLA* provided Τ is an agent designator which 
is not identical to the empty coalition. Thus, we do not permit the construction of 
formulas which express that the empty coalition sees to it that something is the case 
(whether in the weak or in the strong sense). Since we assume, like we did in DLA, 
that - ψ is a wff of DLA* if and only if ψ is a wff of DLA*, it follows that 
formulas like -ϋο^ί,,φ) and -Οό^ί,,φ) are also excluded if Τ is identical to the 
empty coalition ±. In our opinion, it is absurd to say that an agent consisting of 
nobody performs an action. With respect to the Do- and Dó-statements which are 
wffs of DLA*, the alethic and the deontic modalities are applied to them in the 
same way as in DLA. Hence, if ψ is a Do- or Dó-statement of DLA*, Cany, 
Musty, Mayy, and Shall\|/ are also wffs of DLA*. 
Finally, we remark that the free individual symbols do not necessarily refer to 
human beings. In the language of DLA*, individuals are simply assumed to be 
those agents which cannot be designated as the application of the operation '+' on 
two non-identical agent designators - they are, so to speak, the primitive agents of 
the model. For example, the expression / denotes an individual since there are no j , 
к (j * it) such that / = (/' + k). Now it may well be the case that these symbols do 
not refer to persons but to groups of persons. For example, in the context of 
analysing coalition formation processes the individual agents may be political 
parties, whereas the collective agents are coalitions of political parties. On the other 
hand, in a different context, for example when studying political participation, the 
individual agents may indeed be individuals, say citizens. In the chapters 7 and 8 
we shall attribute preferences to the agents designated by the free individual 
symbols. Obviously, if one assumes that only human beings can have preferences, 
then the free individual symbols do indeed refer to individuals. 
4.3 A specification of the properties of the operators ' + ' and ' Θ ' still does not give 
us sufficient information about the logic of collective actions. We also want to 
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know what the rules of logic are which regulate expressions about the behaviour of 
collective agents. To say that (ι + j) denotes the same coalition as (/ + i) does not 
say anything about, for example, the relation between actions taken by i on the one 
hand, and actions taken by (/ + j) on the other hand. 
Two assumptions about the relationship between individual and collective actions 
can be distinguished. Both assumptions state that in order to say that a collectivity 
does (or can do or may do) a certain thing, it must be true that the members of a 
collectivity act (can act or may act) in such a way that the state of affairs arises. 
However, the first assumption, which we call the assumption of complete support, 
says that every member of the group contributes (respectively can contribute or may 
contribute) something to the realization of the state of affairs. For instance, if / pays 
j to paint his walls, and if j accepts the money and paints the walls, then the 
collectivity (i + j) can be said to bring about the state of affairs in which the walls 
are painted. 
On the other hand, according to what we call the assumption of partial support it 
need not be the case that all members of a collectivity contribute (or can, 
respectively, may contribute) to the realization of the state of affairs. Thus if I were 
to paint these walls, then the collectivity consisting of me and the Russian people 
also sees to it that these walls are painted. 
It is not too difficult to formulate principles that are compatible with each of these 
assumptions. For example, with respect to the Do-operator the following principle 
formulated by Lindahl [1977, p. 221] 
(la) F = G-> (ϋο^ί,,φ) <-» Do
c
(r,,<p)) 
seems reasonable and is compatible with both assumptions. 
Hansson [1986, p. 90] formulated a condition which also seems to be in line with 
both assumptions: 
(2a) D o f (ί,,φ) & Doc(f,,(p) -> OoF + σ(ί,·,φ) 
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Since φ is a necessary result of their actions, the agents designated as F and G can 
be said to support or to contribute completely (and hence also partially) its 
realization. 
The following principle formulated by Ranger is compatible with the partial support 
assumption, but not with the complete support assumption: 
(3a) ϋο^ί,,φ) -» Do F + G(f,,(p) 
According to this principle, if the agent designated as F sees to it that something is 
the case, then any group which contains all the members of F can be said to see to 
it that it is the case. Hence, one can say that the actions of a group, say F + G, lead 
to a state of affairs φ, even though there may be some members who do not support 
the coming about of the resulting state of affairs. 
With respect to both the Do-, the Dó and the Can-operator the partial support 
assumption is compatible with the semantics of DLA*; (2a), (3a) and 
(3b) CanDo^.cp) -> CanDoF +
 σ
(ί,,φ) 
are valid statements of DLA*. Furthermore, valid formulas result if we replace the 
Do-operator by the Do-operator. The DLA*-semantics of Do- and Can-statements is 
essentially the same as in DLA. At each point of time there is exactly one game 
form which describes the possible actions of the individual agents and the 
consequences of each possible combination of individual actions. The actions of a 
coalition of individuals are the combinations of individual strategies - one strategy 
for each individual. To see whether a formula like ϋο^ί,-,φ) holds, we look at the 
necessary consequences of the strategy-tuple which the coalition designated by F 
takes. As in DLA, a consequence is said to be necessary if it results regardless of 
the actions other agents take. Obviously, if an individual i takes an action which has 
φ as a necessary consequence, then any coalition of which ƒ is a member, and 
consequently has /'s strategy in its strategy-tuple, takes a strategy-tuple which has φ 
See [Kanger and Kanger, 1966] and [Lindan], p. 224]. 
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as its consequence. Hence, (2a) and (3a) are valid expressions. The same reasoning 
shows that (3b) is valid. 
On the other hand, the reasoning does not hold with respect to the relation between 
actions individuals are permitted to take and the permissible actions of collectivities. 
That is, the statement 
(3c) MayDo^-.cp) -» MayDoF + c(ff,<p) 
or even the weaker 
(2c) MayDoF(f,-,(p) & MayDoG(f(,(p) -> MayDo f + σ(ί,,φ) 
are not valid statements of DLA*. This is a result of the presupposition that there is 
not one game form which describes the actions individuals are permitted to take, 
but that such an admissible game form is assigned to each coalition. Since there is 
no a priori relationship between the various game forms, it may be the case that i is 
permitted to do something according to the game form assigned to ι, even though 
the coalition of / and j is not permitted to do so according to the admissible game 
form assigned to ((' + J). Thus the logic of the relation between collective and 
individual behaviour differs in the context of actual or possible actions from the 
logic of that relation in the deontic context. 
Whereas the partial support assumption is compatible with the semantics of DLA* 
in the context of actual or possible behaviour, it is not clear how the assumption 
relates to the semantics of deontic statements. Although the deontic counterpart of 
(la), 
(le) F = G -» (MayDo^íp) <-» MayDoc(r,,cp)), 
is valid according to the semantics of DLA*, the same cannot be said of (2c) and 
(3c). The absence of any a priori information about the relationship between the 
admissible game forms assigned to individuals and the admissible game forms 
assigned to collectivities - game forms which are used to determine what is 
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permissible - prevents us from concluding anything about the relation between 
permissions of individuals and permissions of collectivities. 
As we shall show in the next chapter it is, however, possible to define 
circumstances under which formulas like (2c) and (3c) are always true. Thus it is, 
in priciple, possible to define circumstances in which the partial support assumption 
is compatible with DLA*. However, it is not possible for any of the three realms of 
behaviour to define systems of DLA* which are compatible with the complete 
support assumption. This is caused by the specific character of the logic. We focus 
only on the results of actions taken by individuals, not on the characteristics of 
those actions. Since, for example, the intentional dimension of human behaviour is 
ignored, it is not possible to distinguish intended from unintended consequences of 
actions. Such a distinction is obviously important for any construction of a 'support 
function', i.e., a function specifying which agent designators support the realization 
of a state of affairs. 
4
 Cf. [Pöm, 1971, p. 9] and [Lindahl, 1977. p. 225]. 
Chapter 4* 
Formal presentation 
4*1 DLA*: Syntax 
The signs of the language of DLA* are 
(1) The signs of DLA 
(2) Free coalitional symbols: F, G, H, ... (countably many) 
(3) Bound coalitional variables: 5, T, U, ... 
(4) Empty coalition symbol: J_ 
(5) Agentive predicate: « 
(6) Function symbols: +, θ 
4*1.1 Definition The set of agent designators of DLA* is defined inductively: 
(1) Every free individual symbol is an agent designator; 
(2) Every free coalitional symbol is an agent designator; 
(3) The empty coalition symbol is an agent designator; 
(4) If Tj and T2 are agent designators, then (Tj + T2) and (7j θ T2) are agent 
designators; 
(5) (l)-(4) define all agent designators. 
4*1.2 Definition The set of atomic formulas of DLA* is defined as follows: 
(1) Every atomic formula of DLA is an atomic formula of DLA*; 
(2) For all agent designators Ту, T2, CT¡ « T2) and (T| = T2) are atomic formulas 
of DLA*. 
(3) (1) and (2) define all atomic formulas. 
4*1.3 Notation Let φ be a wff of DLA*, α a free individual, temporal or 
coalitional symbol and β an individual, temporal respectively coalitional variable. 
φ[β/α] denotes the expression which results if the free symbol α is replaced by the 
variable β wherever α occurs in φ. 
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4*1.4 Definition The set of wffs of DLA* is 
(1) For all wffs φ of BL and all free temporal symbols ί,, (ί,,φ) is wff of DLA*; 
(2) Each atomic formula of DLA* is a wff of DLA*; 
(3) For all wffs φ of DLA*, -φ is a wff of DLA*; 
(4) For all wffs φ and ψ of DLA*, (φ & ψ) is a wff of DLA*; 
(5) For any free individual or coalitional symbol α and for all free temporal 
constants f : 
(a) if φ is a wff of DLA*, the expression Do
a
(r ,φ) and Dóa(f,(p) are wffs 
of DLA* called Do-statement of type alt. and Dó-statement of type 
α/Λ respectively; 
(b) if φ is a Do- (DÓ-) statement of type α/Λ, -φ is a wff of DLA* which 
is also a Do- (Dó-) statement of type а/л; 
(c) if φ and ψ are Do- (Dó-) statements of type α/ί then (φ & ψ) is also 
a Do- (DÓ-) statement of type α/Λ and a wff of DLA*; 
(d) there are no other Do- or Dó-statements of type α/Λ than those defined 
by (a) - (c); 
(6) For any free individual or coalitional symbol α and for all free temporal 
symbols t : if φ is a Do-statement or Dó-statement of type α/Λ, then Мауф 
and Can<p are wffs of DLA*; 
(7) For all wffs φ of DLA*, all free individual, coalitional or temporal symbols a, 
and all bound individual, coalitional respectively temporal variables β: Va 
[φ[β/α]] is a wff of DLA* (see notation 4*1.3); 
(8) the clauses (l)-(7) define all wffs of DLA*. 
4*1.5 Remark We define free and bound occurrences of individual, coalitional or 
temporal variables are defined as in 2*4 except that it is now in the context of 
DLA*. 
4*1.6 Definition The abbreviations used in DLA are also used in DLA*. 
Furthermore, the following abbreviations are used: 
Γ, * T2 for -(7, = T2) 
φ[Γ,/5] for 3S [<p & (Γ, = S)} 
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where 7"j and 7"2 are agent designators, where 3 5 [φ] is a wff of DLA*, and where 
(p[7yS] denotes the formula which results if the coalitional variable S is replaced by 
the agent designator Tj wherever it occurs free in φ. 
4*2 DLA*: semantics 
4*2.1 Definition A model structure of DLA* is an ordered triple < Γ, p, 3 > such 
that 
(1) Γ = < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > is a cooperative CGT (cf. definition 3*4); 
(2) p is a play-structure of Γ; 
(2) 3 is a mapping which assigns 
(a) to each agent designator a subset of N in such a way that 
(1) 3(1) = 0 ; 
(2) for all agent designators 7^, T2: 3(7\ + T2) = 3(7",) u 3(Γ 2) and 3(7, 
Φ T2) = 3(Γ,) η 3(7-2); 
(3) to each free individual symbol a one-element subset and to each free 
coalitional symbol a non-empty subset is assigned; 
(4) there is no non-empty subset of N which has not been assigned to a 
free coalitional symbol. 
(b) to each free temporal symbol a positive integer; 
(c) to each element of X a model of BL in which the set of individuals is 
N. The interpretation /" (see Appendix 1) of each of those models 
assigns the same singleton to a free individual symbol as the 
interpretation 3 . 
4*2.2 Definition Let Γ = < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > be a cooperative CGT, p a play-structure 
of Γ, and M = < Γ, j 9 , 3 > a model structure of DLA*. Furthermore, let the 
interpretation of a symbol χ always be denoted as x. 
Let Τ be either a free individual or free coalitional variable. For any formula φ of 
DLA*, we say that φ is true in (holds in) M iff 
( Ц in case φ = (f,ψ): ψ is true in the model of the basic logic assigned by 3 to 
the fj-point of p\ 
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(2) in case φ = Doj<í,ψ): ψ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for every [N-f,¡^-variant 
P* of p; 
(3) in case φ = ϋ ό ^ , ψ ) : 
(a) Doy<í ,ψ) is trae in M; 
(b) ϋογίί,,ψ) is not true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for at least one feasible tj-split p* 
of p; 
(4) in case φ = Canvy (ψ is a Do- or a Dó-statement of type Tit): 
ψ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 > at least one feasible F -split p* of p; 
(5) in case φ = Mustxy (ψ is a Do- or a Dó-statement of type Tit): 
ψ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for every feasible i-split p* of p; 
(6) in case φ = May\|/ (ψ is a Do- or a Dó-statement of type T/t): 
ψ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for at least one f-admissible r^ -split p* of p; 
(7) in case φ = Shall\|/ (ψ is a Do- or a Dó-statement of type T/t): 
ψ is true in < Γ, p*, 3 > for every Г-admissible t -split p* of p; 
(8) in case φ = -ψ: ψ is not true in M; 
(9) in case φ = (ψ & ω): both ψ and ω are true in M; 
(10) in case φ = Vn [ψ] (β is a bound individual, coalitional or temporal variable): 
for every free individual, coalitional respectively temporal variable a, the 
formula ψ [β/α] is true in M ; 
(11) in case φ = (f, = ry): t, = t/, 
(12) in case φ = (r, < Ç: r, < r,; 
(13) in case φ = (Tj « T2): fl с f2 (where Tj, T2 are agent designators); 
(14) in case φ = (Tj = T2): fl - f2 (where T,, T2 are agent designators); 
where ψ [α/βΐ denotes the formula which results if the symbol β is replaced by the 
symbol α wherever it occurs free in ψ . 
4*2.3 Definition Let Γ be a cooperative CGT and let φ be a wff of DLA*. φ is Γ-
satisfiable iff there is an alethic play-structure p of Γ such that φ is true in a 
model structure < Γ, p, 3 > of DLA*. The formula φ of DLA* is T-valid iff for 
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all alethic play-structures p of Γ and all interpretations 3, φ is true in < Γ, p , 3 
>. 
Let С be a class of cooperative CGTs of DLA*. A set of wffs of DLA* is C-valid 
iff every element of the set is T-valid for all Г e С The set of all such C-valid 
wffs of DLA* is called the C-system of DLA*. 
Chapter 5 
Effectivity functions and systems of logic 
5.1 The notion of a model structure plays a crucial role in the semantics of both 
DLA and DLA*. As we have seen, a model structure can be understood as a 
description of histories of the world. A formula is said to be satisfiable if it fits 
within the description: there is a history of the world in which the formula is true. 
Obviously, some types of formulas do not fit into some types of model structures. 
Consider, for instance, the set В of all non-cooperative CGTs in which the game 
forms which are used to determine what an individual can and cannot do - the 
feasible game forms - all assign exactly one strategy to each individual. Or, stated 
differently, consider those non-cooperative CGTs in which each of the feasible 
game forms can be played in only one way. It is easily seen that every formula of 
the type 'Vj [CanDo/ί,,φ) -» MustDo/ί,,φ)]' is a B-valid formula of DLA: it is 
true in every model structure in which the CGT is an element of B. If every 
individual has been assigned only one strategy, then every individual has only one 
option. He or she must choose that strategy. If an individual does not have the 
option of smoking a cigarette, then he must see to it that he is not smoking, or 
more concisely, he must refrain from smoking. On the other hand, given the 
existence of model structures in which some of the game forms assign more than 
one strategy to individuals, seeing to it that something is the case does not always 
imply that one must see to it that it is the case; consider the individual who has 
both the option of smoking and the option of not smoking. 
Similarly, the characteristics of the admissible game forms of a model structure 
determine which types of deontic formulas are satisfiable. If, for instance, all 
individuals have also only one admissible strategy, then the formula 'Vj 
[MayDo/Γ,,φ) -» ShallDo^.cp)]' is also a ß-valid formula of DLA. 
In this chapter we shall define properties of complex game trees in terms of 
characteristics of the game forms (feasible and admissible) constituting those game 
trees. In doing so we shall make use of the notion of an effectivity function. After 
having presented this concept in an informal manner, we shall show how it can be 
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used to define those properties. We then present, for each of the properties, 
formulas which are true in model structures in which the CGT has the property in 
question. 
5.2 Consider a point q of a complex game tree. Depending on whether the game 
tree is non-cooperative or cooperative, there are either η + 1 game forms or 2" 
game forms assigned to q. If the complex game tree is non-cooperative, i.e., if 
collective agents are not taken into account, η + 1 game forms belong to q. There is 
one feasible game form describing the things individuals can and cannot do, and 
there are η admissible game forms - one for each individual - describing what they 
may and may not do. If the game tree is cooperative 2" game forms will belong to 
q: one feasible game form, and one admissible game form for each of the 2" - 1 
non-empty subsets of N. 
We shall associate with each point of a complex game tree two ejfectivity functions. 
The concept of an effectivity function was introduced by Moulin and Peleg [1982]. 
It is a function describing the power structure underlying a decision situation. 
[Moulin and Peleg, 1982, p. 119] [Abdou and Keiding, 1991, p. ix] The function 
assigns to each non-empty coalition a set of non-empty subsets of X. A coalition is 
said to be effective for a set of points if it can force the outcome of the decision 
situation to be within that set. For instance, if an individual i has a strategy which, 
depending on what the other individuals do, either leads to qi or to q2, then the set 
(<7),<72) belongs to the effectivity set of {/}: by choosing this strategy the individual 
makes sure that the outcome belongs to [^j,^)· Similarly, if a group of individuals 
can coordinate their actions in such a way that the outcome will always be q^, then 
(<7¡} belongs to the group's effectivity set. 
For all points q of an arbitrary complex game tree < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > we formulate, first 
of all, an effectivity function which describes the power distribution underlying the 
decision situation as described by the feasible game form Σ(<7). This is called the 
feasible effectivity function associated with q and is denoted as E (<?\ Subsequently, 
we construct one effectivity function on the basis of the η admissible game forms in 
case the game tree is non-cooperative, or on the basis of the 2" - 1 admissible game 
forms if it is cooperative. We call this the admissible effectivity function associated 
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with q and denote it as E^^'. In terms of this effectivity function, a coalition S is 
said to be effective for a set В of points only if the members of the coalition can, in 
the coalition's admissible game form, coordinate their actions in such a way that the 
outcome will always be an element of B. 
Before we proceed we remark that our definitions of effectivity functions differ in 
two respects from the standard definitions as presented in [Moulin and Peleg, 1982] 
[Moulin, 1983] [Peleg, 1984] [Abdou and Keiding, 1991]. In the first place, the 
domain of an effectivity function is usually taken to contain all non-empty sets of 
individuals.1 In our definition this need not be the case, however. In the semantics 
of DLA non-cooperative CGTs are used. This means that the only possible 
coalitions are the trivial coalitions, i.e., the coalitions consisting of exactly one 
individual. Hence, it does not make much sense to talk about the effectivity of non-
trivial coalitions. We shall assume that the domain of an effectivity function is 
always identical to the domain of the particular CGT under consideration. In the 
context of the semantics of DLA the domain of an effectivity function is the set of 
all trivial coalitions. When we are studying the logic of actions taken by 
collectivities, i.e., in the context of DLA*, the domain of the function consists of all 
non-empty coalitions - it is identical to the set of all non-empty subsets of N. 
Secondly, whereas in the standard definition a coalition is always effective for a 
superset of a set for which it is effective, this is not necessarily true in the 
definition we use. In our definition, which is based on a definition given by Rajat 
Deb [1990], a coalition is effective for a set if and only if each member of the 
coalition has a strategy such that if they play that strategy then (a) any of the 
elements of the set and no other outcomes than those belonging to the set can be 
the outcome, and (b) only outcomes belonging to the set are possible. Whereas part 
(b) is in line with the usual definition of an effectivity function which is associated 
with a game form, part (a) differs from it. It implies that a set for which an 
individual is effective does not contain outcomes which will never be reached if the 
coalition follows that particular strategy. 
In [Moulin and Peleg, 1982], [Moulin, 1983) and [Peleg, 1984] ihe domain contains only non­
empty subsets of N, whereas in, for instance, [Abdou and Keiding, 1991, p. 31] the empty coalition also 
belongs to the domain. We shall follow Moulin's and Pclcg's approach. 
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5.3 Consider again the non-cooperative complex game tree of the example in 
chapter 3. The set of individuals N contained three members, /, j and k. The set of 
outcomes was X = {q0, q¡, ... ) . Furthermore, 
Σ(«70) = Ξ(<70)(ί) = Ξ(<70)(/) = Е(д0)(к) = G 0 
Ц
Яі
) = Ξ( 9 ι ) (0 = Ξ(9ι)(/·) = 5fo,)(*) = Gì 
Hq2) = E(q2)(i) = E(q2)(j) = G2 * E(qz)(k) = G3 
Ifo3) = Ξ(<73)(ι) = Ξ(<73)0·) = E(q^k) = G 4 
Σ(<74) = Ξ(<74)(0 = Ξ(<74)(/) = G5 * E(qA)(k) = G6 
where the game forms G
n
, G 2 and G 3 were defined as 
G0 = < {?,, <72, ήτ3, 9 4 } . « 0 ' 7 t 0 > G2 = < \q9, q]0, qn, ql2], σ 2 , π ^ 
(a) a0(i)= {sy^SpSj}; 
σ
ο(/) = σ0(*) = | Í 5 ) ; 
(b) *<#><,,) = πο(ί,, Í 5 , ί 5) = <7,; 
π
οθΌ2) = ^ г - *5> J5) = ^ 
*<М)з) = *ds3> s5> J5> = <7з; 
π0(Ρ()4) = «о(*4· 55> Js) = ЧЛ> 
(a) σ2(/) = {s5}, 
σ2(/) = σ2(Λ) = ( Í 6 , i 7 } ; 
(b) π 2 ( ρ 2 1 ) = π 2 ( ί 5 , j 6 , s6) = q9; 
л 2 ( р 2 3 ) = 7С2(і5, j 7 , J 6 ) = ? M ; 
^ (Р24) = π2(Α5· *7· ^ ) = <?12· 
G 3 = < ^ І О ' <?12b σ 3 ' π 3 > 
(a) σ3(ι') = { ί 5 } . ОзО) = (*6· -Μ· σ 3^> = ( ^ l ; 
(b) π 3 (ρ 3 1 ) = π 3 (5 5 , j 6 , j 7 ) = </10; 
π 3 (ρ 3 2 ) = n 3 (s 5 , ί 7 · 57) = ÍI2· 
As said above, there belong two effectivity functions to all points of the tree. The 
feasible effectivity function assigns a non-empty set of non-empty subsets of X to 
all coalitions in the domain of the game tree on the basis of the feasible game form. 
The other effectivity function, the admissible effectivity function, assigns such sets 
on the basis of the admissible game forms. We call the sets assigned by the feasible 
and admissible effectivity function feasible effectivity sets and admissible effectivity 
sets respectively. 
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For any of the sets belonging to an individual's effectivity set, the individual can, 
in the particular game form on the basis of which the effectivity function is defined, 
adopt a strategy such that the outcome belongs to that set regardless of the actions 
other individuals take. To see how this is achieved we first look at the feasible 
game form at q§. We see that /' has four strategies, and that j and к each have only 
one. Therefore, by choosing a strategy, ι determines the outcome. The other two 
individuals can do nothing about this. If ι chooses i,, then ql will always be the 
outcome, if ί chooses s2
 ш е
 outcome will be q2,
 e t c
- Hence, / can make sure that 
the outcome will belong to any of the four sets {q^}, {q2\, W3I. \.4ά,\· w e s a v that 
these sets belong to the feasible effectivity set of / at qQ. 
The individuals j and к cannot in any way make sure that one or more of the 
possible outcomes q¡ - <74 will not be the actual outcome of the game form. 
Therefore, the feasible effectivity set of both j and к contains one set only, the set 
l?i· аг> b' Q4)· 
According to the standard game-theoretic definition an individual is called effective 
for a set if that individual can make sure that the outcome belongs to the set. This 
notion of effectivity implies that an individual who is effective for a set В is also 
effective for any superset of B. If / makes sure that the outcome belongs to {q^\ 
then it is trivially true that he also makes sure that it belongs to, for instance, [q
x
, 
<74). However, as explained in the previous section, in our definition of a feasible or 
admissible effectivity function, the set {<7i,<74) belongs to /'s effectivity set if and 
only if it is the case that / has an action which always leads to q^ or <74 and which -
depending on the actions taken by other individuals - sometimes leads to q^ and 
sometimes to q4. This latter condition is not satisfied, however. The strategy s4 
always leads to <74 and never to q¡: there is no play of G0 in which ƒ plays s4 and 
which has q^ as its outcome. Hence, {q^q^} or any other superset of [q^], {q2}, 
{qy\ or (<74} for that matter, does not belong to i's effectivity set. Thus we 
conclude that, for q = q0, £ Σ ^((/)) = {!</,), iq2), {<?3}, [q4]), and E™({j}) = 
' Like in chapter 3 we shall, in order to make reading lighter, frequently speak about an 'individual 
1' in places in which it is more appropriate to speak about the 'Inviai coahuon (1)'· For instance, we 
shall often refer to an individual's effectivity set instead of the effectivity set of the coalition of which 
that individual is the sole member Similarly, we shall speak about an individual, rather than a trivial 
coalition, as belonging to the domain of a complex tree game 
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In the feasible game form belonging to G2 individual j can, by choosing s6, make 
sure that either q9 or <?10 results. If he chooses s-¡ either qn or ql2 will be the 
outcome. Since j has no other strategies, his effectivity set is [{qg, <710}, [qn, 
<712}}. Similar reasoning shows that the effectivity set of к is {{qg, Ч\\), (<7m> 
q
n
}} and, finally, that /'s is {{q9, ql0, qn, ql2}}. 
To establish the deontic effectivity of an individual we also examine into which sets 
of outcomes the individual can force the outcome to be. However, the outcomes and 
strategies are the outcomes and strategies belonging to the individual's admissible 
game form. Since individuals may have been assigned different admissible game 
forms, the admissible effectivity function may well be based, in contrast to the 
feasible effectivity function, on more than one game form. 
To illustrate the procedure we investigate which admissible effectivity function 
belongs to q2. At q2, the admissible game form assigned to both /' and j is G 2. We 
have seen above that the effectivity sets of /' and j in G2 are {{q9, ql0, qn, qui ) 
and {{qg, <7io)' 1<7ц> Qn^ respectively. Hence, these sets are also their admissible 
effectivity sets. The admissible game form of к is Gy In this game form, к has only 
one strategy: s-j. Depending on what ƒ s strategy is, the outcome will either be ql0 
or <712. Therefore, ¿'s admissible effectivity set is {{<7ю> Я\2^· Thus, we see that if 
q = q2, e%4\{¡}) = {{qg, qw, qu, qn)), ЕН(<?)((Л) = {(</„, <jr,0|, [qn, qn\) and 
£Ξ(,?)((*})={{<7ΐ0><7ΐ2Π· 
In a cooperative setting, that is, if the domain of the CGT equals the set of all non­
empty subsets of N, the procedure through which the effectivity of a coalition in a 
feasible or admissible game form is determined, is more or less the same as 
described above. We look at the combinations of strategies that the members within 
the coalition can adopt, and examine to which outcomes each possible combination 
may lead. 
5.4 The relationship between the feasible and admissible effectivity functions on the 
one hand, and the truth of formulas of DLA or DLA* within a model structure on 
the other hand, is not difficult to understand. An interpretation 3 assigns a model of 
the basic logic to each point in the game tree. Thus if an individual is effective for 
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a set of outcomes, he or she is in a certain sense effective for a set of 'worlds'. 
Depending on 'vhether we are talking about the feasible or admissible effectivity 
function, an individual's effectivity for a set implies that he or she can, respectively 
may, make sure that a state of affairs as described by a world within that set arises. 
Or, formulated negatively, the individual can, respectively may, make sure that a 
state of affairs which is not described by any of those models will not arise. 
Take the model structure M - < Γ, £>, 3 > belonging to the invitation example, and 
consider the formula which describes that at time f individual j can perform an 
action which necessarily leads to a state of affairs in which j does not attend the 
party at the next point in time: CanDo (f ,(ί
Α
.,~ω)). As we have seen, q2 is the point 
at which the /-round of fp is played.3 It is easily seen that CanDo{f ,(r¿,~(u)) is 
true in M if there is a set belonging to ƒ s feasible effectivity set at q2 such that -ω 
is true in every model belonging to an element of this set. Since j is effective for 
{q9, ?IQ}, this is indeed the case. Individual j can make sure that the outcome 
belongs to this set and, since -ω is true in every model belonging to the points in 
it, he can therefore make sure that ~ω will be true at time t¡¿. j can decide not to go 
to the party. 
An individual can sometimes do things which are not effectuated at the next point 
in time, but which will occur later. Take, for instance, the statement 
CanDo^Xf^-co)). It states that, at time t¡, player i can see to it that j does not 
attend the party at time t¡.. To see whether this formula holds we once more look at 
the feasible effectivity function, in this case the one belonging to qQ, the point 
through which the play-structure passes at time t¡. However, it is useless to look at 
the models assigned to the elements of the sets for which / is effective: those 
models are models of the world at time t·, whereas we need information about the 
characteristics of the world at the time at which the party will take place, i.e., at 
time tk. 
To see how in general effectivity functions can be used to determine the truth of 
formulas of DLA or DLA* we introduce an additional definition. Given a non-
Recall lhat we have assumed thai 3(0 = ι', 3(/y) = /, etc. 
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cooperative (cooperative) CGT Γ, and an interpretation 3 of DLA (DLA*) we shall 
say that a wff φ of DLA (DLA*) holds in (is true in) a point q of the CGT Γ iff φ 
holds in every model structure < Γ, p *, 3 > in which p * is a play-structure which 
passes through q and in which at q and at all points later in time than q, the feasible 
game form is played. 
The notion of truth in a point is convenient when proving the truth of a Can- or 
May-statement in a model structure. As we shall see, we can prove that a formula 
of the form CanDo^/ ,φ) holds in a model structure M - < Γ, ρ, 3 > if and only if 
there is a set В belonging to /'s feasible effectivity set at the /-point such that, 
given Г and 3, φ is true in every element of B. A formula like Can~Do,{f ,φ) is true 
in M if and only if there is a set В belonging to /'s feasible effectivity set at the t-
point such that, given Г and 3, φ does not hold in at least one element of B. Thus, 
the individual / has, at time /, a feasible strategy which does not necessarily lead to 
φ: in some histories of the world it leads to -φ. 
Formulas like MayDo,<i ,φ) and May-Do^/ ,φ) are treated similarly except that we 
now look at /'s deontic effectivity set at the /-point. Thus, a formula of the form 
MayDo({/,<p) holds in a model structure M = < Γ, ρ, 3 > if / is at the /-point of 
p deontically effective for a set such that, given Γ and 3, φ is true in every 
element of B. The formula May-Do,(/ ,φ) is true in M if there is a set В belonging 
to /'s feasible effectivity set at the i-point such that, given Г and 3, φ does not 
hold in at least one element of B. 
Thus we see how effectivity functions can be used to determine whether individuals 
can or may bring about particular aspects of states of affairs. For instance, in our 
example / can make sure that j cannot go to the party. If we look at the initial 
situation we see that / can see to it that the point <73 or q4 is reached. By 
construction of the example, the feasible game forms belonging to these points are 
such that j is not effective for a set of outcomes in which he attends the party. 
Hence, in the worlds described by the feasible game forms belonging to <73 and <74, j 
cannot see to it that he goes to the party. Since / can make sure that one of those 
points will be reached, the formula CanDOjC/^ -CanDo (/ .(/¿.ω))) holds in the model 
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structure M. Moreover, since j stays home in each of the models assigned to the 
direct successors of q^ and q4, the formula CanDo^Xf^-co)) is also true in M. 
5.5 Different types of CGTs can be distinguished on the basis of the properties of 
the admissible and feasible effectivity functions associated with the points of a 
structure. Using some of those properties we distinguish four classes of CGTs and 
four corresponding systems of logic. Two of these systems, Cl and C 2, are systems 
of logic of DLA, the other two, Dj and D2, are systems of logic of DLA*. 
The system of logic Cj is the easiest one to define. It is based on the set, denoted 
C], of all non-cooperative complex game trees. A formula of DLA is called Cy 
valid if and only if it is Г-valid for each Γ belonging to C
v
 In other words, a in­
valid formula φ is a formula which is true in any model structure of DLA in which 
the play-structure consists of plays of feasible game forms only. The system of 
logic Cj is defined as the set of all such С [-valid formulas of DLA. (Note that we 
use the same symbol, in this case Cj, to denote both a class of model structures and 
a set of formulas.) Obviously, Ci is the largest class of non-cooperative CGTs. Any 
C,-valid formula therefore also belongs to any other system of logic of DLA. 
A list of some Cj-valid formulas is: 
(1) Do^.cp) -> φ 
(2) Сап~Оо,{г;,(р) -» Can-Do <ίΑ,φ) 
(3) MustDo,(rA,(p) -» CanDo,(fA,(p) 
(4) MustDo/r^ip) -> MusfDoy^.ip) 
(5) (f, < tj) & ϋο,ί,ί,,ϋο/ί,,ψ)) -> ϋο,α,,Μιιβίϋο/ί,,ψ)) 
(6) ShallDo,(r¿,(p) -> MayDo((fA,(p) 
(7) ϋό ,^ ,φ) «-> [Do,(fA,(p) & Can~D0j(f;,íp)l 
(8) CanDó/^,φ) <-> [CanDo((f¿,(p) & Can~Do,(í¿,(p)] 
(9) MayDó,(fA,cp) «-» [MayDo,(fA,(p) & Can~Do,(fA,(p)] 
(10) -MustDó/^,φ) 
where i, j are arbitrarily chosen free individual symbols and where φ is a wff of 
DLA. 
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The Cj-validity of almost all of these formulas is easily seen to follow from our 
remarks about the semantics of DLA. The formulas (2) and (4) may need some 
clarification, though. According to (2), if there is one individual who can perform 
an action such that some particular state of affairs does not necessarily follow, then 
any individual can do the same. That this formula is Ci-valid is easily understood if 
we look at its semantic 'translation'. In the game-theoretic framework, the formula 
amounts to saying that if there is an individual who has a strategy such that certain 
outcomes do not necessarily result, then all the individuals have such a strategy. Or, 
more precisely, if /' has a strategy such that there is at least one play ρ in which Í 
plays that strategy and which always leads to a point in which, given the CGT and 
the interpretation in question, φ does not hold, then all the individuals have such a 
strategy. This is indeed always the case. The n-1 other strategies are precisely the 
strategies that other individuals take in the play p. The combination of i's strategy 
of not sending an invitation to j and ƒ s and k's strategy of staying passive leads to 
the state of affairs in which j is not invited. Therefore, (', j and к all have a strategy 
available which does not necessitate the state of affairs in which j is invited: ί does 
not invite j , j stays passive and A; stays passive. 
The Cj-valid formula (4) states that if some individual must see to it that something 
happens, then any other individual must also see to it that it happens. According to 
our semantics, saying that someone must see to it that a state of affairs is brought 
about implies that any play of the relevant feasible game form eventually leads to 
that state of affairs. But then it is true that the other individuals must also see to it 
that the state of affairs arises. To say that someone has a strategy which possibly 
leads to the opposite situation contradicts the fact that all plays of the game form 
will lead to this situation. Hence, (4) is indeed Cj-valid. 
We remark that the deontic counterparts of (2) and (4), the formulas 'May-Do^.cp) 
-> May~Do{f;,(p)' and 'ShallDo^tp) -» ShallDo (ίλ,φ)' are not C rvalid formulas. 
The individual's admissible game forms determine whether the individual may and 
may not do something, but they do not determine which permissions the other 
individuals have. It follows that in model structures in which individuals have been 
assigned different admissible game forms, there need not be any relation between 
the permissions of one individual and the permissions of another. 
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For a more extensive list of C¡-formulas the reader is referred to Appendix 2. 
5.6 Except that it is a system of DLA*, the system of logic Dj is defined in the 
same way as С γ. a wff of DLA* is an element of Dl if and only if it is Γ- valid for 
all cooperative CGTs. Many D1-valid formulas are either identical to a Cj-formula 
or derivable from it by simply substituting individual constants and variables by 
coalitional constants and variables. To give one example, if φ still denotes a wff of 
DLA (and hence also of DLA*), then 
(1) Can~Dof(r¿,cp) -» Can~Doc(í¿,(p) 
is derivable from the Cl-valid formula 'Can~Do((f¿,(p) —» Can-Do{ί^,φ)'. 
Obviously, since DLA* contains symbols and expressions which DLA does not 
contain, not every Dj-valid formula is derivable in this way. Consider, for example, 
the formulas 
(2) CanDo^q)) & F « G -> СапОо
с
(^,<р) 
(3) CanOop(tk,<p) & CanDoG(f¿,(p) -» CanDo^ + c(í¿,(p); 
(4) CanDo^cp) ν CanDoc(í¿,(p) -» CanDoF + c(rA,(p); 
(5) CanDo/^,φ) & СапОо
с
(^,-ф) -» (F θ G φ 1). 
That these formulas are Dj-valid is not difficult to understand. For instance, (2) is 
an obvious consequence of our use of game forms in determining what a coalition 
can do. As we have seen, a coalition can do something if, given the appropriate 
feasible game form, the individuals within the coalition have a strategy such that the 
relevant state of affairs results, regardless of what the individuals outside the 
coalition do. Evidently, if we expand the coalition and let some other individuals 
join it, then the coalition still can see to it that the state of affairs arises: the original 
individuals simply play the same strategy. 
5.7 Obviously, it need not be the case that the same admissible game form has been 
assigned to every agent at a particular point in the CGT. Sometimes, however, it is 
possible to redefine a CGT in such a way that the distribution of power as 
expressed by the feasible and admissible effectivity functions remains the same at 
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each point, except that, at every point of the redefined CGT, the admissible game 
forms of the individuals are identical. We call such complex game trees reducible. 
More accurately, a complex game tree Γ is reducible if and only if it is possible to 
formulate a complex game tree Γ' such that: 
(1) Γ and Γ' differ only with respect to the admissible game forms assigned to 
the agents; 
(2) for all agents L and all points q, the deontic effectivity of L at q is the same 
in Γ as in Γ'; 
(3) for all points q, the admissible game forms assigned to the agents at q in Γ" 
are identical. 
In a reducible model structure every agent has the same deontic frame of reference. 
To see what the agents may do at a certain point in time we can limit our attention 
to one game form, the one to which the set of all admissible game forms (one for 
each coalition) can be 'reduced'. The classes C 2 and D2 of CGTs are defined as, 
respectively, the set of all reducible and non-cooperative CGTs and the set of all 
reducible and cooperative CGTs. The corresponding systems of logic of DLA and 
DLA*, C 2 and D 2 , are defined as the set of all C2-valid formulas of DLA and the 
set of all D2-vaIid formulas of DLA* respectively. 
The logic of the Can-operator in the systems C] and D¡ is determined by the fact 
that at each point one game form, the feasible game form, is used to establish the 
truth of a Can-statement. Since we use different game forms in Cj and Dx to see 
whether a May-statement holds, the logic of Can- and May-statements differs. 
However, in a certain way there is, in the systems C2 and D2, at each point also 
only one admissible game form used, namely the game form to which all the 
admissible game forms can be reduced. As a consequence, the rules of logic which 
regulate the relations between Can-statements in Cl and Dl also regulate the logic 
of the relations between May-statements in C2 and D2. Thus, for instance, since the 
formulas 
(1) CanDo,(fA,9) & (i *j) -» -CanDo (ί
λ
,-φ) 
(2) CanDo^/^φ) & (F Θ G = 1) -> ~CanDoG(fA,~(p) 
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are Cy and Dj-valid, the corresponding formulas 
(3) MayDo,<it,q>) & (ι * j) -> -MayDo/r¿ ~φ) 
(4) MayDo^.q)) & (F θ G = 1) -> ~MayDoG(f¿,~<p) 
are C2- respectively D2-valid. 
If a CGT is reducible, then relations between the permissions of one coalition and 
the permissions of another coalition exist. Because the same game form is used to 
establish what all agents may do in a certain situation, the permission of one 
individual to do something automatically implies that none of the other individuals 
has the permission to see to it that the opposite happens. The formulas (3) and (4) 
state that every permission to act is accompanied by an obligation on others not to 
interfere. Early writers in the analytical tradition of law like Jeremy Bentham and 
John Austin held this view of vested liberty. Later, the legal theorist Hohfeld 
argued that this view was incorrect. As Lindahl quotes him: 
'...a privilege or liberty... might very conceivably exist without any peculiar 
concomitant rights against "third parties" as regards certain kinds of 
interference. Whether there should be such concomitant rights (or claims) is 
ultimately a question of justice and policy; and it should be considered, as 
such, on its merits. ... It would therefore be a non sequitur to conclude from 
the mere existence of such liberties that "third parties" are under a duty not to 
interfere, etc.' Hohfeld in [Lindahl, 1977, p. 30-1]. 
Although we have not presented Hohfeld's definitions of privileges, claims, liberties 
etc., the general point is clear. The existence of vested liberty, and the absence of 
its opposite, naked liberty, is not a matter of logic, but a 'question of justice and 
policy'. 
It may seem that our definition of the systems C2 and D2 is in conflict with these 
remarks. The C2- and D2-vaIidity of the formulas (3) and (4) shows that the 
4
 Cf. [Lindahl, p. 31, 127]. 
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absence of naked liberty is decided on logical grounds. However, we can reconcile 
Hohfeld's view with ours by saying that systems of logic describe the logical 
relationships between deontic concepts within a particular context. The systems C 2 
and D2 may well describe those relationships given a context in which the 
principles of 'justice and policy' are such that any permission is always 
accompanied by an obligation on others not to interfere. 
5.8 In chapter 5* we shall present several other conditions which can be imposed 
on effectivity functions. Using these conditions we shall characterize, in terms of 
formulas of DLA and DLA*, classes of model structures. Some of those conditions 
have to do with the relation between the deontic and the alethic realm. Rules of 
logic which, in a particular system of logic, regulate the relation between alethic 
and deontic statements can be called budging principles. [Holmstrom-Hintikka, 
1991, p.146] In this section, we shall discuss two of those principles. 
The first characterization is based on the well-known 'ought implies can'-principle. 
[Von Wright, 1963, p. 108] A system of logic of DLA or DLA* which incorporates 
this principle is a system of logic in which 
(1) Shallip -» Сапф 
is valid for every Do- or Do-statement φ of DLA or DLA*. 
Holmstrom-Hinlikka [1984, p. 614] has suggested that the principle should be formulated along the 
lines of 
(a) 'It shall be the case that an agent F sees to it that φ' logically implies 'It shall be the case that F 
has the practical possibility to sec to it that φ' 
Since we attach deontic operators only to action statements and since 'It is the case that F has the 
practical possibility to sec to it that φ' is not an action statement, this principle cannot be formulated in 
terms of DLA or DLA*. A possible escjpe route would be to interpret it as 
(b) 'It shall be the case that an agent F secs to it that φ' logically implies 'It shall be the case that 
there is an agent who sees to it that the agent F has the practical possibility to sec to it that φ' . 
The implication may in some circumstances yield a more appropriate interpretation of the 'Shall implies 
Can'-principle than (1). Furthermore, the two statements in (b) can be formulated in terms ol DLA and 
DLA* Consequently, one can define systems of logic ot DLA and DLA* in which the implication 
between the two statements always holds 
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In a similar way as with the principle of non-interference with other agents' 
permissions, the acceptability of this principle will depend on the particular context 
of 'justice and policy'. A much stronger principle is 'may implies can'. A defence 
of this principle, which can be translated as 
(2) May<p —» Can<p 
implies also a defence of the 'ought implies can' principle. (For any Do- or Dó-
statement φ of DLA (DLA*), (2) implies (1).) A possible defence of (2) is saying 
that permissions to perform an action which one cannot perform are in a certain 
sense meaningless. Can a person who may sleep in a bed but cannot do so, actually 
be said to have the permission to sleep in a bed? And if so, is that permission not 
meaningless because it is empty? 
One might object that any principle establishing a link between the deontic and the 
alethic realm forms an example of the naturalistic fallacy. For instance, it seems 
that, under the 'may implies can'-principle, the absence of the possibility to do 
something ('John cannot smoke now'), which is a factual statement, entails a norm 
('John may not smoke now'). However, as Von Wright argued [1963, p. 110], such 
an objection is based on a confusion about the distinction between norms and norm-
statements. The principles 'ought implies can' and 'may implies can' describe a 
relationship between different types of statements. At one end there is a norm-
statement (the Ought- or May-statement), at the other an action statement (the Can-
statement). To say that there exist logical relationships between norm statements 
and action statements does not form an instance of the naturalistic fallacy: it is not 
a reasoning from a norm to a fact. Thus, there seem to be arguments for assuming 
the truth of the 'may implies can'-principle or the weaker 'shall implies can'-
principle. In chapter 5* we define properties of a CGT Γ which enable us to relate 
these and other bridging principles to types of CGTs. 
Von Wright uses Ihc Icrm norm-propositions. [Von Wright, 1963, 106] 
Chapter 5* 
Formal presentation 
5*1 Effectivity functions 
Let Γ = < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > be a CGT 
5*1.1 Definition For all q G X, the Effectivity Function associated with Z(q) is 
defined as the mapping E ^' from Dp to the set of non-empty subsets of X such 
that for each non-empty В с X and all L e Dp, В e EZ(<?)(L) iff there is a play ρ of 
Σ(<7) such that Β = (π(/0 I ρ' is an (N-L)-variant of p | (where π is the outcome 
mapping belonging to Σ(<7)). 
5*1.2 Definition For all q e X, the Effectivity Function associated with E(q) is the 
mapping E~^ from D
r
 to the set of non-empty subsets of X such that for each 
non-empty В <zX and all L e Dp, В e E~^{L) iff there is a play ρ of E(q)(L) such 
that В = {πΙ/Ο I ρ ' is an (N-L)-variant of p\ (π denotes the outcome mapping 
belonging to E(q)(L))} 
5*1.3 Definition For all q e X. 
(a) Χ Σ ^ = (π,(/?) I ρ is a play of Σ(ί/)| (π, is the outcome mapping of Σ(^)); 
(b) X~^ = {π2(ρ) I there is an L e Dp such that ρ is a play of E(q)(L)} (π 2 is the 
outcome mapping of E(q){L)) 
The following definition and lemma are useful 
5*1.4 Definition Let Γ be a non-cooperative (cooperative) CGT, 3 an interpretation 
of DLA (DLA*) and φ a wff of DLA (DLA*). For all q € Γ we say that, Φ ¡s, 
given Γ and 3 , true tn (holds in) q iff φ is true in all model structures < Γ, p, 3 > 
Definitions 5*1 1 and 5*1 2 are based on Deb's, definition of a Ch
a
( )-function [Deb, 1990, ρ 32] 
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in which p = [(<7],Pi), (q2>Pl)' — 1 ' s a play-structure such that for some positive 
integer k: 
(a) qk = q\ 
(b) for all t > k, p, is a play of the feasible game form assigned to qt. 
We shall say that 'φ is true in (holds in) q' instead of 'φ is, given Γ and 3 , true in 
(holds in) q' if it is clear from the particular context what Γ and 3 are. 
5*1.5 Lemma Let M = < Γ, ρ , 3 > be a model structure of DLA (DLA*) and φ a 
wff of DLA (DLA*). Let q be the 3(f,)-point of p. For all free individual 
(coalitional) symbols T: 
(1) the formula 'CanDo^f,^)' is true in M iff 3(7) is E^-effective for a set В 
such that for all r e Β, φ is true in r\ 
(2) the formula 'Can-Do^.cp)' is true in M iff 3(Γ) is EI(<?)-effective for a set В 
such that, for some r e Β, φ is not true in r; 
(3) the formula 'MusfDoj^.cp)' is true in M iff for every set В for which 3(T) is 
E^-effective it is the case that for all r Ε Β, φ is true in r; 
(4) the formula 'MayDo^.q))' is true in M iff 3(Γ) is EH(<?)-effective for a set В 
such that, for all r e Β, φ is true in /·; 
(5) the formula 'May-Do^/,,φ)' is true in M iff 3(7") is E^-effective for at least 
one set В such that, for some r e Β, φ is not true in r; 
(6) the formula 'ShallDo^f^ç)' is true in M iff for every set В for which 3(Г) is 
£-(<7)_cffectjve ¡ t j s m e case that for all r e Β, φ is true in r. 
Proof We prove (a) for the formula CanDo^f^cp) of DLA. First we prove necessity. 
By definition 3*10 CanDo((/;,(p) is true in M iff there is a feasible 3(i,)-split p' 
such that ϋο,ίί,,φ) is true in < Γ, p', 3 >. Let ρ be the play in the 3(/,)-round of 
p'. By 3*7 and 3*10, for any N-3(/)-variant p* of ρ and any model structure M+ 
= < Γ, p+, 3 > in which the play-structure p+ passes through the outcome of p* 
and in which at all points in time later than /; a feasible game form is played, it is 
the case that φ is true in M+. In other words, φ is true in any element of В = 
[π(ρ*) I ρ* is an N-3(i>variant of ρ) (π is the outcome mapping of Σ(<7)). By 
definition of the effectivity function associated with Σ((?), В is an element of Σ(^)((). 
This proves necessity. 
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Now let 3 (0 be £s^-effective for a set В such that for all r e Β, φ is true in r. Let 
ρ be the play of Σ(^) such that В = (π(ρΟ I ρ ' is an N-3(0-variant of p). By 
definition 3*8 any play structure p* which passes through q and in which ρ is 
played in q is a feasible 3(f,)-split of p . Since φ is true in any outcome of any N-
3(0-variant of ρ, Οο,ίί,-,φ) is true in < Γ, p*, 3 >. Consequently, CanDo^.cp) is 
true in M. • 
5*2 Properties of CGTs 
In this section we describe properties of CGTs and formulate, for each of those 
properties, formulas that are Г-valid for all CGTs Γ satisfying the property in 
question. 
5*2.1 Definition Let Γ = < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > be a CGT. We say that Γ 
(1) is Σ-regular iff for all q e X, all S, Τ e D
r
 such that 5 η Τ = 0 : if A e 
£ Σ ( 9 ) (5) and В e EUq\T), then Α η В * 0 ; 
(2) is E-regular iff for all q e X, all S, Τ e D
r
 such that S η Γ = 0 : if Д e 
£ Ξ ( 9 ) (5) and ß € ΕΞ{4\Τ), then Д η ß * 0 ; 
(3) is Σ-interrelated iff for all <? e X, all S e D
r
 and all А, В e ΕΣ((?)(5): (Α η В) 
€ £Z(í?)(S); 
(4) is Ε-interrelated iff for all q ε X, all S e D
r
 and all А, В e £Ξ ( < ? )(5): (Λ η 
(5) is Σ-normal iff for all q e X, а\\ S e D
r
: if there is some В с ΧΣ(<?) such that 
for all A e EU<*\S) A Œ B, then ß e EE{q\S); 
(6) is Ε-normal iff for all <y e X, all S e D
r
: if there is some В с X~(<?* such that 
for all A e ES(íi\S) A Œ В, then В e ΕΣ(</)(5); 
(7) is Σ-embeddable iff for all # e X, all 5 e D
r
 and all ß e EE(q)(S): there is an 
Л e £ а д ( 5 ) such that A c f i ; 
(8) is E-embeddable iff for all q e X, all S e D
r
 and all ß e £Σ ( < ? )(5): there is an 
Λ e £ Ξ ( 9 ) (5) such that А с ß; 
(9) is reducible iff it is possible to define a complex game tree Г* = < Χ, Σ, Ξ*, 
τ > such that Dp, = D
r
 and for all q e X: 
(a) for all 5, Г e D
r
* , Ξ*(<7)(5) = E*(q)(T); 
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(b) for all S e D
r
* , Ε
Ξ
*
(<7)(5) = EZ^\S). 
The properties of Σ- and Ξ-regularity are variations of the property of regularity. 
Gärdenfors uses concepts which are comparable to the properties of Ξ-regularity 
and Ξ-interrelation and which he calls the consistency condition and the condition 
on combination of rights. [Gärdenfors, 1981, p. 344] The properties (5)-(9) are new. 
5*2.2 Proposition Let Γ = < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > be a non-cooperative CGT. For arbitrary 
wffs φ, ψ of DLA and for all free individual symbols /, j and all free temporal 
symbols tt, if Γ is 
(a) Σ-regular, then [[(/' *j) & CanDo((r(,(p)] -> ~CanDo<r(I~(p)] is Γ-valíd; 
(b) Ξ-regular, then [[(i*j) & MayDo/ί,,φ)] -» ~MayDo{f
r
~(p)] is Г-valid; 
(c) Σ-interrelated, then [[СапОо,(/,,(р) & CanDo^f,^)] -> CanDo^f,, φ & ψ)] is 
Г-valid; 
(d) Ξ-interrelated, then [[MayDo,(f,,(p) & MayDo(<i(,y)] -» MayDo,(i,, φ & ψ)] is 
Г-valid; 
(e) Σ-normal, then [MustDo^.íp) -» MayDo((f(,(p)] is Г-valid; 
(f) Ξ-normal, then [ShallDo^.tp) -» CanDo,(f,,<p)] is Г-valid; 
(g) Σ-embeddable, then [MayDo((r,,(p) —» CanDo^.q))] is Г-valid; 
(h) Ξ-embeddable, then [СапОо,(Г,,ф) -» MayDo^.cp)] is Г-valid; 
(i) reducible, then 
(il) [[(i*J) & MayDo,(f,,(p)] -> -MayDo/ί,,-φ)], and 
(i2) [May~Do,(fJt(p) -> May-Do <ί,,φ)1, and 
(ІЗ) [ShallDo,(i,,<p) -> ShallDo/ί,,φ)] 
are Г-valid. 
We shall not prove proposition 5*2.2 for each property. To give an idea of how the 
proofs run, we prove (b), (c) and (І2). 
Proof Let φ, ψ be arbitrary wffs of DLA. Let M be a model structure < Γ, p, 3 > 
of DLA (where p is an alethic play-structure of Γ). Let q be the 3(f,)-point of p. 
2 [Pclcg, 1984] and [Abdou and Kciding, 1991] contain lists of properties of effectivity functions. 
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(b) Let Γ be a Ξ-regular and non-cooperative CGT. We show that [[(/ Ψ j) & 
MayDo f^j.cp)] —» -MayDo <ί(,~φ)] is true in M. Assume that (/ * j) and 
MayDo({r(,(p) are true in M. By lemma 5*1.5 МауооД.ф) implies that 3(0 is 
Zi^-effective for a set В such that, for all r e Β, φ holds in r. By definition, it 
cannot be the case that both the formulas φ and -φ hold in an element of X. Hence, 
the formula -φ can only hold in elements of the complement of B. Since ι * j , Ξ-
regularity of Γ implies that 3(/) is not Zi^-effective for every set С such that Β η 
С = 0 . Therefore, 3(0 is not Zi^-effective for any set such that ~φ holds in each 
of its elements. By lemma 5*1.5, MayDo<ί,,-φ) is not true in M and, consequently, 
~MayDo{f,,~(p) holds in M. Ш 
(c) Let [CanDo,(/,,φ) & CanDo((r,,\|/)] be true in a model structure M of DLA in 
which the CGT is Σ-interrelated. Lemma 5*1.5 implies that there is a set A such 
that (1) A belongs to the feasible effectivity set of 3(0 at q and (2) φ is true in each 
r e A. Similarly, there is a set В such that (1) В belongs to the feasible effectivity 
set of 3(0 at q and (2) ψ is true in each r e В. By Σ-interrelatedness Α η В also 
belongs to the feasible effectivity set of 3(0 at q. Consequently, СапОо({г,,(р & ψ) 
is true in M. • 
(І2) Assume that May-Do^r^cp) holds in a model structure M of DLA of which 
the CGT is reducible. Let G denote the game form to which the game forms of the 
individuals can be 'reduced' at q. By lemma 5*1.5 3(0 is admissible effective at q 
for a set containing at least one element r such that φ is not true in r. By definition 
of an effectivity function, this implies that there is at least one play of the game 
form G which has r as its outcome. But then individual 3(/) also has a strategy, 
viz., the one which he or she adopts in that particular play, which sometimes leads 
to r. Hence, 3(/) admissible effectivity set at q contains at least one set of which r 
is an element. By lemma 5*1.5 this implies that May-Do (ί,,φ) is true in M. • 
Obviously, the proposition also holds if Γ is a cooperative CGT and if φ and ψ are 
arbitrarily chosen formulas of DLA*. Furthermore, the following proposition is true. 
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Proposition 5*2.3 Let Γ be a cooperative CGTs and let φ, ψ be arbitrary wffs of 
DLA*. For all free coalitional symbols F and G and all free temporal symbols tt, if 
r i s 
(a) Σ-regular, then [[(F Θ G = 1) & CanDoF(í,,9)] -> ~CanDoc(r,,~(p)] is In-
valid; 
(b) Ξ-regular, then [[(F θ G = ±) & MayDo^/,,φ)] -> ~МауБо
с
(Г,,~<р)] is Г-
valid; 
(c) Σ-interrelated, then [[CanDo^.cp) & CanDo/τ(ί,,ψ)] -> CanDo f(r,,9 & ψ)] is 
Г-valid; 
(d) Ξ-interrelated, then [[MayDo^.q)) & MayDo^.vi/)] -> MayDo^.q) & ψ)] 
is Г-valid; 
(e) Σ-normal, then [MustDo^.q)) -> MayDo^.q»)! is Г-valid; 
(f) Ξ-normal, then [ShallDo^f^q») -> CanDo^f^q))] is Г-valid; 
(g) Σ-embeddable, then [MayDo^.qO —» CanDo^.cp)] is Г-valid; 
(h) Ξ-embeddable, then [CanDof(/j;q>) -> MayDo^^q))] is Г-valid; 
(i) reducible, then 
(il) [[(F θ G = 1) & MayDoF(í,,(p)] -» ~MayDoc(í,,~q))], and 
(12) [May~Do^r(,q>) -> May~DoG(í,,q>)], and 
(13) [ShallDo^/,,φ) -> ShallDoc(í,,q>)] 
are Г-valid. 
Some other properties of cooperative CGTs are given by the next definition. 
5*2.4 Definition Let Γ = < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > be a cooperative CGT. Γ 
(1) is Σ-monotoìiic iff for all q & X, all S, Τ e Df. if ß e ΕΣ ( | ? )(5) and 5 с Γ, 
then В e Ε^ΐΧΤ); 
(2) is E-monotonìc iff for all ? e X , all S, Γ e D
r
: if В e ¿ ^ ( S ) and S c T , 
then В e ΕΞ(<?)(Γ); 
(3) is Σ-superadditive iff for all g e i , all S,T e D
r
 such that 5 η Γ = 0 , all Λ 
e £Σ ( , ? )(5) and all В e ß ^ T ) : (A η ß) e E*<>\s и Τ); 
(4) is E-superaddUive iff for all <? e X, all S,T e D
r
 such that 5 η Γ = 0 , all Л 
e £ Ξ ( ^(5) and all В e ΕΞ(<?)(Γ): (A η В) e EB^\S и Τ); 
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(5) is Σ-subadditive iff for all q e X, all S, Τ e D
r
, all A e Е а д ( 5 ) and all В e 
Е
а д ( 7 ) : if A η ß = 0 , then ( A u f i ) e £ Σ ^ ( 5 η Γ); 
(6) is Ξ-subadditive iff for all ? e X, all S, Τ e D p all A e £Ξ(<?)(5) and ali В e 
£ E ( ^ ( D : if Λ η ß = 0 , then ( A u ß ) e £ ^ ( 5 η Γ); 
(7) is Σ-convex iff for all q <= X, all 5, Γ e D
r
, all A e ΕΣ(<?)(5) and all В e 
E ^ T ) : (A u ß) e Ε ^ ί η Γ) or (Λ η β) e E1{íi\S и Г); 
(8) is Ξ-соп ех iff for all ? e X, all 5, 7 e D
r
, all Л e £ ^ ( 5 ) and all В e 
Ε
Ξ(4\Τ): (Α υ ß) e E ^ C S η Γ) or (Λ η Β) e fi^S υ Γ). 
The properties are variations of well-known properties of effectivity functions. 
5*2.5 Proposition Let φ, ψ be wffs of DLA*. For all free coalitional symbols F 
and G, all free temporal symbols f, and all cooperative CGTs Γ, if Γ is 
(a) Σ-monotonic, then [[CanDof(f,,<p) & F « G] -» CanDoG(f(,q>)] is Γ-valid; 
(b) Ξ-monotonic, then [[MayDo^(f(,<p) & F « G] -> MayDoG(f(,(p)] is Г-valid; 
(c) Σ-superadditive, then [[(£ θ G = 1) & CanDo^.íp) & CanDoG(f,,\|/)] -» 
CanDof + G(f,,cp & ψ)] is Г-valid; 
(d) Ξ-superadditive, then [[(£ θ G = 1) & MayDo^.íp) & MayDoG(r(,vj/)] -» 
MayDoF + c(f,,q> & ψ)] is Г-valid; 
(e) Σ-subadditive, then \[VS MustDo^r,, - φ ν -ψ) & CanDof(f,,(p) & 
CanDoG(f(,V|/)] -> CanDoF ф G(f,,<p ν ψ)] is Г-valid; 
(0 Ξ-subadditive, then [[V5 ShallDo9(f;, - φ ν -ψ) & MayDo^.tp) & 
МауОо
с
(Г,,\|/)] -> MayDo f ffi G(f,,(p ν ψ) | is Г-valid; 
(g) Σ-convex, then [[CanDo^í,^) & Cd\\OoG(lr\\i)\ -> |CanDoF + G(r,,<p & ψ) ν 
CanDo f $ G(f,,9 ν ψ)]] is Г-valid; 
(h) Ξ-convex, then [[MayDo/τΟ,,φ) & MayDoG(f(,V|/)] -> [MayDo f + 0(ίνφ & ψ) 
ν MayDo/r ф с(',.ф ν ψ)11 ' s Г-valid. 
The proofs of 5*2.3 and 5*2.5 are along similar lines as the proof of proposition 
5*2.2 and are therefore omitted. 
See [Peleg, 1984) and [Abdou and Keiding, 1991]. Gardenfors [Gardcnfors, 1981, p. 345) uses a 
condition called Condition on îhe rights of groups which is comparable with the property of Ξ-
monolorucity. 
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5*2.6 Definition 
Cy is the set of all non-cooperative CGTs; 
C2 is the set of all reducible and non-cooperative CGTs; 
D[ is the set of all cooperative CGTs; 
£>2 is the set of all reducible and cooperative CGTs. 
5*2.7 Proposition 
(1) Any Cj-valid formula is C2-, Dj- and D2-valid; 
(2) Any C2-vaIid formula is £>2-valid; 
(3) Any Dj-valid formula is D2-valid. 
The truth of 5*2.7 follows directly from definition 5*2.6. 
Chapter 6 
Individual and collective rights 
Introduction In this chapter we shall introduce several types of right. The 
definitions of these types of right are based on the work of Stig Kanger, which in 
tum is an elaboration of the legal theory formulated by W.N. Hohfeld in the 
beginning of this century. Kanger formulated rights in terms of the notions of 
'obligation' and 'seeing to it that'. Since these concepts are also central notions of 
DLA and DLA*, it is possible to define Ranger's typology of rights in terms of 
expressions of DLA and DLA*. After we have shown how such a 'translation' of 
the Kanger types of right into the languages DLA and DLA* can be achieved, we 
shall define specific kinds of rights-structures, i.e., combinations of individual and 
collective rights. 
6.1 The work of Stig Kanger2 has had a profound effect on the development of the 
logic of law. In particular, his definition and typology of various right-types has 
influenced many authors in this area. The types of right are defined through the use 
of a deontic operator and an action operator. Kanger has used both the deontic 
operator 'shall' [Kanger and Kanger, 1966] [Kanger, 1972] and the deontic operator 
'ought' [Kanger, 1971] to define his right-types. In our exposition of Kanger's 
theory we shall use the operator 'shall'. Kanger has also used different action 
operators. In [Kanger and Kanger, 1966] the action operator is interpreted as 
'causes that', in his later work as 'sees to it that'. We shall use this latter 
interpretation. 
1
 Cf. [Lindahl, 1977]. 
2 
In publications as early as 1957 and 1963, Stig Kanger first presented his theory of rights. 
[Kanger, 1971] is a revised version of the 1957 publication The other essay was translated (with minor 
changes) in cooperation with Helle Kanger and was published in 1966 [Kanger and Kanger, 1966] See 
also [Kanger, 1972], [Kanger, 1985] 
In [Kanger, 1970, ρ 40] Kanger explains his use of the operator 'ought* 
Chapter 6 Individual and collective rights 103 
Kanger distinguished simple types of right and atomic types of rights. The 
definition of the simple types of right is based on Hohfeld's definition of Claim, 
Power, Immunity and Freedom. In terms of two agents T¡ and T2, the Shall-
operator, the action operator 'see to it that' and a state of affairs x(Ty,T2) existing 
between T¡ and T2, Kanger distinguished the following simple right-types: 
(1) Ту has versus T2 a claim with respect to x(Ty,T2) if and only if T2 shall see to 
it that x{J
x
,T2)\ 
(2) Ту has versus T2 a power with respect to x(Ty,T2) if and only if it is not the 
case that Ту shall not see to it that x(Ty,T2); 
(3) Ту has versus T2 an immunity with respect to x(Ty,T2) if and only if T2 shall 
not see to it that not x(Ty,T2); 
(4) Ту has versus T2 a freedom with respect to x(Ty,T2) if and only if it is not true 
that Ту shall see to it that not x(Ty,T2). 
The next four types of right are obtained by simply substituting 'not x(Jy,T2)' for 
'х{Ту,Т2У in (1) to (4). Since 'not not x(Ty,T2Y is assumed to be identical to 
x(Jy,T2), this yields 
(5) Ту has versus T2 a counterclaim with respect to x(Ty,T2) if and only if T2 
shall see to it that not x(Ty,T2); 
(6) Ту has versus T2 a counterpower with respect to x(Ty,T2) if and only if it is 
not the case that Ту shall not see to it that not x(Ty,T2); 
(7) Ту has versus T2 a counterimmunity with respect to x(Ty,T2) if and only if T2 
shall not see to it that x(Ty,T2); 
(8) Ту has versus T2 a counterfreedom with respect to x{Ty,T2) if and only if it is 
not true that Ту shall see to it that x(Ty,T2). 
Obviously, the specific logical relationships existing between the various simple 
right-types depend on how one assumes the logical relations between permissions, 
obligations, action statements, etc., to be. The deontic logic of action developed by 
Kanger differs in several aspects from ours. We shall not go into the specifics of his 
logic but merely note that the following strength diagram depicts the logical 
relationships existing between the various simple right-types in Kanger's logic. 
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freedom 
not coumerpowcr 
immunity 
nol cuunicrcljim 
power 
Figure 6.1 
Assuming that a state of affairs x(T{,T2) existing between T( and T2 is identical to 
the state of affairs x{J2,T\) existing between T2 and Tj, we see that the question 
which rights an actor has cannot be answered independently from the question 
which rights the other actor has. For instance, if agent T2 shall see to it that the 
state of affairs x(T¡,T2) arises, then it cannot be true that agent T2 shall also see to 
it that not д:(7,1,Г2) arises. Consequently, if T{ has a claim versus T2 with respect to 
χ(Γ[,Γ2), then T2 has versus T¡ a freedom with respect to л(Т2,Г|). 
Claim stands for T ( has versus T 2 a claim with respect Ιο xiT^Tj)', power for T ¡ has versus T2 a 
power with respect to х(Т
х
,Т2У'
 c t c
· An arrow represents the (transitive) relation of 'is a logical 
consequence o f . For instance, if 7", has versus T-, a claim with respect to r, then Tj docs not have a 
countcrfreedom versus T2 with respect to χ 
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Saying that an actor 7| has versus actor T2 a specific simple type of right with 
respect to a state of affairs between Tj and T2 does n o t fully specify the legal 
relations between the two actors with respect to that state of affairs. To say that Ту 
has versus T2
 a
 claim with respect to x(Ty,T2) does not say anything about, for 
instance, whether 7j also has a power versus T2 w ' t n respect to x(TltT2). An atomic 
type of rights provides a full specification of the simple right-types existing between 
two actors. For each of the eight types of right it specifies whether that type of right 
holds or not. 
Given two actors 7", and T2 and a state of affairs x(Jy,T2) between Tx and T2, 
Kanger distinguishes 26 atomic rights-types. They are defined in the following way. 
[Kanger and Kanger, p. 92-3] First of all, the set of all lists of simple right-types 
existing between two agents with respect to a certain state of affairs is defined. 
Each of those lists specifies for each simple type of right whether or not it holds 
о 
between the two agents. Since there are eight such rights, there are 2 = 256 lists. 
Not every list is, however, logically possible. For instance, the list 
Claim, not power, freedom, not immunity, counterclaim, not counterpower, counterfreedom, not 
countenmmunity 
is not logically possible since, as can be concluded from figure 6.1, 'not immunity' 
and 'counterclaim' contradict 'claim'. The second step is to remove all such 
contradictory lists. This leaves twenty-six lists. The third and final step in the 
derivation of the atomic types of rights is to write each of those lists as economical 
as possible. This means that we remove those simple right-types which are a logical 
consequence of another entry on the list. 
Claim, not power, freedom, immunity, not counterclaim, not counterpower, counterfreedom, not 
countenmmunity 
is, for instance, shortened to 
Claim, not power 
106 Rights, Liberalism and Social Choice 
because, in Ranger's logic, 'claim' logically entails 'immunity', 'not counterclaim', 
'not counterimmunity', 'freedom' and 'not counterpower'. Furthermore, 'not power' 
implies 'counterfreedom'. 
The remaining 26 combinations form the Kanger-list of atomic types of rights, 
which is presented in Appendix 3 of this book. 
6.2 In this section we shall derive simple right-types and atomic types of right in 
the context of DLA. The simple types of right of DLA are defined (1) on the basis 
of the deontic operator Shall and either the action operator Do or the action 
operator Dó; and (2) with respect to formulas of DLA describing states of affairs 
existing between two individuals. Simple types of right defined in terms of the Do-
operator are called simple types of right of class I. Class 2 simple types of right are 
defined in terms of the operator Dó and will be discussed in the next section. 
Let M be any model structure of DLA, rA a free temporal symbol, and / and j free 
individual symbols which - according to M - are not identical. Let φ be a wff that 
describes a state of affairs existing between / and j . Given M, we say that, at time 
f¿, ι has, with respect to φ, versus j the simple type of individual right 
(1) claim (class 1) if and only if ShallDo (r¿,<p) holds in M; 
(2) power (class 1) if and only if -Shall-Do^f^ç) holds in M; 
(3) immunity (class 1) if and only if Shall-Do (ί
λ
,-φ) holds in M\ 
(4) freedom (class 1) if and only if -ShallDo^.-cp) holds in M; 
(5) counterclaim (class 1) if and only if ShallDo/^,-φ) holds in M; 
(6) counterpower (class 1) if and only if -Shall-Do^f^-cp) holds in M\ 
(7) counterimmunity (class 1) if and only if Shall~Do (ί
λ
,φ) holds in M 
(8) counteifreedom (class 1) if and only if -ShallDo^.q)) holds in M. 
Note the close relationship between this definition of simple types of right (class 1) 
and Kanger's definition of the simple right-types. Our definition translates Ranger's 
definition in terms of DLA: Kanger's 'shall' is replaced by the operator 'Shall', his 
'see to it that' by the weak action operator 'Do', and the state of affairs дс(Гі,Г2) by 
a wff φ of DLA. Furthermore, it is assumed explicitly that the individuals are non-
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identical. Kanger did not make any assumption to that effect. Finally, we remark 
that although the types of right are formally defined in terms of a model structure 
M, we do not need information about the characteristics of the play-structure after 
the ¿¿-point. Thus, the specification of the various types of right at a point in time 
does not depend on what happens at later points in time. 
Since our logic of action differs from Kanger's, different logical relationships exist 
between the simple types of right. If we do not make any further assumptions about 
the model structure M, the following implications hold. 
claim immunity nol counterclaim 
noi counierimmuniiy 
noi freedom countcrpower counicrlrccdom 
nol power 
Figure 6 2 
In figures 6 2 and 6 1 'claim' stands for 'at time rA, ι has versus j (ι Φ j) a claim (class 1) with 
respect to φ ' , 'power' stands for 'at time i t, ι has versus j (ι * j) a power (class 1) with respect to φ ' , 
etc The arrows should be interpreted in terms of Cpvalidily (in figure 6 1 · C 2 -va l^ty ) of the 
corresponding implications For instance, the arrow between claim and immunity represents the fact that 
the formula 'ShallDo{/ t,(p) -* Shal l-DoX^-φ) ' is C^-valid 
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To derive atomic (individual) rights-types we adopt the same procedure as the one 
used to derive the Kanger atomic types of rights. From the 256 possible lists of 
simple right-types (class I) and negations of simple right-types we first remove all 
lists which, given the logical relationships depicted in figure 6.2, are contradictory. 
This leaves 36 lists. Next we remove from each of these 36 lists those entries which 
are logical consequences of another entry in the list. The list is presented in 
Appendix 3. 
If we do make specific assumptions about the model structure under consideration, 
we may well find that not only the C|-valid implications determine the relations 
between the simple right-types, but also that other implications which can be seen 
to hold influence those relations. As a consequence, the list of atomic rights-types 
may change. We shall now investigate what happens in the system C2, i.e., if we 
assume that the CGT of the model structure is always reducible. The logical 
relationships between the simple types of right can then be described as: 
claim « » nol counicrirecdom 
not couiuenmmunily 
nol counierpowcr immunity 
freedom 4 • nol counterclaim 
power 
Figure 6.3 
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Given these relationships, we can delete those atomic rights-types which contradict 
these relations. For instance, in Cj 
2.5 Claim, power, counierpower 
is an atomic type of rights. However, as figure 6.3 shows, in C2 having a claim 
versus another person implies that one does not have a counterpower versus that 
other person. Thus, this atomic rights-type in C( is not possible in C2. 
Furthermore, some of the remaining entries in the atomic types of rights can be 
deleted since they now follow from other entries in it. The Cj atomic rights-type 
2 4 Claim, not countcrfrecdom 
can be reduced to 
3.1 Claim 
since in C2 having a claim implies not having a counterfreedom. In this way, the 36 
atomic rights-types from Cj can eventually be reduced to 11 atomic types of rights 
of C2 which are listed in Appendix 3. 
6.3 To derive the atomic rights-types (class 1) for Cl and C2 we have used the Do-
operator. It is interesting to see what happens if we define the simple right-types in 
terms of the strong action operator Dó instead of the weak action operator Do. We 
shall call the resulting type of right a simple type of right of class 2. We shall 
underline a simple type of right to indicate that we are talking about a class 2 
version of a simple type of right. Thus, given a model structure M, an individual ί 
has a claim versus j with respect to φ if and only if ShallDó (ί
λ
,φ) holds in M. He 
has a power if and only if ~Shall~Dó((r¿,(p) holds, and so forth. 
In C2 (as in D2 - sec section 6.4) the entries 'claim' and 'not counterfreedom' will not be deleted 
because they are equivalent Saying that ι has a claim versus j with respect to φ is equivalent to saying 
that J, with respect to φ, docs not have a freedom versus j : the formula ShallDo/r^tp) «-» ShallDo </t,(p) 
is C2-vahd. For similar reasons, the equivalent entries 'not freedom' and 'not counterclaim' are not 
deleted. 
по 
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Both in Cj and C 2 the logical relationships between the simple types of right of 
class 2 are identical to the logical relationships between the corresponding simple 
types of right of class 1. This means that the following relationships hold in С γ. 
claim immunity not counterclaim 
not coutuerimnuiniiv 
not freedom counicrnowcr counter! rcedom 
""' power 
Figure 6.4 
Obviously, this implies that the atomic rights-types of class 2 can be easily derived 
from those of class 1. For instance, to obtain the 36 atomic rights-types (class 2) for 
the system Cl we simply have to underline each of the atomic rights of class 1. The 
class 2 version of the atomic rights-type of class 1 
Immunity, countenmmunily, power, not countcrpowcr, countcrfrcedom 
therefore is 
In figures 6.4 and 6.5 'Claim' stands for 'at time і
к
, ι has versus j (ι * j) a claim with respect to 
φ ' , 'Power' stands for 'at time /t, ι has versus у (i * j) a power with respect to φ ' , etc The arrows depict 
Cj- respectively C2-vahdily of the corresponding implications 
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Immunity, counterimmunity, power, not countcrpower. counterfrcedom. 
In C2 the logical relations between the class 2 simple right-types are similar to 
those of their class 1 counterparts in C2: 
claim nn| cnnnierfreedom 
nol соипісгіттнічі power 
n»t cnuniernower immunity 
freedom -> not cnuiilerclaim 
Figure 6.5 
Similarly, we can derive the 11 corresponding atomic rights-types of class 2 for the 
system C2 by simply underlining each of the 11 atomic rights-types of class 1. 
Thus we see that it does not make much difference for the taxonomy of atomic 
rights-types whether the strong or the weak action operator is used. In Cj there are 
36 atomic types of rights (class 2) and these are the same as the 36 atomic types of 
rights (class 1), except that they are defined in terms of the simple right-types of 
class 2 rather than in those of class 1. In a similar way, the 11 atomic rights-types 
(class 2) of C2 can be derived from those of class 1. The similarity in taxonomy 
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does, of course, not mean that it does not make a difference whether the 
individual's atomic type of rights is of class 1 or of class 2. For instance, having a 
claim of class 2 versus a person also means having a claim of class 1 versus that 
person. The converse does not hold, however: the fact that someone shall see to it 
that something is the case in the weak sense of 'seeing to' does not imply that he or 
she also has the obligation to do so in the sense of the strong action operator. 
6.4 In this section we shall show how taxonomies of atomic types of rights can be 
derived within the context of DLA* instead of DLA. The definition of the simple 
types of right, which we shall call collective, is the same as in DLA except that we 
now refer to coalitions instead of individuals. 
Let M be any model structure of DLA*, tk a temporal symbol and Ti and T 2 be two 
(non-empty) agent designators which are non-identical according to the model 
structure M. Let φ be a wff of DLA* describing a state of affairs existing between 
Τγ and 7"2. Given M, we say that 7^ has versus 7 2 with respect to φ the simple 
collective right-type 
(1) claim (class ]*) if and only if ShallDo72(f¿,(p) holds in M; 
(2) power (class 1*) if and only if -Shall-Doy-^.q)) holds in M; 
(3) immunity (class ]*) if and only if Shall-Do^i^.-ç) holds in M; 
(4) freedom (class 1*) if and only if -ShallDoTl(iA,-9) holds in M\ 
(5) counterclaim (class 1*) if and only if ShallDo72(f¿,~(p) holds in M\ 
(6) counterpower (class I*) if and only if ~Shall~Do7/(/¿,~(p) holds in M; 
(7) counterimmunity (class 1*) if and only if Shall-Doy-^r^cp) holds in M; 
(8) counterfreedom (class 1*) if and only if ~ShallDoy,(í¿,(p) holds in M. 
We shall derive atomic collective rights-types in the same way as we derived the 
atomic individual rights-types. Within the system D¡ the logical relationships 
between the simple collective right-types of DLA* are identical to those between 
the corresponding simple right-types of DLA. Hence the lists of atomic collective 
rights-types of class 1 * are identical to the atomic rights-types of class 1 - except, 
of course, for the fact that the first types are defined in terms of obligations of 
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(non-empty and non-identical) agent designators, whereas the latter are defined in 
terms of obligations of (non-identical) individuals. 
However, if we assume that the CGT of the model structure is reducible, we cannot 
reduce the list of atomic rights-types of class 1* in the same way as we did with 
those of class 1. A formula like 'MayDo^tp) -> -MayDo{?A,~(p)? is C2-valid and 
therefore 'power' entails 'immunity' whenever the CGT is reducible. According to 
the view of vested liberty, which underlies the assumption of reducibility, the 
permission of a group to do something entails that there are no individuals outside 
the group who have the permission to do so. It does not entail that the group itself 
does not have the permission to do the opposite. In terms of DLA*, 'MayDo^f^p) 
—» ~MayDoc(f¿.,~(p)' is not a D2-valid statement. If, for instance, F is a subgroup of 
G, (F « G), then it may well be that both 'MayDo^.q))' and 'МауОо
с
(^,~<р)' 
hold. Consequently, in D 2 'power' does not always imply 'immunity'. Similarly, it 
does not mean that 'not counterimmunity' always leads to 'not counterpower'. 
However, the truth of such inferences is warranted if the particular agent 
designators are disjoint: if F and G are coalitions such that (F ® G) = ±, then F 
having a power (class 1 *) versus G with respect to a wff φ implies in D 2 that F has 
an immunity (class 1*) versus G with respect to the wff φ. Similarly, in such 
circumstances F's not having a counterimmunity (class 1*) versus G implies in D 2 
that F has a counterpower (class 1*) versus G. 
Thus we distinguish two types of situations: those in which we talk about two 
coalitions which do not have any members in common, and those in which they do 
have such common elements. In the first type of situation, reducibility of the CGT 
always implies that the logical relationships between atomic rights-types of class 1* 
are the same as in figure 6.3 except that the simple types of right are now defined 
as relations between two agent designators instead of two individuals and that the 
arrows now represent invalidity of the corresponding implications. It follows that 
in D 2 the atomic rights-types are the same as the 11 of C2. The only difference is 
that the 11 atomic rights-types of D 2 are defined between two disjoint (and non­
empty) agent-designators and not necessarily between two individuals. 
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If F and G are not disjoint, i.e., if (F θ G Φ ±) holds, then the relations between 
the simple collective types of right are 
claim < y not couotcrlrcctlom 
Dot counter- not counter- power 
power immunity 
" 1 I 
freedom 4 » not counterclaim 
Figure 6.6 
In this case not 11 but 18 D2-atomic rights-types result. The reason is obvious. If 
the agents have some members in common, the inferences 'Counterpower entails 
counterimmunity' and 'Power entails immunity' are not justified. Hence, some 
combinations of simple collective right-types are D2-contradictory if the agents do 
not have any members in common, and they are not if the agents share at least one 
member. 
Finally, we remark that, as with the atomic rights-types of class 2, it does not make 
a difference for the taxonomy of atomic rights-types if we define the simple types 
of right in terms of the Dó-operator instead of the Do-operator, i.e., if they would 
be of class 2*. In the system D, 36 atomic types of rights of class 2* result. If the 
CGT is reducible then there are, depending on whether the particular agent 
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designators have any members in common, either 11 or 18 atomic rights-types of 
class 2*. 
6.5 Atomic rights-types describe the deontic relations between two agents at a time 
tk with respect to a state of affairs as described by a formula φ. There are, however, 
several atomic rights-types with respect to a certain state of affairs: there is not only 
an atomic rights-type between an individual ij and /2, but also one between i2 and 
/]. Furthermore, there are rights-types between il and /3, /3 and t"j, t2 and /3, etc. 
Given a model structure M of DLA, a point in time tk and a formula φ of DLA, we 
shall call a description of permissions and obligations of individuals which entails 
the specification of all atomic rights-types (class 1) possibly existing with respect to 
φ, a partial rights-structure at time tk with respect to φ. 
For example, assume that we have a model structure M of DLA according to which 
о 
a society consists of exactly three individuals denoted i, j and k. An example of a 
partial rights-structure at time í¿ with respect to φ within С γ (where the atomic 
right-types are either all of class 1 or all of class 2 and where φ is a wff describing 
a state of affairs between all individuals): 
(1) 1 versus j : 'not counterfreedom, counterclaim'; 
(2) ι versus к: 'not counterfreedom, not immunity, not counterimmunity'; 
(3) j versus 1: 'not freedom, claim'; 
(4) j versus A:  'not freedom, not immunity, not counterimmunity' 
(5) к versus i: 'power, counterpower, claim'; 
(6) к versus у: 'power, counterpower, counterclaim'. 
Not every combination of atomic rights-types forms a partial rights-structure, 
however. Since some combinations of simple types of right are contradictory, some 
combinations of atomic rights-types are not logically possible. For example, if i has 
versus j the atomic rights-type 'claim, not counterfreedom', then j cannot have 
versus í the simple right-type 'counterpower' with respect to φ. The reason is 
obvious: ShallDo (f|,(p) implies -MayDo (tk,~q>). 
О 
This means lhal the formulas V4 [(s = ι) ν (s = j) ν (s = k)] and [(/ *• j) & (ι * к) & (/ Φ к)] are 
true in M. 
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More generally, if we know the atomic rights-type existing between ƒ and j with 
respect to a formula φ, then we also know the atomic rights-type existing between j 
and i with respect to that formula. For instance, if, given a model structure M of 
DLA and with respect to a formula φ, / has versus j the atomic rights-type 
2.28 Not immunity, couiuerimmunity, not counterclaim, power, counterpower, 
then j has, with respect to φ, the following atomic rights-type versus ι: 
2.35 Not immunity, not counlcrimmunity, freedom, not power, counterpower. 
Thus we do not have to describe all atomic rights-types existing between all 
individuals to derive the partial rights-structure at a certain time. If we have 
described the atomic rights-type existing between i and j at that time then we have, 
by implication, also described the atomic rights-type between j and i. As we shall 
see in chapter 6*, our definition of a rights-structure (at a certain time) avoids such 
superfluous information. 
In DLA* partial rights-structures at a certain time are defined in a similar way as in 
DLA, except that they are not specifications of the atomic rights-types existing 
between two individuals, but, more generally, of those existing between two agents. 
Note, finally, that although we have discussed partial rights-structures in terms of 
atomic rights-types of class 1, the concept can also be defined in terms of rights-
types of class 2. 
We speak about a partial rights-structure because it only entails a description of 
some deontic relations, namely those existing with respect to a specific formula φ. 
A specification of deontic relations which implies a description of all partial rights-
structures existing at a point in time tk is called a rights-structure at tk. Finally, we 
define a complete rights-structure as the disjunction of all rights-structures located 
at different points in time (see definition 6*2). 
We assume that a formula describing a stale of affairs between i and j also describes a state of 
affairs between j and i. 
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6.6 It will not always be possible to derive the rights-structure at a certain time. 
Because such a rights-structure entails a specification of the legal relations with 
respect to every formula of the language, it also entails a specification of the legal 
relations with respect to formulas describing future states of affairs. Since there are 
infinitely many time-points there are also infinitely many future states of affairs. 
With respect to each formula describing any of those future states of affairs, such a 
rights-structure would have to specify what the legal relations are. 
In some circumstances, however, we are not really interested in the permissions and 
obligations which exist in the very far future; sometimes all that concerns us is the 
present or the immediate future. Therefore, we introduce the concept of a rights-
structure with finite time-horizon. The definition of this concept is based on the idea 
that Do- and Dó-statements have a certain starting time, i.e., the time at which an 
action is undertaken, and an end-time, the time at which the state of affairs to which 
an agent sees is realized. For instance, if φ is a formula of the basic logic, the 
formula Do,(f
 (·,(ί·, φ)) has tx as its starting time and t as its end-time. If, however, φ 
= Ï>o{tk, (//,ψ)) with ψ being a formula of the basic logic, then the end-time is t¡ 
instead of t,-. In the formula ϋό/ί,,ίί,,ψ)) t{ is both the end-time and the starting 
time. The negation of a Do (Dó)-statement is also a Do-statement and therefore we 
also say that -Do^.Dó/r-.^.y))) has t¡ as its starting time and tk as its end-time. 
Moreover, since the conjunction of two Do- (Dó-) statements is also a Do- (Dó-) 
statement, a formula can have more than one starting- and end-time: we say that the 
formula (ϋο,ίί,,ίί,ψ)) & ϋο,ίί^,,ίί,,ψ))) has both f, and t
m
 as its starting time and t¡ 
and t: as its end-time. 
Given a point in time t¡ and a model structure M = < Γ, ρ, 3 >, a rights-structure 
with finite time-horizon is a description of all permissions and obligations existing 
with respect to all wffs φ for which it is true that they do not have an end-time 
later than some t¡ (( > f(). The difference between the integers assigned to t and t¡ 
by the interpretation is called the width of the rights-structure. It tells us how many 
'steps' it takes to get from a point located at the starting time to a point at the end-
time of the formula. 
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To describe a rights-structure with finite length we only have to look at a part of 
the CGT belonging to the model structure. For instance, if the CGT looks like 
Ίο 
' l l 
*o 
'
e<
-~~. 
»-о 
»•<· 
• o 
Figure 6.7 
and if the ί,-point of the particular play-structure is ήτ3, then, in order to derive the 
rights-structure with length 3 at time t
r
 we only have to examine that part of the 
model structure which is graphically represented by 
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τ = 3 
Figure 6.8 
whereas, for instance, to find out what the rights-structure with length 1 is at time t¡ 
we only have to look at 
τ= 3 
Figure 6.9 
In the next chapter we discuss conditions which can be imposed on rights-
structures. We shall argue that those conditions can be defended as liberal 
principles. 
Chapter 6* 
Formal presentation 
Let M = < Γ, pt 3 > be a model structure of DLA (DLA*), φ a wff of DLA 
(DLA*) and r( a free temporal symbol. 
6*1 Definition B(M, t
r
 k) (B*(M, t
r
 к)), where к is a positive integer, is the set of 
all wffs φ of DLA (DLA*) in which 
(a) no bound temporal variables occur, and 
(b) for any free temporal variable t occurring in it 3 ( 0 - 3 ( 0 < к. 
Furthermore, B(M, tt, ~) (B*(M, tr ~)) = | φ Ι φ e B(M, tr к) (B*(M, t,, к)) for 
some positive integer к). 
By construction the sets B(M, t
r
 к) (B*(M, tt, к)) contain only wffs of DLA (DLA*) 
describing states of affairs which occur later than t
r
 The definition enables us to 
focus only on formulas which describe that, at time t
r
 an agent can or may see to it 
that a state of affairs is realized at a point in time later than t
r 
6*2 Definition Given Μ, φ and tt, we distinguish three weak types of permissions. 
They are defined as 
9Ϊ](φ, M, f,) = (Γ Ι Γ is a free individual symbol (agent designator) and 
M a y D o ^ i p ) holds in M); 
9Ϊ2(Φ' M, f,) = (7" I Τ is a free individual symbol (agent designator) and 
May(-Do7<r,,(p) & ~Do7{r,,~(p)) holds in M); 
SR3((p, M, t¡) - {Τ I Τ is a free individual symbol (agent designator) and 
M a y D o ^ - í p ) holds in M ) . 
(a) The set 91(φ, M, t) = {91,(φ, M, t), 9ΐ2(φ, M, f,), 9t3(q>, M, 0 1 is called the 
partial rights-structure at time tt with respect to φ; 
Cf. Lindahl who uses ihe term 'basic types of one-agent liberties'. [Lindahl. p. 92] 
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(b) The set 9Î(M, t,) = {91(φ, Μ, f,) Ι φ e fi(Af, f,, ») (B*(Af, f,, -))} is called the 
rights-structure at time r(; 
(c) The set 9lM = {9ï(M, f,) I f, ¡s a free temporal symbol of DLA (DLA*)} is 
called the complete rights-structure; 
(d) The set SR(M, f,, it) = |SR(q>, Λ/, f() Ι φ is an element of θ(Μ, tr k) (B*(M, t,, 
k))) is called a rights-structure with finite time-horizon, к is called the width 
of the rights-structure. 
In definition 6*2 the types of permissions are defined in terms of the Do-operator. 
Obviously, we can also use the Dó-operator. The resulting three types of 
permissions might then be called the strong types of permissions: 
6*3 Definition Given Μ, φ and tt, we define 
9Ϊ4(φ, M, f() = [Τ I Τ is a free individual symbol (agent designator) and 
MayDó7<r(,(p) holds in M); 
9Ϊ5(φ, Λ/, f() = {Τ I 7 is a free individual symbol (agent designator) and 
Mayí-Dó^.íp) & -ϋό^Γ,,-φ)) holds in M); 
9Ϊ6(φ, M, f,) = (Γ Ι Γ is a free individual symbol (agent designator) and 
MayDÓ7<f;,~<p) holds in M). 
(a) The set 91'(φ, M, t) = (9ΐ4(φ, M, t), 9Ϊ5(φ, M, г,), 9Ϊ6(φ, Μ, t)) is called the 
strong partial rights-structure at time r( with respect to φ; 
(b) The set 9Γ(Λ/, ί,) = {9Τ(φ, Μ, ί,) Ι φ e B(M, ί,, ~) (β*(Μ, ί,·, «))) is called 
the strong rights-structure at time f(; 
(c) The set 9TW = (9T(M, t¡) I r, is a free temporal symbol of DLA (DLA*)} is 
called the strong complete rights-structure; 
(d) The set 9Г(Л/, t
r
 k) = {9Τ(φ, M, f,) Ι φ is an element of B[M, t
r
 k) (β*{Μ, f(, 
A'))) is called a strong rights-structure with finite time-horizon, к is the width 
of the rights-structure. 
6*4 Remark Although rights-structures are defined with respect to a model 
structure M = < Г, p , 3 >, in order to derive the (strong) rights-structure at a 
certain point in time t, we only need to know the interpretation 3, the CGT Γ and 
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the ί,-point of the play-structure p. (Cf. definition 5*1.4 and lemma 5*1.5.) We do 
not need to know the points through which the play-structure p passes at later 
points in time. Furthermore, note that, given the definitions of atomic rights-types 
presented in chapter 6, for any free temporal symbol t¡, a rights-structure at time í¡ 
entails a description of all atomic rights-types (class 1) existing between agents at 
that point in time. Similarly, a specification of the strong rights-structure at time t¡ 
entails a description of all atomic rights-types which exist between two agents at 
that point in time. 
Chapter 7 
Liberalism and conventional decision-making 
Introduction In the introduction of this book we argued that liberalism can be 
defined in terms of specific procedures of collective decision-making, in particular 
those which involve individual rights. Because those procedures had to be defined 
first, we postponed a discussion of the characteristics of liberalism. The semantics 
of the languages DLA and DLA* yielded models of processes of decision-making. 
The presented models, i.e., the complex game trees, and the insights of deontic 
logic provided us with the means to define individual rights in terms of processes of 
collective decision-making. In this chapter we shall show how we can use those 
models to formulate liberal principles of decision-making. 
In doing so we shall make use of the distinction between conventional and 
constitutional decision-making. Both types of decision-making are processes in 
which decisions on states of affairs are made. In conventional decision-making, 
however, it is assumed that those states of affairs either do not contain a description 
of the decision procedures adopted in it, or that those procedures are the same in 
each of the states of affairs under consideration. In the first case, though the choices 
made may well affect the way decisions are being made in the future, the 
individuals have no idea how they will be affected. In the second case, the 
individuals do have such information but since each possible decision leads to the 
same procedures, it does not matter - as far as the future way of decision-making is 
concerned - which strategies they will choose. Constitutional decision-making, on 
the other hand, is decision-making about, among other things, different procedures 
of collective decision-making. [Pattanaik and Suzumura, 1992] 
Given a model structure M, our distinction between conventional and constitutional 
decision-making leads to a partition of the set of points X into two sets: one set 
consists of points of conventional decision-making and one set consists of points of 
constitutional decision-making. Though we shall not provide a formal definition of 
these sets, we shall assume that such a definition would incorporate the idea that if 
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there are, with respect to the capabilities and permissions of the individuals, no 
differences between the outcomes of the game forms belonging to a point, then the 
point is a point of conventional decision-making. However, although such a 
condition may be sufficient, it is not necessary. For instance, we have seen that the 
decision to invite people to one's party leads to other admissible game forms than 
the decision not to invite people. Yet, we do not want to maintain that sending 
invitations for a party is a form of constitutional decision-making. 
In this chapter we shall formulate a principle which, from a liberal point of view, 
can be understood as a necessary requirement of any process of conventional 
decision-making. In doing so, we make use of the notion of a protected sphere of 
personal action, a notion which we have already briefly touched upon in our 
discussion of Sen's condition of liberalism. In the next chapter we shall discuss 
liberal principles of constitutional decision-making. 
7.1 We shall employ a notion of liberalism which is derived from the work of John 
Stuart Mill. In a well-known passage in his On Liberty, which was first published in 
1859, he states that 
'(...) there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the 
individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest: comprehending all that 
portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself or, if it also 
affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and 
participation.' [Mill, 1859, p. 71] 
There has been much discussion about Mill's notion of a private sphere of action. 
One of the main points in these disputes has been the actual possibility of defining 
those aspects of an individual's life which affect only him- or herself. The crucial 
point is, of course, which actions are considered to be purely self-affecting, i.e., 
what is meant by the phrase 'which affects only himself'. It is, for instance, almost 
trivial to remark that the interpretation in which an action is purely self-affecting 
1
 See, for instance, [Gray, 1983. p. 48-57] and [Rees, 1985. pp. 137-155]. 
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only if it does not have any influence on other individuals cannot be sustained since 
any action somehow influences other individuals or their actions.2 
The question of how to provide a general definition of the personal sphere of 
individuals need not be answered in this chapter, however. For our purposes, it is 
sufficient to assume that the delimitation of such private spheres is a central tenet of 
any theory of liberalism and that there is consensus among liberals about many of 
the contents of those spheres. Most liberals agree that the acts of reading a book, 
eating a sandwich, practising a religion do indeed belong to the individual's private 
sphere. Yet, we do not assume that there is consensus with respect to all possible 
aspects. There is much discussion about the proper limits of the personal sphere -
liberals disagree about, for instance, the question whether smoking in public, driving 
a car, or torturing an animal are acts that should belong to a person's protected 
sphere. There is no such thing as the theory of liberalism and we shall therefore not 
try to formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions of such a theory. 
In fact, since we shall define the protected sphere in terms of procedures of 
(conventional) decision-making, the question of how to delimit the protected spheres 
of individuals can be seen as a question about decision-making about decision-
making processes and hence as a question of constitutional decision-making, a 
subject which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
7.2 Liberalism presupposes the existence of protected spheres. However, what this 
assumption means is not clear at all. Is a protected sphere defined morally, legally 
or in terms of what the individuals can do? What kind of relations exist between 
the protected spheres of the individuals? What is the relation between individual 
rights and the protected spheres? Different answers can be and have been given to 
these questions. In this section we shall try to answer them in such a way that 
characteristics of liberalism can be expressed in terms of the languages of DLA and 
DLA*. 
" According to Isaiah Berlin '(·· ) ¡* frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and that 
of public authority. Where it is to be drawn is a matter of argument, indeed of haggling. Men are largely 
interdependent, and no man's activity is so completely private as never to obstruct the lives of others in 
any way.* [Berlin, 1969, ρ 124] As Riley has pointed out, Mill was well aware of this interdependence 
[Riley, 1989, ρ 126-7] 
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We assume that the protected spheres of individuals contain specific states of 
affairs. For example, we shall not say that religion as such belongs to my private 
sphere, but that a state of affairs in which I am a muslim, one in which I am a 
Roman Catholic, one in which I am an atheist etc., belong to it. Secondly, we 
assume that there is a close relation between the states of affairs belonging to the 
protected spheres and the actions of individuals. This relationship can be described 
in different ways, however. One of these interpretations is Riley's, who, in his 
discussion of Mill's idea of liberty with respect to purely private matters, notes that 
it 
'presupposes some minimal capacity on the part of the agent to reason about 
the means (choices) that fulfill his ends (what he desires), as well as 
noninterference by other persons with his actual choices. But more than this, it 
also presupposes that the agent could have chosen (and knows he could have 
chosen) other alternatives from some given feasible set if he had so desired. 
The nature and extent of the given feasible set of opportunities is as much a 
part of the definition as is noninterference by others with the agent's actual 
choice.' [Riley, 1989, p. 122] 
On this view, there seem to be at least three characteristics of the relation between 
the actions of an individual and a state of affairs ('alternative') belonging to his or 
her private realm: (1) the agent can see to it that it happens, (2) the agent can chose 
differently, (3) there is no interference by the other agents. 
First of all, it is our opinion that the notion of a protected sphere should not be 
defined in terms of what an agent can do, but what he may do. When I say that the 
state of affairs in which I read the book entitled Gehoorafwijkingen bij de Japanse 
dansmuis belongs to my protected sphere, I do not say that I am actually able to 
read the book. I may, for example, not be able to understand Dutch or, for that 
matter, the scientific language in which a doctoral dissertation in biology is written. 
An interpretation in which I have the permission to read the book seems to be more 
reasonable. A permission can be stated in moral or in legal terms and, as is well 
known, an individual may well have a permission of one type without having the 
corresponding permission of the other type. Since we are interested in processes of 
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decision-making and since we have defined such processes in a legal context, we 
shall adopt the latter interpretation. 
The same reasoning leads us to formulate the second and third aspect in terms of 
permissions (instead of capabilities) as well. The second aspect can then be stated 
as saying that the agent had the permission to act differently. However, it is not 
clear at the outset what is meant by the phrase 'to act differently'. Different 
interpretations are possible. If χ describes a state of affairs belonging to the private 
realm of a person, we can interpret the counterfactual aspect as (a) the permission 
to see to it that not x, but also as (b) the permission not to see to it that x, or as (c) 
the permission to stay passive, i.e., the permission to undertake an action which 
neither necessitates χ nor not x. We shall assume that the counterfactual aspect can 
always be interpreted as (a) and therefore also as (b), but not necessarily as (c). 
Liberalism seems to assume that individuals should have complete control over any 
state of affairs A' belonging to their private sphere and this should in our opinion be 
interpreted as assuming that they have both the permission of seeing to it that χ 
occurs and the permission of seeing to it that the opposite occurs. It does not 
necessarily imply that individuals have the permission to stay passive with respect 
to any of the states of affairs belonging to their private sphere. The fact that I may 
not stay passive with respect to, for instance, the question whether I read a book or 
not does not contradict the tenets of liberalism. 
The third aspect, non-interference, is understood as saying that if a state of affairs χ 
belongs to an individual's /'s personal sphere, then every other individual and, in a 
cooperative context, every coalition of individuals of which ι is not a member has 
to stay passive with respect to χ and not x. Thus every other individual has the 
obligation not to take an action which either always leads to χ or always to not x. 
Practising a religion belongs to my protected sphere and the other agents are 
therefore obligated not to undertake actions which prevent me from practising or 
from not practising it. 
Given a model structure M we now define a person's recognized personal sphere at 
a time tk as the set of wffs φ for which it is true that the person may, at time tk, see 
to it that φ is the case and also that not φ is the case. Moreover, all the other 
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individuals and, if M is a model structure of DLA*, every coalition of which / is 
not a member, should stay passive with respect to φ. The minimum recognized 
personal sphere is a particular subset of the protected sphere. It is the set of 
formulas of the form (Λ,ψ) where ψ is a formula of the basic logic and where r- is 
the point in time immediately following tk. 
If we make specific assumptions about the model structure M we can also define 
the protected sphere of an individual in terms of atomic rights-types within systems 
of DLA. For example, let M be a model structure of DLA and assume that φ 
belongs to the recognized personal sphere at time t¡. of the individual denoted as i. 
The remarks above imply that the following formulas are true in M: 
(1) MayDo,(^,9); 
(2) MayDo^-cp); 
(3) Vs l(s * i) -> Shall~Dov(fA,(p) & Shall-Do/^,-φ)]. 
(1) and (2) express that / has both the permission to see to φ and to see to not φ, 
(3) expresses that the other individuals should stay passive. 
Obviously, there is a close relation between the recognized personal spheres of the 
individuals and the simple right-types (class 1) existing between individuals. For 
instance, if φ denotes a state of affairs existing between individual i and another 
individual j , then ( 1 ) and (2) imply that / has versus j at time tk the simple right-
types 'power' and 'counterpower' with respect to φ, and (3) implies that i has 
versus j also the simple right-types 'immunity' and 'counterimmunity' with respect 
to φ. Stated differently, in Cj φ belongs to the protected sphere of the individual 
referred to as i only if, at time f¿, / has, with respect to φ, versus j the atomic 
rights-type (class 1) 
2.26 Immunity, counterimmunity, power, counterpower 
whereas in C 2 φ belongs to the protected sphere of the individual referred to as J' 
only if, at time tk, i has, with respect to φ, versus individual j (i ^ j) the atomic 
rights-type (class 1) 
3.8 Power, counterpower. 
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Thus, we establish a close relation between the protected sphere on the one hand 
and individual rights on the other. Saying that a person's protected sphere is non-
empty is saying something about the rights of that person, i.e., about some of the 
legal relations existing between him or her and the other individuals. Conversely, a 
specification of the legal relations existing among individuals also entails a 
specification of the protected spheres of the individuals. 
We shall now define a condition which can be seen as a necessary requirement of 
any liberal process of conventional decision-making: we say that a complete rights-
structure 9ÌM satisfies the condition of minimal liberalism if and only if 
(1) the history of the world as described by the model structure M passes through 
at least one point of conventional decision-making; 
(2) for any point in time tk at which the model structure passes through a point of 
conventional decision-making it is true that the minimum recognized personal 
sphere of an individual is non-empty for each free individual symbol i. 
The first clause is related to the fact that we want to talk about conventional 
decision-making. It does not make much sense to do so in a world in which only 
constitutional decisions are being made. Though our framework of analysing rights 
differs substantially from both Sen's and Gibbard's, it is our conviction that the 
second clause captures the intuition behind their definitions of minimal liberalism: 
for each individual there is at least one state of affairs about which the individual 
on his or her own may see to it whether it will arise or not. 
Since the conditions of liberalism defined by Sen en Gibbard were in terms of 
individual preferences, the so-called liberal paradoxes were also defined in terms of 
individual preferences. Thus far, individual preferences have played no role in our 
model of collective decision-making. We shall show next how such preferences can 
be introduced. We will then show how the paradoxes of liberalism can be defined 
in terms of model structures of DLA and DLA*. 
7.3 Individuals attach values to the world around them. They undertake actions on 
the basis of their preferences regarding the consequences of those actions. Usually it 
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is assumed that the preferences of the individuals can be represented as orderings 
over a set of states of affairs. Those states of affairs or social states describe a 
specific societal situation completely. To use Arrow's words: 
'The most precise definition of a social state would be a complete description 
of the amount of each type of commodity in the hands of each individual, the 
amount of labor to be supplied by each individual, the amount of each 
productive resource invested in each type of productive activity, and the 
amounts of various types of collective activity, such as municipal services, 
diplomacy and its continuation by other means, and the erection of statues to 
famous men.' [Arrow, 1963, p. 17] 
We shall assume that the basic logic and the feasible and admissible game forms 
assigned to a point in a model structure describe such a situation at a specific 
moment in time completely: a model structure provides for each point of it not only 
a description of the characteristics of a social state which the models of the basic 
logic also describe, but also the description of the permissions and capabilities of 
the agents. 
Thus we can see the points of a model structure as social states and assume that 
individuals have preferences regarding those points. One might therefore define, in 
the usual way, individual preference relations over the set of points of a model 
structure and assume that at each specific point in time (at which conventional 
decision-making takes place) the individuals will make their choices on the basis of 
those preferences. More in particular, we shall assume that at each point of 
conventional decision-making the individuals base their decisions on their 
preferences regarding the set of points directly following the point of conventional 
decision-making. Obviously, these preferences can be derived from the overall 
preference relations. 
7.4 In this section we shall formulate two paradoxes of liberalism. They are inspired 
by the paradoxes of liberalism as formulated by A.K. Sen and A. Gibbard. The 
[Gaertner, 1993] examines relations of entailment between the models of Sen, Gibbard and GPS. 
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formal presentation of the paradoxes will be given in chapter 7*. Here we shall 
illustrate them by the story of choosing shirts given in chapter 1 except that we first 
consider another preference profile than the one of the original example. 
In the story there were two individuals, / and j , who each had the permission to 
decide on their own on the colour of the shirt they would be wearing: white or blue. 
We assume that they choose at time t¡ and we let f • denote the time at which they 
will actually wear the shirt. To simplify matters we assume that Í and j are the only 
individuals and that a model of the basic logic only describes whether an individual 
wears a white or a blue shirt. 
Let the interpretation be such that q¡, q2, q^ and q4 are points with time t- and that 
it can be described as 
q¡: ί and j wear white; 
< 7 2 : / wears white but j wears blue; 
qy j wears white but / wears blue; 
<74: ι a n d j w e a r b lue. 
We assume that the admissible game form describing the permissions and 
obligations of the individuals at time t¡ is the same for all individuals and can be 
described as : 
¡\J white blue 
Я\ 
Яъ 
Яг 
Я4 
Matrix 7.1 
In the first place, we note that each agent has the permission to choose the colour 
of shirt he or she likes, and (since the matrix lists all permissible strategies) that the 
other individual does not have the permission to interfere with this choice. Thus, the 
formula which describes the state of affairs in which i wears a white shirt belongs 
to /'s protected sphere and, similarly, the formula which describes the state of 
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affairs in which j wears a white shirt belongs to j's. If we assume that the 
admissible game form belongs to the only point of conventional decision-making, 
the condition of minimal liberalism is satisfied. 
If we represent the preference orderings of individuals by numerical values, then a 
possible combination of individual preferences, i.e., a possible preference profile, 
over the set [q{, ... , q4) is 
¡\J white blue 
(3,3) 
(4,1) 
(1,4) 
(2,2) 
Matrix 7.2 
(The higher the number the more preferred an outcome. For instance, i finds q-$ 
strictly better than q¡, qx strictly better than qA and q4 strictly better than q2.) 
Looking at the matrix we see that both individuals have a dominant strategy, i.e., a 
strategy which leads to a better outcome irrespective of the strategy chosen by the 
other individual. Since / prefers qy to qit i will not choose white if y chooses white. 
Since / also prefers q4 to q2 he will also choose blue if j chooses blue. Hence, 
whether j chooses white or blue, / is better off by choosing blue. The same 
reasoning shows that j is always better off by choosing blue. Hence, if we assume 
that rational individuals will always choose a Nash-equilibrium, i.e., a play of a 
game form from which it is for no individual advantageous to deviate on his or her 
own, if such an equilibrium exists, then q4 will be the outcome. However, if we 
look at matrix 7.2 we also see that both individuals prefer ql to qA. Thus, we see 
that the rational behaviour of individuals leads to an outcome which is not Pareto-
optimal, as there is another outcome which everyone prefers. The first paradox of 
liberalism says that any complete rights-structure satisfying the condition of 
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minimal liberalism may lead to situations in which the only Nash-equilibria lead to 
suboptimal outcomes. 
The second paradox of liberalism can also be phrased in terms of Nash-equilibria. It 
points to the fact that any complete rights-structure satisfying the condition of 
minimal liberalism may lead to situations in which there are no Nash-equilibria at 
all. 
Now consider the preference profile belonging to the original example (i denotes 
person \,j denotes person 2): 
¡\J white blue 
(4,2) 
(2,4) 
(1,3) 
(3,1) 
Matrix 7.3 
It is easily checked that none of the plays is a Nash-equilibrium. First of all, look at 
the play leading to q^. Individual j is better off in q2, a n outcome which will be 
reached in case j decides to wear blue and i does not change his strategy. However, 
the play which has q2 as its outcome is not a Nash-equilibrium either, since ι 
prefers qA to q2 and since outcome q4 will be reached if / switches to the other 
strategy in case j chooses not to wear white. Similarly, we see that j will change to 
<73 in the play leading to <74, i to qx in the play leading to qy Thus there is, given 
this preference profile, no Nash-equilibrium. 
In chapter 7* we will give a formal proof of these results. We have called the 
results pardoxes of liberalism to indicate the close relation with the Sen and the 
Gibbard results. The first paradox expresses, like Sen's original paradox, a tension 
between a condition of liberalism and the Perto-condition. The second paradox 
does, as in Gibbard's theorem, not invoke the condition of Pareto-optimality. It 
Obviously, the game is a Prisoners' Dilemma. The close relation between Sen's liberal paradox 
and the Prisoners' Dilemma was first noted by [Fine, 1975]. Sec also [Schwartz, 1981]. 
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states that a rights-structure which satisfies the condition of minimal liberalism 
always entails the existence of decision-situations in which no Nash-equilibria 
exists. 
Chapter 7* 
Formal presentation 
7*1 Conventional and constitutional decision-making 
Let M = < Γ, ρ, 3 > be a model structure of DLA or DLA* and let q, with time f(, 
be a point through which p passes. 
7*1.1 Definition Let F = XZ{q) u ΧΞ(<?) (see definition 5*1.3). Thus Fq is the set of 
direct successors of q, i.e., r e F iff r is an outcome of the feasible game form 
assigned to q or an outcome of one of the admissible game forms assigned to q. 
7*1.2 Assumption Given any model structure M, each point of M is a point of 
conventional or a point of constitutional decision-making. A point is a point of 
conventional decision-making iff it is not a point of constitutional decision-making. 
7*1.3 Assumption Given a model structure M, a point q e X with time tk is a point 
of conventional decision-making if for all r, s e F any statement of the form Cantp 
or Мауф is, given Г and 3, true in r iff it is, given Г and 3 , also true in s. (See 
definition 5*1.4.) 
According to this assumption a point is a point of conventional decision-making if 
there is no difference between the outcomes of the decision-making process with 
respect to the capabilities and the permissions of the individuals. 
7*2 Two paradoxes of liberalism 
7*2.1 Definition Let M - < Г, £ ? , 3 > b e a particular model structure of DLA. For 
any free temporal symbol tk and any free individual symbol i, at time tk /'s 
recognized personal sphere, RPS(M,t¡.,i), is defined as the set of all the wffs φ such 
that: 
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(1) MayDo,<iA>9) is true in M\ 
(2) MayDo({r¿,~(p) is true in M; 
(3) V
 s [(/' ^ $ ) - > Shall-Do/^,φ) & Shall-Do^.-q))! is true in M. 
The set of all wffs φ = (ί,,ψ) belonging to RPS(M,tk,i), for which it is true that: 
(1) 3(/,) - Щ) = 1; 
(2) ψ is a wff of the basic logic, 
is called the minimum recognized personal sphere at tk. It is denoted MRPS(M,tk,i). 
Thus the minimum recognized personal sphere contains only formulas describing 
state of affairs of the next point in time. 
If we replace (5) by: 
(5*) V
 s
 [-(Ζ « S) -> Shall~Do
s
(^,cp) & ShaIl~Doç(rA ~φ)] is true in M 
we obtain the corresponding definitions of a recognized personal sphere and a 
minimum recognized personal sphere for the cases in which M is a model structure 
of DLA* . 
7*2.2 Definition A complete rights-structure Л
м
 satisfies the condition of minimal 
liberalism iff 
(1) the play-structure of M passes through at least one point of conventional 
decision-making; 
(2) for any point in time f¿ at which the model structure passes through a point of 
conventional decision-making and for any individual (': MRPS(M,^,() is non-
empty. 
7*2.3 Definition Let A be a finite subset of X. An ordering on A is any binary 
relation R on A which has the following properties: 
- reflexivity : for all a e A: qRq\ 
- transitivity : for all q, r, s e A: (qRr & rRs) -> qRs; 
- completeness : for all q, r e A: (qRr or rRq). 
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We shall assume that the preferences of individuals regarding a set of outcomes can 
be represented as orderings on that set. To indicate that we are talking about the 
preferences of specific individuals /, j , ... e N subscripts will be used: /?,, R¡ 
The orderings R are interpreted as 'finds at least as good as'. Thus, for instance, 
qRf stands for 'individual í finds the state of affairs denoted by q at least as good 
as the one denoted by r\ 
7*2.4 Definition The strict preference relation Ρ ('strictly better than') is defined by 
qPr <-> (qRr & (not rRq)); the indifference relation / ('just as good as') by qlr <-» 
(qRr & rRq). 
7*2.5 Definition Given a set A, a preference profile (over A) is an ordered n-tuple 
R = (Äj^?2>··-Я
п
) of individual preference orderings over A. The set of all 
preference profiles over A will be denoted R(A). 
7*2.6 Definition Let G = < Α, σ, π > be a game form and R a preference profile 
over A. We say that a play ρ = (jj,...,ín) e σ(1) χ . . . χ σ(π) is a Ν ash-equilibrium 
of the game (GЯ) iff for no i e N there is an {/(-variant p* of ρ such that 
π(ρ*)Ρρ(ρ). (Cf. definition 3*2) 
7*2.7 Definition Let G = < Α, σ, π > be a game form and R a preference profile 
over A. We say that an outcome π(ρ) of a play ρ = (slt...,sn) e σ(1) χ . . . χ a(ri) is 
Pareto-optimal iff there is no play p* of G such that π(/?*)/?,π(ρ) for all i e N and 
n(p*)P¡Ji(p) for at least one / e N. 
7*2.8 Definition We call a complete rights-structure SRW Paretian if and only if for 
each point of conventional decision-making, each admissible game form G = < A, 
σ, π > belonging to that point, and each R e R(A), if there exist one or more Nash-
equilibria of (G,R), then there is at least one Nash-equilibrium which leads to a 
Pareto-optimal outcome. 
7*2.9 Definition We say that a complete rights-structure 9ÎM is stable if and only if 
for each point of conventional decision-making, each admissible game form G 
belonging to that point, and each R ε R(A), a Nash-equilibrium of (GJi) exists. 
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7*2.10 Definition Let Γ = < Χ, Σ, Ξ, τ > be a CGT. We say that Γ is locally 
reducible if and only if one can define a CGT Γ* = < Χ, Σ, Ξ*, τ > such that Dp* 
= D
r
 and 
(1) for all points of conventional decision-making q and all S¡, 52 e ^г* ' 
Ξ*(9Χ5,) = Ξ*θ7)(52); 
(2) for all Í/ e X and all S e D r*, £ Ξ ( ί ) (5) = £-*(<?)(S). 
We call a complete rights-structure 9ÎW locally reducible iff its complex game tree 
is locally reducible. 
7*2.11 Proposition (The First paradox of liberalism) There exists no locally 
reducible and Paretian complete rights-structure which satisfies the condition of 
minimal liberalism. 
Proof: Let M be a model structure of DLA or DLA*. By definition N contains at 
least two individuals i and j . Since the model structure M satisfies the condition of 
minimal liberalism there exists a point of conventional decision-making, say the t-
point of the play-structure belonging to M, at which MRPStM,^,/) and MRPS{M,t¡j) 
are non-empty. Let (r φ) e MRPS(M,t
r
i) and (ί;,ψ) e MRPS(M\ttJ). First of all, we 
show that, since the complete rights-structure is locally reducible, the set of 
outcomes of the admissible game forms can be partitioned into four sets Л,, Л2> ^з· 
/44 such that the following formulas of the basic logic hold in the models assigned 
to those points 
A{: ( φ & ψ ) ; 
A2: (φ & -ψ); 
A3: (-φ & ψ); 
Д4: (-φ & -ψ). 
It is easily seen that none of these four sets is empty. Consider, for example, the set 
Aj. Since the rights-structure is locally reducible, the admissible game forms of all 
the individuals can be assumed to be the same. Because (t ,φ) belongs to 
MRPS(Af,f(,(), MayDo^/i.,φ)) is true in M: i has in the admissible game form a 
strategy which - regardless of what the others do - leads to a point with a model of 
the basic logic at which φ holds. Similarly, it follows that j has a strategy which 
leads to a point with a model in which ψ holds. But since the admissible game 
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forms are the same, there must be an outcome q in which (φ & ψ) holds. The non-
emptiness of the other sets can be shown in the same way. 
Now let R be any preference profile in which 
(1) For all outcomes r, s: if r and s belong to the same set, then everybody is 
indifferent between the two outcomes; 
(2) all the individuals except j strictly prefer any element of A3 to any element of 
A,, any element of Aj to any element of A4 and any element of A4 to any 
element of A2; 
(3) j strictly prefers any element of A2 to any element of Ap any element of Aj to 
any element of A4 and any element of A4 to any element of A3. 
To prove the proposition we show (a) that every play leading to an element of A4 is 
a Nash-equilibrium, (b) that there are no other Nash-equilibria, and (c) that the 
outcomes belonging to A4 are not Pareto-optimal. Let g be an element of A4. If i 
and j stick to their strategies, the other individuals cannot choose a strategy such 
that the resulting play leads to an outcome not belonging to A4. Since all the 
individuals are indifferent with respect to the elements of A4 they have no incentive 
to change their strategies. If the others do not change from strategy, individual ; can 
change the outcome only to realize another element of A4 or to change to an 
outcome of A2. However, ι is indifferent with respect to the elements of A4 and 
prefers any element of A4 to A2. Similarly, j has no incentive to switch if the others 
do not change. Such a switch leads either to another element of A4 or to an element 
of Ay However, j is indifferent with respect to the elements of A4 and prefers any 
element of A4 to any element of Ay Hence, we see that no individual has an 
incentive to switch on his or her own to another strategy. This proves (a). The 
elements of A4 are, however, not Pareto-optimal: everybody strictly prefers an 
element of Aj. Hence, (c) is true. Now we prove that the only Nash-equilibria are 
those which have an element of A4 as their outcome. A play leading to an element 
of A[ is not a Nash-equilibrium: j can switch to a strategy which, if the strategies of 
the others stay the same, leads to an element of A2, an outcome j prefers to any of 
the elements of Aj. Similarly, assuming that the strategies of the others remain the 
same, ί has an incentive to switch to an element of A4 if an element of A2 is the 
outcome and an incentive to switch to A3 if an element of Aj is the outcome. This 
proves (b) and in turn concludes the whole proof. • 
140 Rights, Liberalism and Social Choice 
7*2.12 Proposition (The second paradox of liberalism) There exists no locally 
reducible and stable complete rights-structure which satisfies the condition of 
minimal liberalism. 
Proof: We can prove the existence of the four non-empty sets A[ - A4 in the same 
way as in the proof of 7*2.11. Let R be any preference profile in which 
(1) For all outcomes r, s: if r and s belong to the same set then everybody is 
indifferent between the two outcomes; 
(2) All the individuals except j strictly prefer any element of A4 to any element of 
Aj, any element of A¡ to any element of A2 апа" апУ element of A2 t 0 апУ 
element of A3; 
(3) j strictly prefers any element of A2 to any element of Ay, any element of Aj to 
any element of Ay and any element of A-, to any element of A4. 
It is easily checked that none of the possible plays is a Nash-equilibrium. • 
Chapter 8 
Liberalism and constitutional decision-making 
Introduction In this chapter we shall examine principles of constitutional decision-
making, i.e., decision-making about, among other things, the way society makes its 
decisions. In particular, constitutional decision-making is about the question how 
rights and liberties should be allocated. The purpose of this chapter is to show that 
our framework enables us to answer this question from a liberal point of view. That 
is, we formulate and analyse liberal principles of constitutional decision-making; 
principles which attach predominant importance to the protection of individual 
freedom. 
As we have seen, the points of a model structure can be understood as alternatives, 
social states, about which individuals have to make a decision. A model structure 
not only provides information about the Ordinary' characteristics of the societal 
situation belonging to a point, but also information about the things the individuals 
can and may do. Obviously, the availability of this information implies the inclusion 
of information about the decision procedures employed in society and in particular, 
as we have also seen, information about the rights of individuals. 
Without such information about the components of the social states it is impossible 
to compare alternatives with respect to specific types of non-utility considerations. 
For example, if the justice of a state of affairs is at least partly related to the way 
society makes it decisions, we cannot, without information about the procedures 
used, determine whether a social state q is more just than a social state r, or 
whether r is at least as just as a. Similarly, if we want to make judgements about 
the freedom of individuals in a social state, we need information about the rights 
This chapter is based on [Van Hees, 1994]. 
In this chapter the term freedom docs not refer to the simple type of right existing between two 
individuals or coalitions. Instead, it is a general notion of the overall freedom individuals enjoy in a 
social state. 
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and liberties granted to the individuals in that social state. In this chapter we shall 
focus on comparisons of social states in terms of the amount of freedom individuals 
have in these social states. However, the information about the rights-structure, 
information which can be derived from the model structure, is, in itself, not 
sufficient to enable such comparisons. We do not only need information about the 
rights and liberties of the individuals, but we also need a moral standard which 
specifies to what extent those individual rights and liberties contribute to the 
individual's freedom. Different moral standards may yield different moral rankings. 
One moral standard may state, for instance, that smoking belongs to a person's 
protected sphere and that, consequently, a social state in which an individual has the 
permission to smoke can be said to give the individual more freedom than a social 
state in which individuals do not have that permission. Another moral standard, 
however, may specify that an individual's freedom depends on his or her physical 
capabilities. If the individual is destined to become a compulsive smoker if he or 
she would have the permission to smoke, the permission will, according to this 
moral standard, imply a decrease of the individual's freedom. 
Given a moral ranking, we shall define conditions which can be imposed on 
decision-making procedures and which take this moral information into account. 
The conditions will be defended as liberal principles of group decision-making. 
Thus we hope to lay the foundation of a full-fledged model of liberal collective 
decision-making. 
The framework we present is closely related to the one recently developed by P.K. 
Pattanaik and K. Suzumura [Pattanaik and Suzumura, 19921. Their framework, like 
ours, is aimed at the analysis of decision-making about alternatives which are 
extensions of the social states as traditionally defined: they incorporate information 
about procedures. There is an important difference, however. In Pattanaik's and 
Suzumura's framework decision mechanisms about such extended social states are 
made on the basis of utility information only. We shall define decision procedures 
which also take non-utility information into account. 
8.1 In chapter 7 we 'enriched' a model structure by assuming that, at any point in 
the structure, individuals have preferences regarding the set of points directly 
following that point and that these preferences can be represented as orderings. We 
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shall now make an additional assumption: we assume that there exists, exogenously, 
a moral reference point or moral standard which describes how decisions should be 
made, and how - given a characterization of an ideal procedure - alternatives can be 
compared in moral terms. In particular, it contains a specification of the rights and 
liberties individuals "ideally" have, and describes how alternatives can be ranked in 
terms of how much freedom they give to individuals on the basis of such an "ideal" 
rights-allocation. We shall leave it open whether the standard describes the actually 
existing morality in a society, or whether it is used by some external observer to 
make judgments about the way society makes its decisions. In the latter case it 
might differ considerably from the morals upheld in society. 
By assumption, a moral standard specifies for every individual ƒ a binary relation h¡ 
over the set of points of a model structure. The relation is called the individual 
freedom-relation and is interpreted as 'gives i at least as much freedom as'. The 
strict relation of 'gives / more freedom than' is denoted >-. The relation 'gives i as 
much freedom as' is denoted by =·. Saying that social state q provides an individual 
i at least as much freedom as a social state r, i.e., qh¡r, does not necessarily mean 
that each right of i which is respected in r is also respected in q. First of all, there 
may be some permission which is given to ( in q but not in r, and which according 
to the moral standard "outweighs" the violation of another right. Secondly, the 
rights-allocation corresponding to an alternative may give some individuals rights 
which are not considered to be ideal by the moral standard. Consider the right to 
smoke again. If, according to a particular moral standard, smoking does not belong 
to the realm of the individual's ideal rights, q may - given this moral standard - be 
said to give individuals more freedom even though they have a permission to smoke 
in r, and not in q. 
On the basis of the individual freedom-relations we derive collective freedom-
relations. We say that a social state q gives collectively more freedom than r, q>r, 
if and only if every individual has at least as much freedom in q as in r and if at 
least one person has more freedom in q. According to this definition, the loss of 
freedom of one particular individual cannot be compensated by some other 
3
 СГ. [Riley, 1986, p. 236] 
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individual's gain of freedom As we shall see below, the collective freedom-relation 
will be used to define principles of liberal decision-making Liberalism, we assume, 
precludes such balancing out of individual freedoms 4 
A combination of η individual freedom-relations, one for each individual, is called a 
freedom-profile and is denoted / Let S£ be the set defined as follows / e ¿£ if and 
only if there exists a moral standard which induces / Can the elements of £P be 
characterized in a general way9 Answering this question requires, like any attempt 
to determine completely which freedom-profiles belong to £f, a detailed analysis of 
moral standards for any я-fold combination of binary relations over X it should be 
ascertained whether there exists a moral standard such that its freedom-profile 
coincides with that particular combination Although the outcome of such an 
examination is not obvious beforehand, it may be conjectured that individual 
freedom-relations fc( sometimes fail to be ordenngs Consider the condition of 
completeness is an individual who lost the right to vote, and who therefore has lost 
some of his freedom, less, equally or more free compared to a situation in which 
he, for example, is allowed to vote but in which he does not have the right to join a 
political party9 The difficulty of answering such questions shows that an individual 
freedom-relation may not always be complete 5 
Establishing whether other conditions do or do not hold may be more difficult For 
instance, it is not a priori clear that a moral standard always induces a freedom-
profile such that the individual freedom-relations are transitive However, for our 
purposes we do not need to try to give a general characterization of the freedom-
profiles belonging to the set ¡£ We shall make a particular assumption regarding the 
set of freedom-profiles without providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
'(N)o moral balancing act can lake place among us, there is no moral outweighing of one of our 
lives by others so as lo lead to a greater overall social good There is no justified sacrifice of some of us 
for others ' [Nozick, 1974, ρ Ή] 
Another reason may be the absence of complete information about each tt Note by Ihe way that 
if the conditions LIBI L1B2 or LIBÌ which will be formulated in 8 4 are applied in situations of 
incomplete information, the following principle presented by Robert No/ick may be violated The 
principle, which Nozick called the epitema, prim ¡pie of boidercrossing states thai If doing act A 
would violate Q's rights unless condition С obtained then someone who docs not know that С obtains 
may not do A [No/ick 1974 ρ 1061 
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a freedom-profile to be in that set. The assumption we make is that, for any model 
structure M, there is at least one constitutional point at which the set of freedom 
profiles restricted to the set of outcomes (of which there are at least three) of the 
feasible game form contains the set of all η-tuples of orderings over that set. 
Finally, we note that since each individual knows, by assumption, the contents of 
the alternatives, qRf and r>¡q imply that i weakly prefers q to r even though q -
according to the appropriate moral standard - provides him or her with less freedom 
than r. Stated differently, it implies that the individual does not care too much about 
the loss of freedom, either because he or she does not care about the freedom itself 
or because he or she is compensated in some way. 
8.2 We saw that a process of constitutional decision-making contains three 
ingredients: a feasible game form G, a preference profile R which is an element of 
the set of all possible и-tuples of orderings over the set of outcomes, and a 
freedom-profile / which is an element of Si. The triple (G,R,l) is called a 
constitutional game. 
Henceforth, we shall assume that for each constitutional game (GJt,l) there is 
exactly one appropriate solution concept which yields a solution set, i.e., a non­
empty set of plays ρ of the game form. The plays represent those combinations of 
individual strategies which, according to the particular solution concept, are in 
equilibrium. Except for the non-emptiness of the solution set no assumptions are 
made about the type of solution concept that is used. It can be any of the familiar 
game-theoretic solution concepts (Nash-equilibrium, the core, the bargaining set, 
etc.) which are defined in terms of utility considerations only. It can equally well be 
some newly defined solution concept which takes the non-utility information given 
by the freedom-profile into account. Consider, for example, a solution concept 
which we call an extended Nash-equilibrium, according to which the individuals 
will choose a play such that there is no individual who, as long as the others stick 
to their strategies, can reach an outcome which he or she either strictly prefers or in 
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which the person has more freedom. Evidently, the concept of an extended Nash-
equilibrium is stronger than the concept of a Nash-equilibrium as it is usually 
defined: an extended Nash-equilibrium is always a Nash-equilibrium whereas the 
converse statement does not hold. 
A Constitutional Decision Procedure (CDP)fìs a mechanism which assigns to each 
combination of (1) a preference profile, (2) a freedom-profile, and (3) a set of 
extended alternatives, the agenda, a non-empty subset of the agenda. 
Given a model structure M, the set of agendas contains exactly those sets of points 
which are the outcome sets belonging to at least one constitutional point of 
decision-making. The set of all preference profiles is the set of all л-tuples of 
orderings over X, and the set of all freedom profiles is, as we have seen, S£. The 
relation between a CDP ƒ and the feasible game forms assigned to points of 
constitutional decision-making is as follows. We assume that for each constitutional 
game (GJi,l) there exists a solution set, i.e., a set of plays of the particular game 
form G = < Α, σ, π > which, given the notion of equilibrium on which the solution 
concept is based, contains equilibria of the constitutional game. The outcome 
mapping of the game form assigns an outcome to each of these plays. The non­
empty set of outcomes belonging to the plays in the solution set is, by definition, 
the set of extended alternatives which a constitutional decision-making procedure 
assigns to the situation in which the agenda is the set A, the preference profile R 
and the freedom-profile /. We call this set of outcomes the choice set for the 
situation (AyR,I). 
Example To illustrate the construction of a constitutional decision procedure, let us 
assume that there are only two individuals and that q is a point of constitutional 
decision-making. The feasible game assigned to q, G, has three outcomes, the points 
Formally, a play ρ of a game form G - < Α, σ, π > is an extended Nash-equilibrium of the 
constitutional game (G, R, I) if and only if there is no ι e N such that for some j-variant p* of ρ it is the 
case that (a) n(p*)Pp(p) or (b) π(/>*)>π(ρ). 
In the literature both the term 'agenda' and the term 'issue' have been used to denote the set of 
alternatives actually presented for choice In this chapter we use the term 'agenda' to avoid confusion 
with Group Decision Procedures, in the context of which was spoken about issues (sec chapter 1) 
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Q\' Яг> Яу Decisions about those outcomes are made in the following way. 
Independently from the others, each individual proposes one outcome. If all 
individuals propose the same alternative, then that alternative will be the outcome. 
In all other circumstances q¡, which is the status quo, is the outcome. This game 
form G is described in matrix form as: 
<7| Яг <?3 
4\ 
Я\ 
Я\ 
Я\ 
Яг 
Я\ 
Я\ 
Я\ 
Ь 
Matrix 8.1 
Let us assume that the solution concept is the extended Nash-equilibrium as defined 
in the previous section. Firstly, we note that the solution concept is well-defined: 
for each preference profile R and freedom-profile / there exists a play ρ which 
о 
forms an extended Nash-equilibrium. Hence, for each preference profile R there is 
a non-empty set of extended Nash-equilibria. Next, we derive for each constitutional 
game (G,/?,/) the set of extended Nash-equilibria. For instance, take a preference 
profile R according to which both individuals strictly prefer q^ to q2 and q2 to qj, 
and a freedom-profile in which both individuals have more freedom in q2 than in q{ 
and q^, and more freedom in q
x
 than in <y
v
 The solution set consists of two plays: 
the play in which they both propose q¡ and the play in which they both propose q2 
are extended Nash-equilibria. That these plays are the only extended Nash-equilibria 
is easily checked. Firstly, if one individual proposes q^ whereas the other does not, 
the outcome will be qx. The individual who proposes qx or q2 can change the 
outcome to q^, an outcome which he or she strictly prefers to qx or q2, respectively. 
Secondly, if one individual proposes ql and the other submits q2, then the first 
individual can reach an outcome, q2, in which he or she has more freedom. Thirdly, 
the outcome in which they both propose q^ is not an extended Nash-equilibrium 
since any unilateral switch to another strategy leads to qlt an outcome which gives 
For example, the play in which both individuals propose qt always forms ал extended Nash-
equilibrium. 
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the individuals more freedom than <73. The outcomes belonging to the plays in the 
solution set are <7, and q2. Hence, the choice set belonging to the situation ({qx, q2, 
q^Jt,!) is {qvq2}. 
8.3 The First condition which we impose on a constitutional decision procedure ƒ is 
the condition of Strong Constitutional Liberalism (SCL). For any situation (AJt,l) 
belonging to the domain of ƒ, if a point ql which belongs to the agenda A gives 
collectively more freedom than q2, then q2 should not be an element of the choice 
set. Obviously, there is strong structural similarity between SCL and the Strong 
Pareto condition (SP) which states that an outcome q may not be an element of the 
choice set if the agenda contains another outcome which everybody finds at least as 
good as q, and which at least one individual finds strictly better than q. The Weak 
Pareto Condition (WP) states that an outcome will not be an element of the choice 
set if there is another outcome which everybody strictly prefers. 
It is clear that SP and SCL are not always compatible. Consider a preference profile 
R according to which everybody strictly prefers an outcome <7, to q2, and a 
freedom-profile / in which q2 gives collectively more freedom than q¡. In this 
situation the constitutional decision procedure will always violate either SP or SCL. 
The intuitive appeal of SCL, however, is not very great. It is hard to believe that 
there may not be at least one point of constitutional decision-making such that there 
are at least two outcomes for which unanimous consent of the members in favour of 
one of those outcomes can lead to its inclusion in the choice set, even though the 
other outcome gives collectively more freedom. 
Both SCL and SP rely on one type of information. SCL is an optimality condition 
which is based on non-utility information. SP, on the other hand, is defined entirely 
in terms of utility information. We now define three optimality conditions which 
incorporate both utility and non-utility information. All three conditions are defined 
for points of constitutional decision-making. According to the First Principle of 
Constitutional Liberalism (LIBI) an outcome should not be an element of the choice 
set if there is an individual /' and another outcome which 
(a) gives all individuals at least as much freedom, 
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(b) gives i more freedom, and 
(c) is strictly preferred by ι. 
In other words, if a social state q gives ι more freedom than r, and if the other in­
dividuals are at least as free in q as they are in r, then if i strictly prefers q to r, 
society should not choose r. Thus an individual i can reject an alternative whenever 
there is a superior alternative as judged from a freedom perspective. We believe the 
principle to be a necessary requirement of any theory of liberalism. Let q be a 
social state which both >-,·- and ^-dominates r. Then, if both q and r are presented 
for choice, society can only choose r if / does not care about the relative loss of 
freedom or if he is compensated for it: he weakly prefers r to q. Stated differently, 
the consent of the individual whose freedom is at stake is needed. 
LIBI is not the only possible optimality definition based on both utility- and 
freedom-considerations. By taking the dual of LIBI we get the Second Principle of 
Constitutional Liberalism (LIB2) which states that an outcome should not be an 
element of the choice set if there is an individual j and another outcome which 
(a) everybody weakly prefers, 
(b) gives j more freedom, and 
(c) is strictly preferred by j . 
According to this condition an individual excludes an alternative q from the choice 
set if there is another alternative which gives him more freedom than q, which 
everyone in society finds at least as good as q and which he strictly prefers to q. 
A stronger condition than LIB2, but in the same spirit, is the Third Principle of 
Constitutional Liberalism (LIB3). It states that an outcome should not be an element 
of the choice set if there is an individual j and another outcome which 
(a) is weakly preferred by everyone who enjoys less freedom in it; 
(b) gives j more freedom; 
(c) is strictly preferred by j . 
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We shall not introduce conditions which are related to the notion of inalienable 
rights. Intuitively, to say that a right is inalienable seems to imply that one holds 
that a rights-allocation in which that right is violated should never be chosen. 
Hence, the inalienability of rights can be defined in terms of conditions imposed 
upon an constitutional decision-procedure: it concerns the allocation of rights. 
However, to do so we must have detailed information about the contents of the 
rights-structures under consideration. We also need an analysis of the moral 
standards used in determining whether a certain rights-structure would violate any 
inalienable rights. 
8.4 In chapter 8* we shall show that the two liberal paradoxes resurface in a 
different shape at the level of constitutional decision-making. In this section we 
shall illustrate these two liberal paradoxes of constitutional decision-making. To 
illustrate the first paradox, which points to a tension between the weak Pareto-
condition and the first condition of constitutional liberalism, consider again a 
society in which there are only two individuals. Assume that they have to make a 
decision about the permission of individuals to smoke cigarettes. There are three 
possible outcomes: q¡ in which both individuals have the permission to smoke, q2 
in which only individual /' has such a permission, and <y3 in which nobody may 
smoke. We assume that, according to the moral standard, a social state in which an 
individual has permission to smoke gives him or her more freedom than a social 
state in which he or she does not have that permission but which is otherwise the 
same. The freedom-profile is: 
Я\>Аъ <l\>fly Я-Ffly 
By assumption, individual /' wants most of all to be the only one with the 
permission to smoke. If he cannot have the permission, then he wants nobody to 
have it. Individual j wants to prohibit what she sees as a filthy habit. However, if 
somebody has the permission then she thinks everybody should have the permission 
to smoke. Hence, the preference profile is 
ifflfflx 
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qfflfflb 
There exists no constitutional decision-making procedure which has this preference 
profile and freedom-profile in its domain and which satisfies the conditions LIBI 
and WP. WP demands that ql is not chosen since everybody strictly prefers <y3 to 
<7j. LIBI demands that <y3 is not chosen since / strictly prefers q2 to <73, since i has 
more freedom in q2 than in q^, and since the other individuals (in this case there is 
only one: j) have at least as much freedom in q2 as in <73. Similarly, LIBI rules out 
q2. j has more freedom in q¡ than in q2, j strictly prefers qi to q2 and everybody 
else has as least as much freedom in qy as in q2. Hence, none of the available 
outcomes can be an element of the choice set. 
To illustrate the second paradox we look at a society consisting of three individuals: 
ι, y', k. Let the three outcomes q¡, q2, q^ be social states in which there is always 
exactly one individual who is permitted to smoke. In q{ this is i, in q2 j and in c 3 k. 
Furthermore, the outcomes differ with respect to the incomes of the individuals. 
Individual /' earns more in q^ than in qx and more in qx than in q2. Individual j 
earns most in q¡, less in q2 and least in <73. Finally, к is best off in q2, somewhat 
less well off in <73 and worst off in qv We assume that the moral standard, which 
views the state of affairs in which an individual smokes a cigarette as belonging to 
his or her protected sphere and according to which a person's income has nothing 
to do with the person's freedom, yields the following freedom-profile: 
Я-fflv Чг>А* Яі=Аз 
qj>#x, q^ifti- Я\=іЯг 
The individuals are concerned about their own income as well as their own 
freedom. Not having the permission to smoke can only be compensated by a higher 
income: the individuals are indifferent between a state of affairs in which they earn 
a lot of money but do not possess the permission to smoke, and a state of affairs in 
which they do have such a permission but in which they have a moderate income. 
However, they want at all costs to avoid the outcome in which their income is 
lower than in the other two outcomes. Hence, the preference profile is 
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lliflfiflv 
LIB3 demands that q
x
 will not be chosen since (1) к strictly prefers q^ to <?,, (2) A: 
has more freedom in q^ than in q¡, and (3) the one individual who would have less 
freedom in q-¡ than in qx, individual /, does not strictly prefer q^ to <7j. Hence, LIB3 
demands that q^ does not belong to the choice set if q^ is an element of the agenda. 
In a similar way we see that q2 cannot be chosen since ql is available, and that q^ 
cannot be chosen since q2 is available. Thus, none of the outcomes can be chosen: 
the choice set is empty. 
The first paradox of constitutional liberalism states that the conditions LIBI and 
WP cannot be satisfied simultaneously. The second paradox states that there is no 
constitutional decision procedure satisfying LIB3. Nevertheless, as we shall see in 
chapter 8*. LIB2 can be satisfied by a CDP. As in Sen's liberal paradox, liberalism 
imposes conditions (in our case LIBI and LIB3) which restrict what can be chosen 
after alternatives have been eliminated using the Pareto-criterion. Thus impossibility 
results follow. LIB2, on the other hand, is a weaker condition than the Pareto-
criterion and, consequently, does not entail an additional restriction of the choice 
set. Hence, it permits possibility results. 
Though impossibility results are negative in character, they also have important 
positive consequences. The impossibility results in social choice theory state 
conditions which a decision-mechanism cannot satisfy simultaneously. The results 
are defined as strong as possible: a weakening of any of the conditions usually 
implies that the impossibility result collapses and that possibility results follow. In 
chapter 8* we shall discuss the possibility of defining constitutional decision 
Interpreting the combination of conditions that social choice theorists impose upon a decision 
procedure as an ethical principle, Steven Strasnick stales that impossibility results show that 'no single 
ethical principle should be able to deal with the complete range of ethical issues. Rather than seeing the 
existence of counterexamples as indicative of inherent contradictions in the nature of morality, we might 
view these counterexamples as fenceposts circumscribing the legitimate domains of different but not 
necessarily competing principles of ethics. Viewed in this manner, counterexamples may reveal 
important clues about the structure of moral theory - and not about its impossibility.' [Strasnick, 1979, 
196] 
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procedures which have a restricted domain. Two types of restrictions will be 
discussed. The restrictions are defined in terms of the existence of what we shall 
call liberal individuals. We distinguish two types of liberals. An individual is called 
a liberal (of type I) with respect to a situation if for any outcomes q^ and q2 
belonging to the agenda the individual strictly prefers q^ to q2 if q\ gives 
collectively more freedom than q2. Furthermore, an individual is called a concerned 
liberal (of type 2) with respect to the situation if, for any q
x
, q2 belonging to the 
agenda, (1) the individual either has strictly more freedom in q^ than in q2, or 
strictly more freedom in q2 than in qly and (2) the individual strictly prefers the 
social state which gives him or her more freedom. 
In chapter 8* we show that it is possible to define a constitutional decision 
procedure satisfying LIBI and WP if there always exists a liberal (of type 1). 
Furthermore, if there is always a concerned liberal (of type 2), then CDPs can be 
defined which satisfy the three conditions of constitutional liberalism as well as the 
weak Pareto-condition. 
8.5 If a decision about a 'conventionally' defined social state is a first-order 
decision, a decision about extended alternatives, i.e., social states which incorporate 
information about decision mechanisms, can be said to be of a second order. The 
question naturally arises how third-order decisions, i.e., decisions about alternatives 
which not only incorporate first-order decision mechanisms but also second-order 
mechanisms like CDPs, should be made. More generally: any description of a 
decision mechanism of order η raises the question which mechanism of order и+1 
leads to its adoption. Following a respectable position in political theory, Arrow 
suggested that unanimous agreement about an nth-order decision may be a 
justifiable ground for interrupting the regression. If everybody unanimously prefers 
a particular decision procedure, albeit a dictatorial one, then there is no need for 
further justification. [Arrow, 1963, p. 90] 
Given our concern about non-utility considerations, a different solution suggests 
itself. It consists of demanding that there should not only be unanimous consent 
about some nth-order decision, but that this nth-order decision should also be >•-
optimal (where >-optimality is defined in terms of freedom-relations over the set of 
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alternatives of order n). In that way, again, individual freedom and individual 
preferences are taken into account. As a consequence, even if 'the desire for a 
dictatorship or for a particular dictator may be overwhelming' [Arrow, 1963, p. 90] 
such a dictatorship is not chosen if there is an alternative which is freedom-wise 
superior. 
To recapitulate, we have presented a reformulation and expansion of the traditional 
social choice format. By introducing non-utility relations which play a similar role 
as preference relations we have shown how moral considerations can be taken into 
account in the context of constitutional decision-making. In particular, we have 
defined some liberal conditions which were based on the principle that the rights 
and liberties of individuals should not be violated without the consent of the in-
dividuals involved. Moreover, we have shown that at the level of constitutional 
decision-making the tension between liberal principles of decision-making and the 
Pareto-condition does not disappear. 
Although we have focused on the formalization of a model of liberal collective 
decision-making, the format is general enough to permit other applications. Instead 
of conceptions of freedom, other moral considerations deemed relevant can be used. 
One can, for example, compare social states on the basis of how just they are, 
define justice-relations instead of freedom-relations, and formulate decision 
procedures which take both this information about the justice of social states and 
information about individual preferences into account. 
Chapter 8* 
Formal presentation 
8.1 Constitutional decision-making 
Let M be an arbitrarily chosen model structure of DLA (DLA*). Let X be the set of 
points of the CGT of M. 
8*1.1 Notation ä denotes a non-empty set of и-tuples (іц,...,ь
п
) of binary relations 
over X. The relations ht ('gives / at least as much freedom as') are called individual 
freedom-relations. 
8*1.2 Definition For all / e N and all q, r e X: q>
x
r iff (цъ
х
г & not rh¡q). 
8*1.3 Definition For all q, r e X: 
qhr iff for all i e N qhtr; 
q>r iff for all i e N qi.tr and for some j e N q> r. 
8*1.4 Assumption There exists a point of constitutional decision making q such 
that 
(1) the set of outcomes X ^' of the feasible game form belonging to q contains at 
least three elements; 
(2) for each «-tuple of orderings over ΧΣ(<?) there exists a freedom profile / G áf in 
which the η individual freedom relations restricted to X^> are identical to 
that η-tuple of orderings. 
8*1.5 Notation [X] = {ΧΣ(<?* I q is a point of constitutional decision making}. (Cf. 
definition 5*1.3) 
8*1.6 Definition A Constitutional Decision Procedure (CDP) is a correspondence ƒ 
which has as its domain a non-empty subset of [X]xR(X)x£t. It assigns to each 
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element (AJi,[) of its domain a non-empty subset МЯЛ of A. The elements of 
[X]xR(X)x££ will be called situations. The set МЯ,0 is the collective choice or 
choice set for the situation (Αβ,Ι) under/. The domain of/will be denoted as D*. 
8*1.7 Definition A CDP ƒ satisfies the First Principle of Liberalism (UBI) iff for 
all (AJt,l) e [X]xR(X)x& and for all q, r e A, if for some ; e N qP,r & qyfr & 
q>r, then r e МЯЛ 
8*1.8 Definition A CDP ƒ satisfies the Second Principle of Liberalism (LIB2) iff for 
all (АЯ,1) e [X\xR(X)xgand for all q, r e Л, if for all / e N rR¡q and for some/ 
e Λ/ /-/»ƒ7 and r>y?, then q й МЯЛ 
8*1.9 Definition A CDP ƒ satisfies the Third Principle of Liberalism (LIB3) iff for 
all (Αβ,Ι) e [X]xR(X)x££, and for all q, r e A, if (a) for some; e N r ^ and rP·?, 
and (b) for all i e Ν, q>tr implies rR¡q, then q г МЯЛ 
8*1.10 Definition A CDP ƒ satisfies the Weak Pareto Condition (WP) iff for all 
(АЯ,1) e [X]xR(X)xg, and for all Ι / , Γ Ε Α , if for all / e N rP¡q, then <7 г МЯЛ 
8*1.11 Definition A CDP ƒ satisfies the condition of Universal Domain (UD) iff the 
domain of/, Dp equals [X]xR(X)xS£. 
8*2 Two paradoxes of constitutional liberalism 
8*2.1 Proposition (First paradox of constitutional liberalism) There does not 
exist a CDP which satisfies UD, WP and LIBI. 
Proof: Assumption 8*1.4 and UD imply the existence of a situation (Αβ,Ι) e 
[X]xR(X)x££ such that (a) A contains at least three elements q
v
, q2, q^, and (b) / is 
an η-tuple of orderings such that, for all i e N 4\>fl2>fl'ìyiw ^or a " w e 
А/{<7],<72><7з}· Take a preference profile R according to which for some /, к e Ν 
q2PflyP'fl\P',w and q^P\q,/3\q2P\w for all w e A/[ql,q2,qTl]. Furthermore, q^P¡w for 
all ι e N and all w e A¡\q2,q^\. Because of LIBI neither q2 nor q^ can belong to 
МЯЛ since <7| belongs to the agenda, q2 cannot belong to the choice set, and 
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since q2 belongs to the agenda, q^ cannot be chosen. By WP, w éf{AJi,l) for all w 
£ A/[q2,q^}. Hence, ДА,/?,/) is empty, which contradicts the definition of a CDP. • 
8*2.2 Corollary There does not exist an CDP which satisfies UD, WP and LIB3. 
Proof: We show that a CDP satisfying LIB3 also satisfies LIBI. Let ƒ be a CDP 
satisfying LIB3 and let there be a situation {АЯ>0 belonging to its domain such that 
for some <' e N qPtr & q>¡r & q>r. We show that г г f{AJt,l). Since q>r there is 
no individual j with r>fl. Since there is some i e N with qPtr and (¡>¡r, LIB3 
implies that r i f(Afi,l). Ш 
8*2.3 Proposition There exists an ƒ which satisfies UD, WP and LIB2. 
Proof: Define the relation /** as follows: qP^r if and only if qRf for all i e N and 
qP r for some j e N. Because the individual preferences are transitive, P^ is 
transitive as well. Moreover, P" is asymmetric. Now construct the CDP ƒ by 
defining ЛАЯ,I) = {<? I there is no r e A such that rPdq) for all (АЯ,0 e 
[X]xR(X)x¡£. Since the relation P^ is transitive and asymmetric and since A is finite, 
ƒ is well-defined. Obviously, it satisfies WP and LIB2. • 
The next proposition shows that under some circumstances 8*2.3 does not hold if 
LIB2 is replaced by the stronger LIB3, not even if WP is dropped. 
8*2.4 Proposition (Second paradox of constitutional liberalism) If N has at least 
three members, then there does not exist a CDP satisfying UD and LIB3. 
Proof: 8*1.4 and UD imply that there is an (АЯ,1) belonging to [X]xR(X)x¿£ such 
that for some i, j , к e N there are q{, q2, q$ belonging to A and an л-tuple of 
orderings (fcj,...,fc
n
) e S£ according to which q\y¡q2>¡cí},>iw, Я2>ІЯ^>ІЯІ>І a n d 
4Ϋ'$'l>'lfl2>'kw f°r a " w e ^1\Я\,Ч2>Чт,)· Take a preference profile R according to 
which q2Pfl}PflxPlw, q^Pjq[PJ<¡2PJw, qlPkq2Piß?iPlw, q^I^^I^ for all w e 
A/{qitq2,q^} and all hi [ij,k]. Let ƒ be any CDP satisfying LIB3. Because of LIB3 
qy cannot be chosen since q^ is an element of the agenda, q^ cannot be chosen 
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because q2 is an element of the agenda, and finally, any w e A/iq^q^} is excluded 
since <7j e A. Hence, the choice set is empty. • 
8*3 Restricted domain 
8*3.1 Definition An individual i e N is called concerned with respect to a situation 
(AJR,l) e [X]xR(X)x££ iff for all q, r e A q>¡r or r>¡q. 
8*3.2 Definition An individual i e N is called a liberal (of type 1) with respect to a 
situation (AJt,l) e [X]xR(X)xg iff for all q, r e A q>r implies qP¡r. 
8*3.3 Definition An individual i e N is called a liberal (of type 2) with respect to a 
situation (AJiJ) e [X]xR(X)x¡£ iff for all <7, r e A q>~¡r implies qPxr. 
8*3.4 Definition A CDP ƒ satisfies the first condition of Restricted Domain (RDI) 
iff its domain is the set of all situations with respect to which there is a liberal (of 
type 1) or a concerned liberal (of type 2). 
8*3.5 Definition A CDP ƒ satisfies the second condition of Restricted Domain 
(RD2) iff its domain is the set of all situations with respect to which there is a 
concerned liberal (of type 2). 
8*3.6 Proposition There exists a CDP ƒ satisfying RDI, LIBI and WP. 
Proof: Define the CDP ƒ as follows: for any (АД,1) e Dp q e f(AJlJ) iff 
(1) qeA, 
(2) there is no r e A such that rP¡q for all i e Ν, 
(3) there is no r e Л such that rP¡q, r>¡q and r>q for some ι e N. 
Obviously, ƒ satisfies LIBI and WP. We have to show that/is well-defined, i.e., 
that there always exists a non-empty choice set. Let (A,R,l) be an arbitrarily chosen 
situation belonging to the domain of/. By condition RDI there is an individual i 
who is either a liberal (of type 1 ) or a concerned liberal (of type 2) with respect to 
(AJiJ). Let q be a point such that qRtr for all r e A. It follows from definitions 
8*3.1 - 8*3.4 that there is no ν e A with v>q. For if i is a liberal (of type 1) then 
v>q implies that /" strictly prefers ν to q, whereas all individuals weakly prefer q to 
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v. If / is a concerned individual, v>q would imply v>¡q and, additionally, if i is also 
a liberal (of type 2), it implies that i strictly prefers ν to q. Thus, there is no ν e A 
with v>q. Furthermore, since q is one of i's most preferred outcomes in A there 
cannot be a ν e A which all individuals (including /) strictly prefer to q. Hence, q e 
ДА,/?,/). Thus ДА,Л,/) is not empty. Since the situation (A,/?,/) is arbitrarily chosen, ƒ 
is well-defined. • 
8*3.7 Proposition There exists a CDP ƒ satisfying RD2, LIBI, LIB3 and WP. 
Proof: Let ƒ be a CDP defined as follows. For any (AfiJ) e Df:q e МЯЛ iff 
(1) Я e A, 
(2) there is no r e A such that rP¡q for all / e Ν, 
(3) there is no r e A such that rP¡q, r>¡q and r>q for some i e Ν, 
(4) there is no r e A such that rP¡q, r>¡q for some i e N and rR-q for all j e N 
with <7>-r. 
The rest of the proof runs in the same way as the proof of 8*3.6 and is therefore 
omitted. • 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
As was stated in the introduction, the central purpose of this thesis is to argue that a 
fruitful synthesis of game-theory and deontic logic is possible. To do so we posed 
six research questions. Firstly, we asked whether insights of deontic logic can be 
used to provide a foundation of the game-theoretical analysis of individual and 
collective rights. The answer to this question proceeded in two steps. The first step 
was the construction of a formal language which contains expressions about the 
permissions and obligations of individuals and collectivities with respect to the 
performance of actions. The expressions of such languages of deontic logics of 
action can, as is shown by literature in this direction, be used to formulate 
individual and collective rights. Next, we developed a game-theoretic semantics of 
this language. That is to say, a game-theoretic model was used to establish the 
truth-value of the expressions of the formal language. Since rights can be 
formulated in terms of expressions of the language, viz., those describing the 
permissions and obligations of agents to perform actions, the semantic machinery 
can also be viewed as a game-theoretic model of individual and collective rights. 
Thus, the desired foundation of the game-theoretical analysis of rights is reached 
through a connection with logic, specifically, with a deontic logic of action. 
Secondly, we posed the question whether it is possible to formulate a game-
theoretic model that distinguishes between rights in terms of hypothetical control 
and rights in terms of actual control. In the definition of a complex game tree we 
distinguished admissible and feasible game forms. An agent who can make sure that 
a certain outcome of his admissible game form is reached can be said to have the 
permission to see to it that a certain state of affairs arises, i.e., the one belonging to 
that outcome. Although the agent may have the permission, he may not have the 
ability or the opportunity to see to the realization of this state of affairs. The 
outcome may, for example, not be an outcome of the feasible game form. In that 
case, the agent is only hypothetically in control. On the other hand, if the agent not 
only has the permission but also the capability of seeing to it that this state of 
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affairs arises, then the agent can be said to have actual control. Since rights are 
defined in terms of the permissions and obligations that agents have, the definition 
of feasible and admissible game forms provides us with a way to distinguish rights 
in terms of actual and rights in terms of hypothetical control. 
The way we defined rights in terms of permissions and obligations was described in 
chapter 6. We showed how Stig Kanger's notion of atomic types of rights can be 
used to formulate different types of individual and collective rights. In this 
framework, rights are conceived as legal relations existing between two agents. On 
the basis of different simple types of right we constructed typologies of so-called 
atomic rights-types. 
The fourth research question concerned the relation of alternativeness used in the 
Kripke semantics of deontic logic: can our model be used to interpret this relation 
game-theoretically? Indeed, this is possible. First, let us note that our definition of a 
model structure can be interpreted in terms of possible worlds: each point of a 
model structure M is a possible world the description of which is given by the 
formulas which, given the interpretation and the CGT in question, are true at that 
point (see definition 5*1.4). The relation of alternativeness between the worlds is 
indicated by the branches of the complex game tree: a world q2 is an alternative to 
another world q^ if there is a play of any of the game forms belonging to ql which 
has q2 as its outcome. More precisely, a world q2 is a deontic alternative to another 
world <7j if there is a play of any of the admissible game forms belonging to q^ 
which leads to q2. Thus we see that the relation of alternativeness is no longer a 
primitive: it is defined game-theoretically. In particular, the relation describes 
aspects of processes of decision-making. If we assume that the feasible game forms 
refer to decision situations actually existing 'out there' and if we furthermore 
assume that each agent has the same admissible game form which is a sub-game of 
the feasible game form, i.e., each admissible strategy is feasible and each play ρ of 
the admissible game form has the same outcome as ρ has in the feasible game 
form, then we can interpret the relation of alternativeness realistically: it describes 
outcomes of the processes of decision-making which actually take place at the 
stipulated points in time. 
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After having constructed the formal framework we presented, in chapter 7, a 
condition of liberalism which can be imposed on rights-structures, i.e., on the 
constellation of permissions and obligations existing in society. This condition of 
minimal liberalism was justified along the same lines as Sen's en Gibbard's 
conditions of liberalism. It expresses the Millean idea that each individual has a 
certain protected sphere in which he or she alone may decide what happens. The 
condition is called minimal because it specifies only a necessary requirement of a 
theory of liberalism. It was shown that rights-structures which satisfy this condition 
entail the existence of decision situations in which there is a tension between the 
condition of Pareto-optimality and the notion of individual stability which is in 
terms of the Nash-equilibrium. To be precise, the condition entails the possible 
existence of decision situations in which the only Nash-equilibria lead to suboptimal 
outcomes. Since this result expresses, like Sen's original paradox, a tension between 
individual rights on the one hand and the notion of Pareto-optimality on the other, 
we have interpreted it as the game-theoretic 'translation' of Sen's impossibility 
result and have called it the first paradox of liberalism. As in Gibbard's theorem, 
the game-theoretic translation of the theorem does not invoke the condition of 
Pareto-optimality. It states that a rights-structure which satisfies the condition of 
minimal liberalism always entails the existence of decision-situations which are not 
individually stable: there is a conceivable combination of individual preferences 
such that there is no Nash-equilibrium of the corresponding game. 
In the last chapter we formulated a framework for the analysis of constitutional 
decision-making. A model of collective decision-making was presented which 
enabled us to analyse the allocation of individual rights and liberties. The model 
broadens the traditional social choice framework. In social choice theory it is 
usually assumed that individuals have preferences over a set of feasible alternatives 
and that society reaches a decision on the basis of those preferences only. In the 
more general model presented in this chapter, however, decision procedures do not 
only take information about individual preferences as input, but also information 
about individual rights and liberty. We defined three conditions of liberal 
constitutional decision-making, that is, three principles which are aimed at the 
protection of individual rights and liberty. Next, we showed that the two liberal 
paradoxes re-emerge at the constitutional level. The first paradox of constitutional 
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liberalism describes that there is no decision procedure which satisfies the first 
condition of (constitutional) liberalism and the Pareto-condition. Thus, we once 
again discovered a conflict between a condition of liberalism and Pareto-optimality. 
The second paradox of constitutional liberalism shows that dropping the Pareto-
condition does not always offer a way out. There is no constitutional decision 
procedure of constitutional liberalism which satisfies both the condition of universal 
domain and which satisfies the third condition of (constitutional) liberalism, not 
even if it violates the Pareto-condition. In the second part of chapter 8 we examined 
restrictions on the domain of a constitutional decision procedure. We formulate 
restrictions which established a relation between the preferences of (some) 
individuals and the amount of freedom individuals enjoy in the social states. The 
restrictions express the idea that there are at least some liberals, that is, some 
individuals who always prefer a social state to another social state if the first gives 
more freedom than the second. We showed that such restrictions permit the 
formulation of possibility results. 
We have called the impossibility results presented in chapter 7 and 8 paradoxes 
because we see them as the game-theoretical respectively constitutional 
'translations' of the Sen- and Gibbard-paradox. Whether the results are really 
paradoxical depends on one's conception of liberalism. In our opinion, the 
paradoxical character of the results can be disputed. For instance, it is not clear to 
us why liberal decision-making should always lead to the existence of Nash-
equilibria.1 Similarly, we are not convinced that liberalism entails Pareto-
optimality. It is our opinion that the results should not be viewed as stating the 
impossibility of liberalism as such, but as descriptions of tensions between demands 
of liberalism and other principles of decision-making, for example the desire for 
stability. 
At the end of this book we would like to pose some questions which have been 
neglected by us, but that are nevertheless of interest to the subject. First of all, we 
note that in our game-theoretic model Can- and May-statements are interpreted in 
terms of what is known in literature as a-effectivity: an agent sees to it that a 
1
 Cf. [Schwartz, 1981, p. 500]. 
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certain state of affairs arises if the agent has a strategy such that, regardless of what 
the others do, this state of affairs results. It is interesting to see what happens if we 
use a weaker interpretation of such statements, for instance, one that is based on the 
notion of ß-effectivity. On this interpretation, an individual can (may) see to it that 
a state of affairs arises if the individual has, for any possible combination of the 
strategies of the other individuals, a feasible (admissible) strategy which leads to 
that state of affairs. Stated differently, a person can see to it that something is the 
case if the person always has a response to the other players' strategies which leads 
to that outcome. Since that response need not always be the same, ß-effectivity does 
not entail a-effectivity. However, it is obvious that a person who has a strategy 
which leads to a certain outcome regardless of what the others do, always has a 
response to the other player's strategies which leads to that outcome: ß-effectivity is 
a weaker notion than a-effectivity. 
A second question which has not been examined is whether, and if so how, the 
Sen-like types of rights, i.e., rights which are defined in terms of individual 
preferences, can be incorporated into the model. Since we have defined rights 
through the use of game forms and since individual preferences are in no way part 
of the definition of a game form, we can say that we have defined rights without 
any reference to the preferences of individuals. Although we have conjectured in the 
introductory chapter that such preference-based rights are not important for a liberal 
theory of decision-making, they may be meaningful in other contexts. 
Thirdly, we would like to remark that many of the research lines that have been 
examined after Sen formulated his liberal paradox are again open, but now with 
respect to the game-theoretic formulation of these paradoxes. For example, many 
authors have examined the relation between types of individual preferences and 
Sen's (and Gibbard's) paradox. With the exception of recent work of Wulf Gaertner 
[1993], this line of research has not yet been explored with respect to the game-
theoretic formulation of the paradoxes. Another topic which can be re-opened is the 
characterization of consistent rights-structures, i.e., rights-structures that do not lead 
to the liberal paradoxes. 
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Finally, our analysis has mainly focused on the definition of the necessary 
requirements of liberalism. For the development of a formal model of liberal 
decision-making, one needs to formulate 'more than minimal' or even sufficient 
conditions. The formulation of different conditions of liberalism may also permit us 
to analyse different processes of liberal decision-making and, consequently, different 
types of liberalism. 
Appendix 1 
Basic logic 
In this appendix the syntax and semantics of the first-order predicate logic, BL, on 
which DLA is based, is described. The signs of the language of BL (Basic Logic) 
are 
(1) Individual symbols 
- Free individual symbols: i,j, ... (countably many) 
- Bound individual variables: s, t, ... 
(2) Predicate symbols: P¡, P2, .... Pp 
(3) Sentential connectives: &, v, - , —», <-» 
(4) Quantifiers: 3, V 
(5) Identity and non-identity sign: =, Φ 
(6) Auxiliary symbols: (, ), [, ] 
The set of atomic formulas of BL is defined in the following way: 
Al.l Definition 
(1) for all free individual symbols jcj, x2 the expression (x¡ = x2) is an atomic 
formula of BL; 
(2) for all positive integers n, if xl , . . . , xn are η free individual symbols and if 
Ρ is an η-placed predicate symbol, then Дл'|,,..д„) is an atomic formula of 
BL; 
(3) BL contains no atomic formulas other than the ones defined by (1) and (2). 
The symbols /, j , ... are free individual symbols denoting, in the particular contexts, 
concrete agents. To keep semantics simple, we do not distinguish free individual 
symbols which are individual constants from free individual symbols which are free 
variables. 
If Jfj and x2 are free individual symbols, the identity (Xj = x2) is an atomic formula 
of BL stating that the symbols denote the same agent. The symbols P
x
, Я,, . . ., Ρ 
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are predicate symbols. Each predicate symbol Ρ is interpreted as an л-placed 
relation (n is a positive integer which depends on P) on the set of individuals. If 
*],...,*„ are η free individual symbols and if Ρ is an л-placed predicate symbol, 
P(jC!,...^
n
) is an atomic formula of BL. It states that the relation denoted by Ρ holds 
among the individuals denoted by the symbols JCj, . . ., x
n
. 
The set of well-formed formulas (wjfs) of BL is defined by the following conditions: 
A1.2 Definition 
(1) each atomic formula of BL is a wff of BL; 
(2) for all wffs φ of BL, - φ is a wff of BL; 
(3) for all wffs φ and ψ of BL, (φ & ψ) is a wff of BL; 
(4) for all wffs φ of BL, all free individual symbols i, and all bound individual 
variables s: if φ(ί/ί) is the formula which results if the symbol / is, wherever 
it occurs in φ, replaced by the symbol s, then V ; [φ(ί/0] is a wff of BL; 
(5) the conditions (l)-(4) define all wffs of BL. 
The signs & and - are, respectively, the signs of conjunction and negation. The wff 
(-φ) is read as: not φ. (φ & ψ) is read as : φ and ψ. The symbols s, t, ... designate 
bound individual variables and are used in quantificational contexts only. The 
formula Vç [<p(s//)] is read as: for each individual s, (p(s//). 
A1.3 Definition In BL the following abbreviations are used: 
(1) (i*j) for -( /=;•) ; 
(2) (φ ν ψ) for - ( - φ & ~ψ); 
(3) (φ -> ψ) for (~φ ν ψ); 
(4) (φ ο ψ) for (φ -> ψ) & (ψ -> φ); 
(5) Ξ, φ for -V, - φ ; 
The symbols ν, ->, <-> are, respectively, the symbols denoting disjunction (read: 
or), material implication (if ... , then ...) and equivalence (if and only if, iff). 3 is 
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the existential quantifier. Formulas of the form 3S [φ] are read as: there exists an 
individual 5 such that φ. 
(Like in this list we shall often economize on our notation by discarding both the 
brackets enclosing a wff and the brackets in a negation or the square brackets 
within the range of a quantifier. In doing this we assume, to avoid confusion, that & 
and ν bind more strongly than -> and <->.) 
A1.4 Definition Let β be an individual variable. If ψ is a string of symbols of the 
basic logic and φ = За |ψ] or Vn [ψ], then [ψ] is called the scope of the quantifier 
3n respectively Vn. The symbol β occurs bound in a string of symbols of the basic 
logic iff it occurs immediately under a quantifier 3 or V or in the scope of the 
quantifier 3n or Vn. β occurs free iff it does not occur bound. 
A1.5 Definition A model of BL is an ordered pair (Ñ, /") where Ñ is a non-empty 
set of individuals and / a mapping which assigns 
(a) to each free individual symbol a member of Ñ; 
(b) to each η-placed predicate symbol Ρ a subset of /V". 
A1.6 Definition Let (Ñ, /") be a model of BL. A wff φ of BL is true in (holds in) in 
(Ñ, f) if and only if 
(1) /"(JCJ) = / (x2) in case φ = (x{ = дг2); 
(2) (ί(
Χ[), ..., / C g ) e f (Ρ) in case φ = P(xlt...jn); 
(3) ψ is not true in (Ñ, /") in case φ = -ψ; 
(4) ψ and ω are true in (Ñ, /") in case φ = (ψ & ω); 
(5) for every free individual symbol /, ψ(ί"Αν) is true in (Ñ, /") in case φ = V [ψ] 
(where ψ(//ι) is the formula which results if the individual variable s is 
wherever it occurs free in ψ replaced by /')• 
Appendix 2 
Systems of logic 
A2.1 Proposition Each of the following formulas is Cj-, C2-, £>¡- and D2-valid. 
(1) (Γ,,-φ) <-> -(ί,,φ) 
(2) Όο^,φ) -> φ 
(3) ϋο,-^,φ) -> - D o ^ - φ ) 
(4) Οο,(ί,,φ) & ϋο,^,ψ) ο ϋο,^,φ & ψ) 
(5) ϋο/ί,,φ) -> ϋο ((ί ;,φ ν ψ) 
(6) οο,(/;,φ) -> ϋο/ί,,ψ -> φ) 
(7) ϋο,^,φ) -> Do,(r;,-φ -> ψ) 
(8) ϋ ο , ^ , φ -> ψ) -> [(ϋο,-Ο,,φ) -> (ϋο,^,ψ)] 
(9) ϋο,ίί,,Οο/ί,,φ)) -> ϋο,ίί,,φ) 
(10) (i=f)-*Ook(tkyi=j) 
(11) (i * j)-> Oofai */) 
(12) (f, = í,) -» ϋ ο ^ , ί , = f,) 
(13) (f, < f,) -» DoA(fÁ,f, < f,) 
(14) Dó,(fr<p)-xp 
(15) Οό,(ί,,φ) -> -ϋό
Α
(ί,,-φ) 
(16) ϋό,Ο,,φ) & ϋό,α,,ψ) -» ϋό,^,φ & ψ) 
(17) ϋό,-ί,ί,,φ -> ψ) - ) [(ϋό,ίί,,φ) -» (ϋό,^,ψ)] 
(18) -DÓA(/ t ,í=;) 
(19) -Oófaiïj) 
(20) ~DÓA(fA,í, = f,) 
(21) -O6k(tk,t, < tj) 
(22) ϋο,(^,φ) -> CanDo/^,φ) 
(23) СапооД^-ф) -> Can~Do,(/;,q>) 
(24) CanDo,(r¿,(p & ψ) -» CanDo,(?A,(p) & CanDo((fA,V|/) 
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CanDo^ip) -» CanDo^.tp ν ψ) 
CanDo({fA,<p) -» CanDo^.iy -» φ) 
СалОоД.ф) -> С а п и о ^ . - Ф -» ψ) 
(Í * У) & CanDo,(iA,ç) -> -CanDo^í^-φ) 
CanDo^.Do (г ,φ)) -> CanDo,<íA,9) 
С а п - Б о ^ . ф ) -> Can-Do (ί
λ>φ) 
MustDo,<f¿^) <-» -Сап-ОоДг^ф) 
MustDo,<íA,9) -> MustDo (/¿,φ) 
MustDo({fA^) -» Сапоо((^,ф) 
Μικίϋο,^,φ) -> Οο(<ίλ,φ) 
MustDo f{f^) -> MustDo,(f¿^ ν ψ) 
MustDOjC^^ & ψ) <-> MustDo/i^) & MustDo,(f¿,y) 
MustDo,(fA^ -» ψ) -» [МіЫОо,(г
А
,ф) -> MustDo((rA,\|/)] 
MustDo((fA,9) -> MustDo,(íA,y -» φ) 
MustDo4(fA,9) -> МішОоДг^-ф -» ψ) 
MustDo((fA,9 -4 ψ) & СагШо^.ф) -> C a n D o ^ . y ) 
(i=j) -> MustDoA(f¿,/ = j) 
(i * ƒ) -» MustDo^ , / * y) 
(í, = tj) -> MustDo^.r, = f;) 
(f, < f,) -> MustDo^.f, < f;) 
MustDó,(fA^) <-> ~Сап~Оо;(^,ф) 
ϋ ό ^ , φ ) -> Сапоо((ГА,ф) 
ϋ ό , ^ , φ ) o ϋ ο , ^ , φ ) & Can~Do,(f^) 
СапОо(<^,ф) <-» СагЮоДг^ф) & Can-Do/^,φ) 
CunDót(tk,y & ψ) -> CanDó/ f^ ) ν CanDó,(/A,\|0 
О * у) & CanDó,(r^) -» -CanDó;(/A,-φ) 
CanDó^ .Do ,^^ ) ) -» CanDó,(f^) 
~MustDó ((/^) 
МауОо,(Г
А
,-ф) -» Мау-Оо^.ф) 
МауОо,(Г
А
,ф & ψ) -» MayDo,(fA,9) & МауОо,( ,^\|/) 
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(56) MayDo({fA,<p) -» MayDo^.tp ν ψ) 
(57) MayDo,(rA,(p) -> МауОо,<^,\|/ -» φ) 
(58) MayDo,{f^) -> M a y D o ^ . - φ -» ψ) 
(59) MayDo^.Do/ί,,φ)) -* МауОо(<Г*,ф) 
(60) ShallDo({f^) <-> -Мау-ОоД.ф) 
(61) ShallDo(<f;^) -> MayDo,(f^) 
(62) ShallDo,(fA^) -> ShallDo ;(f^ ν ψ) 
(63) ShallDo,(fA^ & ψ) <-> ShallDo/^,φ) & ShallDo,(r¿,\]/) 
(64) ShallDo,<fA^ -> ψ) -> [ShallDo^f^) -> ShallDo,{f¿,\|/)] 
(65) ShallDo,(fA^) -» ShallDo^.V)/ -> φ) 
(66) ShallDo,(/^) -> ShallDo,(f ;^ -» ψ) 
(67) ShallDo ( (r^ -» ψ) & МауОоД^.ф) -> MayDo <ίλ,ψ) 
(68) (j = j) -> S h a l l D o ^ i = 7) 
(69) ( i*/)->Shal lDo t(f ¿ > /*y) 
(70) (í, = í;) -» ShallDo^f, = fy) 
(71) (f, < f;) -> ShallDoA(fA,r, < tj) 
(72) ShallDó,(f^) <-> -May-Dó^f^) 
(73) МауОо,(г
А
,ф) <-» Мауио,<^,ф) & Can~Do,(f^) 
(74) MayDó,{f^ & ψ) -> МауОо,(^,ф) ν MayDó((i;,y) 
(75) MayDÓ^.Do/f,^)) -» MayDÓ/ί^φ) 
If we first replace the subformulas (ί = j) and (/ * j) everywhere by the formulas (F 
= G) and (F Θ G = J.) respectively, and then the remaining free individual symbols 
i, j, к by the free coalitional symbols F, G and К respectively, then we obtain 74 
additional D¡- and D2-valid formulas.1 For instance, the formula which results by 
substituting in (28) is the D,- and D2-valid formula '(F θ G = 1) & CanDoF(í,^) 
-^ ~СапОо
с
а,,~ф)\ 
A2.2 Proposition The following formulas are C2- and £>2-valid. 
Since formula number (1) of A2 1 does not change by this procedure, 75 - 1 = 74 new formulas 
result 
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(1) May-Do^.q)) -> May-Do^.cp) 
(2) (/ * ƒ> & MayDo^cp) -> -MayDo/^,-φ) 
(3) (/ *j)& MayDo^cp) -> -MayDÓ/^,-φ) 
(4) ShallDo^q)) -> ShallDo^cp) 
The reader can check that an application of the substitution procedure described 
above yields four more D2-valid formulas. 
A2.3 Proposition The formulas (1) - (3) in the following list are Dj- and D2-valid, 
whereas (4) are (5) are only D2-valid. 
(1) Dof(/,,<p) & (F « G) -> Doc(i,,9) 
(2) CanDo/Κί,,φ) & (F « G) -» CanDoG(/,,(p) 
(3) CanDo^ip) & CanDoG(/,,y) & ( F ® C = l ) - > CanDof + G(r,,(p & ψ) 
(4) MayDo^/,,φ) & MayDo^f,^) & {F Φ G = 1) -• MayDoF + G(f,,cp & ψ) 
(5) MayD0f{r,,<p) & (F « G) -> MayDoc(r,,(p) 
Appendix 3 
Atomic types of rights 
The list of Kanger atomic types of rights is [Kanger and Ranger, 1966, 93-4] 
List 1 
1.1 Power, not immunity, counterpowcr, not countenmmunity 
1.2 Nol power, immunity, not counterpower, countenmmunity 
1.3 Claim, not counterfrccdom 
1.4 Not claim, power, immunity, counterfreedom, not counterpower, not countenmmunity 
1.5 Power, immunity, counterpower, countenmmunity 
1.6 Claim, power, counterfreedom 
1.7 Claim, not power 
1 8 Power, immunity, counterfreedom, not counterpower, countenmmunity 
1.9 Power, immunity, counterpower, not countenmmunity 
1.10 Power, not immunity, not counterpower, countenmmunity 
1.11 Not freedom, counterclaim 
1.12 Freedom, not power, not immunity, not counterclaim, counterpower, countenmmunity 
1.13 Freedom, counterclaim, counterpower 
1.14 Counterclaim, not counterpower 
1.15 Freedom, not power, immunity, counterpowcr, countenmmunity 
1.16 Power, not immunity, counterpowcr, countenmmunity 
1.17 Not power, immunity, counterpower, not countenmmunity 
1.18 Not power, not immunity, not counterpower, not counlerimmuruty 
1.19 Not claim, not counterfreedom, not countenmmunity 
1.20 Not counterfreedom, counteriminunily 
1.21 Not claim, not power, immunity, not counterpower, not countenmmunity 
1 22 Power, not immunity, not counterpower, not counlerimmuruty 
1 23 Not freedom, not immunity, not counterclaim 
1 24 Not freedom, immunity 
1.25 Not power, not immunity, nol counterclaim, nol counterpower, countenmmunity 
1.26 Not power, not immunity, counterpower, not countenmmunity. 
Each of the entries y on this list should be read as 'agent 7", has versus agent T 2 the simple type of 
right y with respect to (x,T
v
T2)'. For instance, 'claim' stands for 'agenl T( has versus agent T2 a claim 
with respect to (г,Г, ,Г2)'. 
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The list of all atomic types of rights (of class k) in C¡ (£>[) is (к is 1 or 2): 
LISI 2 
2.1 Claim, not freedom 
2.2 Claim, freedom, not power, counterpower 
2.3 Claim, power, nol counterpower, counlerfreedom 
2.4 Claim, not counterfreedom 
2.5 Claim, power, counterpower 
2.6 Claim, not power, not counterpower 
2.7 Not freedom, counterclaim 
2.8 Not freedom, not claim, immunity, nol counlerimmunity 
2 9 Not freedom, not immunity, not countcrimmunity 
2.10 Not freedom, immunity, countcrimmunity 
2.11 Not freedom, not immunity, counlerimmunity, not counterclaim 
2.12 Counterclaim, not counterfreedom 
2.13 Counterclaim, power, not counterpower, counterfreedom 
2.14 Counterclaim, not power, not counterpower 
2.15 Counterclaim, power, counlcrpowcr 
2.16 Counterclaim, freedom, not power, counterpower 
2.17 Not counterfreedom, not claim, immunity, not counlerimmunity 
2.18 Not counterfreedom, nol immunity, not counlerimmunity 
2.19 Not counterfreedom, immunity, countenmmunily 
2 20 Not counterfreedom, not immunity, countcrimmunity, not counterclaim 
2.21 Not claim, immunity, not countenmmunily, power, not counterpower, counterfreedom 
2 22 Immunity, countenmmunily, power, not counterpower, counterfreedom 
2.23 Not immunity, not counlerimmunity, power, not counterpower, counterfreedom 
2.24 Not immunity, countenmmunily, not counterclaim, power, not counterpower, 
counterfreedom 
2.25 Not claim, immunity, not countenmmunity, power, counterpower 
2.26 Immunity, countenmmunity, power, counterpower 
2.27 Not immunity, not counlerimmunity, power, counterpower 
2.28 Not immunity, countenmmunity, not counterclaim, power, counterpower 
2 29 Not claim, immunity, not countenmmunity, not power, not counterpower 
2.30 Immunity, countenmmunity. not power, not counterpower 
2.31 Not immunity, not counlcnmmumty, not power, not counterpower 
2 32 Not immunity, counlerimmunity, not counterclaim, not power, not counterpower 
2.33 Not claim, immunity, not counlerimmunity, freedom, not power, counterpower 
2.34 Immunity, counlerimmunity, freedom, not power, counterpower 
2.35 Not immunity, not counlcriinmunily, freedom, not power, counterpower 
2.36 Not immunity, counlerimmunity, not counterclaim, freedom, not power, counterpower 
2 
The entries of this list and those of list 3 should be read as follows Firstly, in the context of DLA: 
given a wff φ of DLA describing a stale of affairs between two individuals denoted by / and J (ι * j) 
and a free temporal symbol lk, each enlry у stands for 'at time (¿, ; has versus j the simple type of right 
у (class k) with respect to φ' Secondly, in DLA* given a wff φ of DLA* describing a state of affairs 
between two agent designated by 7"j and Tj, an enlry у stands for· 'at time <t, Ту has versus Tj the 
simple type of nght у (class k) with respect to φ' 
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The atomic types of rights (of class k) in C2 are (k is 1 or 2): 
List 3 
3.1 Claim 
3.2 Not counlenmmunity, power, nol claim 
3.3 Nol countenmmunity, not power, immunity 
3.4 Not countenmmunity, not immunity 
3.5 Not counterpower, countenmmunity, power 
3 6 Not counterpower, countenmmunity, not power, immunity 
3.7 Not counterpower, countenmmunity, not immunity 
3.8 Counterpower, power 
3 9 Counterpower, not power, immunity 
3 10 Counterpower, not immunity, not counterclaim 
3 11 Counterclaim 
Given a wff φ of DLA* and two disjoint agent designators Ti and T2 (Γ, θ T2 = 
J.), list 3 can also be read as the list of all atomic rights-type (class k) existing 
between Ту and T2 in D2. The entries ν should then be read as Tj has versus T2 the 
simple type of right у (class k) with respect to φ' (φ is a wff describing a state of 
affairs between Γ, and T2). The list of all atomic rights-type between two non-
disjoint agents in D2 is: 
List 4 
4.1 Claim 
4.2 Not counterpower, power, immunity, countenmmunity 
4.3 Not counterpower, not claim, power, immunity, not countenmmunity 
4 4 Not counterpower, power, not immunity, countenmmunity 
4 5 Not counterpower, power, not immunity, not countenmmunity 
4.6 Not counterpower, not power, immunity, countenmmunity 
4 7 Not counterpower, nol power, immunity, not countenmmunity 
4 8 Not counterpower, nol power, not immunity, counterimmumly 
4 9 Not counterpower, not power, not immunity, not countenmmunity 
4 10 Counterpower, not countenmmunity, power, immunity 
4.11 Counterpower, not countenmmunity, power, not immunity 
4.12 Counterpower, not countenmmunity, not power, immunity 
4 13 Counterpower, not countenmmunity, nol power, not immunity 
4.14 Counterpower, countenmmunity, power, immunity 
4 15 Counterpower, counlenmmunily, power, not immunity 
4 16 Counterpower, countenmmunity, not power, immunity 
4.17 Counterpower, countenmmunity, not power, nol immunity, nol counterclaim 
4 18 Counterclaim 
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Samenvatting 
Rechten, Liberalisme en Sociale Keuze. Een logische en speltheoretische analyse 
van individuele en collectieve rechten. 
Ruim twee decennia geleden toonde Amartya Sen aan dat er geen sociale 
beslissingsfunctie bestaat die zowel voldoet aan de Pareto-conditie als aan een 
conditie van minimaal liberalisme. De Pareto-conditie eist dat een alternatief niet 
mag worden gekozen wanneer er een alternatief voorhanden is dat alle individuen 
prefereren. Het liberale principe stelt dat individuen het recht hebben om bepaalde 
zaken zelf te beslissen. Bij de formulering van zijn stelling maakte Sen gebruik van 
het kader van de sociale keuzetheorie, het gedeelte van de rationele keuzetheorie dat 
zich vooral bezighoudt met de formele analyse van de procedurele aspecten van 
besluitvormingsprocessen. Gebruik makend van hetzelfde formeel-analytische kader 
formuleerde Alan Gibbard een sterkere definitie van het liberale principe. Hij liet 
vervolgens zien dat geen enkele sociale beslissingsfunctie voldoet aan dat principe, 
zelfs niet als de Pareto-conditie wordt losgelaten. 
De twee resultaten werden bekend als Sens respectievelijk Gibbards liberale 
paradox en hebben vele reacties opgeroepen. Een belangrijk deel van die reacties 
had betrekking op het analytische kader dat door Sen en Gibbard wordt gebruikt. In 
het kader van de sociale keuzetheorie worden individuele rechten, en bijgevolg het 
liberale principe, gedefinieerd in termen van de preferenties van individuen. Zoals 
door verschillende auteurs is betoogd correspondeert een dergelijke wijze van 
definiëren niet altijd met onze intuïties betreffende het karakter van individuele 
rechten. Er is dan ook voorgesteld een alternatief formeel-analytisch kader voor de 
analyse van individuele rechten te hanteren, namelijk dat van de speltheorie. De 
speltheorie is de tak van de rationele keuzetheorie die zich vooral richt op de 
strategische aspecten van besluitvormingsprocessen. In speltheoretische 
benaderingen worden individuele rechten beschreven in termen van individuele 
strategieën en de bij die strategieën mogelijke uitkomsten. Omdat daarbij niet 
verwezen wordt naar individuele preferenties, worden de problemen die de Sen- en 
Gibbard-benadering oproepen vermeden. Inmiddels lijkt er binnen de rationele 
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keuzetheorie consensus te bestaan over de juistheid van de speltheoretische 
benadering. 
Echter ook de speltheoretische beschrijvingen en analyses van rechten hebben 
tekortkomingen. In de eerste plaats zijn veel van de beschouwingen gericht op de 
analyse van specifieke besluitvormingssituaties; de analyses missen een fundering in 
een meer algemeen kader. Ten tweede lijkt verondersteld te worden dat de 
strategieën die gebruikt worden om de rechten van een individu te beschrijven het 
betreffende individu ook daadwerkelijk ter beschikking staan. Het is echter niet 
onredelijk om te veronderstellen dat een individu een recht op iets kan hebben, ook 
al heeft hij of zij niet het vermogen om de betreffende stand van zaken te 
realiseren. Ten derde is het niet altijd duidelijk of, en zo ja hoe, binnen de modellen 
een systematisch definiëren en categoriseren van verschillende typen van rechten 
mogelijk is. 
Het kan opmerkelijk genoemd worden dat het debat binnen de rationele 
keuzetheorie grotendeels heeft plaatsgevonden zonder verwijzing naar of toepassing 
van inzichten uit de deontische logica, de tak van de logica die zich bezighoudt met 
onder meer de formele analyse van individuele en collectieve rechten. In het 
onderhavige onderzoek wordt getracht een synthese tot stand te brengen tussen de 
speltheoretische benaderingen en de inzichten uit de deontische logica. Betoogd 
wordt dat deze synthese resulteert in een speltheoretisch model dat gebruikt kan 
worden voor de beschrijving en analyse van rechten zonder dat het de genoemde 
tekortkomingen vertoont. 
In de Hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 6 wordt het speltheoretische model ontwikkeld. In 
Hoofdstuk 2 wordt in de traditie van de deontische logica een formele taal 
geconstrueerd. Deze taal, DLA ('Deontic Logic of Action'), bevat uitspraken over 
de consequenties van (a) handelingen die individuen kunnen uitvoeren, (b) 
handelingen die individuen mogen uitvoeren, en (c) handelingen die individuen 
daadwerkelijk uitvoeren. Nadat de syntaxis is uiteengezet, wordt in Hoofdstuk 3 
beschreven wanneer een uitspraak van DLA waar genoemd kan worden: de 
semantiek van de taal wordt gepresenteerd. Een uitspraak is in deze semantiek 
alleen waar binnen de context van een modelstructuur. Een modelstructuur bestaat 
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onder meer uit een verzameling punten die op een bepaalde wijze gerelateerd zijn. 
Bij elk punt in de structuur horen een model van de eerste-orde predikatenlogica (de 
'basislogica'), een tijdstip, en twee typen besluitvormingssituaties die door middel 
van spelkiemen worden beschreven. Er is één spelkiem ('game form') die gebruikt 
wordt om te bepalen wat de individuen kunnen (en niet kunnen) doen. Daarnaast 
heeft iedere actor zijn of haar eigen spelkiem die bepaalt wat hij of zij mag (en niet 
mag) doen. Een modelstructuur kan gezien worden als een Kripke-systeem van 
mogelijk werelden. Het verschilt echter van het standaard Kripke-systeem omdat de 
toegankelijkheidsrelatie tussen de diverse punten (de 'mogelijke werelden') niet een 
primitieve van het model is, maar beschreven wordt in speltheoretische termen. 
Niet alleen individuen kunnen of mogen er op toe zien dat bepaalde situaties 
worden gerealiseerd, ook coalities van individuen kunnen of mogen dat. De taal 
DLA bevat geen mogelijkheid om samenwerking tussen individuen te beschrijven. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt de syntaxis en de semantiek van de taal DLA* gepresenteerd. 
DLA* is een uitbreiding van DLA. De taal bevat ook uitspraken over de permissies 
en verplichtingen van groepen van individuen. 
Omdat de waarheid van een uitspraak van DLA (of DLA*) bepaald wordt met 
betrekking tot een modelstructuur, zijn de eigenschappen van modelstructuren in 
belangrijke mate bepalend voor de logische relaties tussen de uitdrukkingen van de 
taal. In Hoofdstuk 5 worden door middel van effectiviteitsfuncties verschillende 
eigenschappen van modelstructuren onderscheiden. Vervolgens wordt voor elk van 
die eigenschappen aangetoond dat bepaalde typen uitspraken altijd waar zijn in 
modelstructuren met de betreffende eigenschap. 
De formele talen DLA en DLA* bevatten uitspraken die de permissies en 
verplichtingen van actoren beschrijven, maar niet expliciet de rechten van die 
actoren. De logicus Stig Kanger heeft laten zien hoe men rechten kan definiëren in 
termen van de permissies en verplichtingen van individuen. Bovendien heeft hij een 
typologie van rechten ontwikkeld. In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt Kangers theorie gebruikt 
voor de definitie van individuele en collectieve rechten binnen de speltheoretische 
context van een model structuur. 
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Na aldus een nieuw speltheoretisch model ontwikkeld te hebben, wordt in 
Hoofdstuk 7 onderzocht welke betekenis de liberale paradoxen kunnen hebben 
binnen dit model. Daarbij wordt in navolging van Sen en Gibbard verondersteld dat 
liberalisme impliceert dat individuen een persoonlijke levenssfeer hebben 
waarbinnen zij zelf mogen bepalen wat zij doen. Vervolgens wordt uiteengezet dat 
Sens liberale paradox speltheoretisch 'vertaald' kan worden als een spanning tussen 
de wens tot Pareto-optimaliteit enerzijds en de wens tot individueel stabiele 
uitkomsten (Nash-evenwichten) anderzijds. De vertaling van Gibbards liberale 
paradox laat zien dat er besluitvormingssituaties bestaan waarin in het geheel geen 
Nash-evenwichten zijn, zelfs geen suboptimale. 
In Hoofdstuk 8 keren we terug naar het oorspronkelijke kader van Sen, de sociale 
keuzetheorie. We houden ons dan niet meer bezig met de wijze waarop (individuele 
en collectieve) rechten deel uitmaken van het besluitvormingsproces, maar richten 
ons op de besluitvorming over de allocatie van rechten. Omdat het gaat om de 
besluitvorming over besluitvormingsprocedures betreft het constitutionele 
besluitvorming. In het bijzonder zijn we geïnteresseerd in de formulering van 
liberale principes van constitutionele besluitvorming. Daartoe breiden we het kader 
van de sociale keuzetheorie uit door de introductie van vergelijkingen van de mate 
van individuele vrijheid in de diverse alternatieven. Met behulp van zowel 
individuele preferentierelaties als de genoemde individuele vrijheidsrelaties worden 
liberale principes van constitutionele besluitvorming gedefinieerd. Aangetoond 
wordt dat de door Sen en Gibbard geschetste spanningen terugkeren op het 
constitutionele niveau: we formuleren twee paradoxen van constitutioneel 
liberalisme. We laten echter ook zien dat het door middel van domein-restricties 
niet al te niet moeilijk is 'oplossingen' te vinden voor deze paradoxen. 
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Stellingen 
behorende bij het proefschrift van Martin van Hees, Rights, Liberalism and Social 
Choice, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 7 december 1994. 
1. Voor de analyse van individuele en collectieve rechten is de speltheorie meer 
geschikt dan de sociale keuzetheorie. 
2. Sens kritiek op de consistentie-axioma's van de rationele keuzetheorie berust 
op een onjuiste interpretatie van het begrip 'social state'. 
(A.K. Sen, "Internal consistency of choice", Econometrica, 61, 1993, 499-
521) 
3. Riker negeert in zijn verdediging van de liberale democratie-opvatting de 
liberale paradoxen van Sen en Gibbard. Van een adequate confrontatie 
tussen de sociale keuzelheorie en de democratie-theorie is daarom geen 
sprake. 
(W. H. Riker, Liberalism against Populism. A confrontation between the 
theory of democracy and the theory of social choice, San Fransisco: Free-
man, 1982) 
4. De stelling van Arrow zegt dat er geen besluitvormingsprocedure is die (1) 
Pareto-optimaliteit garandeert, (2) geen dictator kent, (3) onafhankelijk is 
van irrelevante alternatieven, en (4) voor iedere combinatie van individuele 
preferentie-ordeningen een sociale ordening genereert. Het bestaan van 
besluitvormingsprocedures die voldoen aan de eerste drie eisen en die soms 
een sociale ordening genereren is geen empirisch tegenvoorbeeld. 
(Contra: H. Pellikaan, Anarchie, Staat en het Prisoner's Dilemma, Delft: 
Eburon, 1994) 
5. Het is twijfelachtig of de gevangenen van het oorspronkelijke Prisoners' 
Dilemma een permanente herhaling van het spel zelf als een oplossing van 
het dilemma zouden hebben beschouwd. 
6. Binnen de leer der internationale betrekkingen moet het neoliberaal institutio-
nalisme worden gezien als een generalisatie van het realisme; het is geen 
alternatief paradigma. 
(Contra: J.M. Grieco, Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist 
critique of the newest liberal institutionalism, International Organization, 42, 
1988. 485-508) 
7. Dat de introductie van een norm een sociaal dilemma kan oplossen sluit niet 
uit dat een sociaal dilemma ook het gevolg van een norm kan zijn. 
(Vgl. E. UUmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1977) 
8. Het Nederlandse kiesstelsel schendt een conditie van monotoniciteit: een 
partij kan zowel procentueel als absoluut meer stemmen halen en toch 
achteruit gaan in zetelaantal. 
9. Wetenschappelijke relevantie impliceert maatschappelijke relevantie. 
10. Voor een goed begrip van een literair werk is vooral dat werk van belang. 
11. De calculerende burger vormt alleen dan een probleem wanneer de overheid 
niet calculeert. 


